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In Germany, in the past few years, notably since the fall of 2015, a debate about 
migration and integration has gained a dominant position in the national public discourse. 
The opposing stances in that discourse are represented by, on one side, the rejection or 
limitation of migration, and on the other side, the welcoming of migrants and refugees. 
The former side usually supports claims which demand the newcomers to assimilate into 
the German society and culture. The latter prefers and desires a symmetric learning 
process. 
The debate usually is accompanied by discussions about how the German society defines 
its own national identity and its culture. Within those discussions, the opposing poles are 
represented by (1) the idea of an – by tendency -ethnic and religious more or less 
homogenic national identity based on a core leading culture (Leitkultur), and by (2) a 
multicultural, multi-ethnic and multi-religious approach which stands on the foundation 
of common basic values and norms (conviviality). As a consequence of the debate, the 
meaning of notions such as identity, nation, and citizenship are discussed and redefined. 
This thesis questions how the perception of national identity shapes the opinion and 
approach on the integration debate among the local population. 
I conducted research in Lauchringen, Germany, a village of around 8000 inhabitants near 
the Swiss border. I discovered that all participants, from a moral standpoint, agreed on 
helping and taking in those who need help. However, the opinions on how the integration 
process should take place and be played out differed significantly for participants, 
depending on how the participants national identity was displayed. 
Participants who tend to support an homogenic and rather exclusive approach of 
Leitkultur expressed themselves in favor of assimilation, often in combination with 
devaluating comments about the culture and religion of newcomers from predominantly 
Muslim countries. 
Differently, a symmetric learning process to achieve a successful integration is usually 
promoted by participants who embody a multicultural, inclusive, and civic national 
identity. 





En Allemagne, pendant les dernières années, surtout depuis automne 2015, une 
discussion concernant la migration et l’intégration a pris du poids dans le débat public. 
Dans ce débat, les différents points de vue sont représentés par le rejet ou la restriction de 
migration d’un côté et de l’autre, par l’idée de faire bon accueil aux migrants et aux 
réfugiés. Cette première position réclame aux nouveaux arrivés de s’assimiler à la société 
et à la culture allemandes. La seconde position préfère et souhaite un processus 
d’apprentissage symétrique. 
Souvent dans ce débat, la question de comment la société allemande définit sa propre 
identité nationale et aussi sa culture est posée. Pour répondre à cette question cette 
première position (restrictive) accentue l’idée d’une identité nationale homogène qui 
repose sur l’ethnie et la religion – ce qui est représenté par la culture dominante 
(Leitkultur). La seconde position (d’accueil) souligne une approche multiculturelle, 
multi-ethnique et multi-religieuse. Cette approche est fondée sur l'idée des grandes 
valeurs (dont la convivialité). Ce débat donne lieu à une redéfinition des expressions 
« identité », « nation » et « citoyenneté ». 
Ce mémoire questionne l’interrelation entre les perceptions de l’identité nationale et la 
notion d’intégration au sein d’une population donnée.  
J’ai mené cette recherche à Lauchringen en Allemagne, un village de 8000 habitants à la 
frontière suisse. J’ai découvert que tous les participants sont d’accord sur le fait d’aider et 
d’accueillir ceux qui ont besoin d’aide. Néanmoins les opinions diffèrent 
significativement concernant la question de comment le processus d’intégration devrait se 
dérouler. Ces opinions divergentes s’arriment à différentes façons de penser l’identité 
nationale. 
Les participants qui favorisent l’approche homogène et exclusive de la Leitkultur mettent 
l’accent sur l’assimilation, souvent combinée avec des commentaires péjoratifs à propos 
de la culture et de la religion des nouveaux arrivés, souvent originaires de pays 
musulmans. 
Par contre, les participants favorisant le processus d’apprentissage symétrique expriment 
l’idée d’une identité nationale caractérisée par une approche multiculturelle et inclusive. 
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(Former) insider on the outside looking in 
Shortly after having moved to Montréal from Germany in January 2015 – to pursue my 
studies at Université de Montréal – I experienced a greater deal of a ‘culture shock’ than I 
had anticipated. After having spent two years in the timespan of 2009-2013 in Rwanda 
where I experienced less of a ‘culture shock’, I had told myself that the transition from 
Germany to Canada would go as smooth as the last time I lived outside of Germany.  
Once I realized that this was not the case I consciously started – until then it probably 
already happened subconsciously – to compare Canada and Germany. While doing so, I 
began to develop another perspective towards Germany. At first, those comparisons 
turned my interest towards the question of how integration in Germany takes place and 
how the German majority society is integrated.  When, in the summer and fall of 2015, a 
disproportionally high number of refugees reached Germany, a political and public 
debate about migration, integration, national identity and culture dominated the public 
discourse as the media intensively covered issues surrounding the debate. 
While I followed this debate from afar – through German online media as well as through 
regular phone conversations with my mother, my sister, and my friends who all lived in 
Germany at the time – it became obvious that the opinions about how to deal with the 
arrival of the refugees (entailing questions of how integration should take place and what 
migration means to German national identity and German culture) varied extensively 
throughout the public discourse as well as within my environment of friends and family. 
Being outside of Germany amplified my own interest in how one’s own identity is shaped 
by the country one grows up in and is usually affiliated to by citizenship. This resulted in 
my decision to do research on and write this thesis about how national identity shapes the 
perception of integration among the local population of my hometown.  






Overview of the thesis 
In chapter 1 (Problem), I will give a short introduction of the current integration debate in 
Germany. This includes highlighting the different positions within the debate as well as 
outlining key-notions of the debate such as identity and the othering of Muslims. Further 
the use of the term integration within the debate and how it affects the debate is 
portrayed. 
In chapter 2 (Theoretical inspiration), the theoretical framework of my research and this 
thesis will be portrayed. This will enable the reader to see how key notions are 
intertwined but all equally important in order to understand how national identity can 
affect the opinion on the integration process. This chapter entails a look at the notion of 
integration at first, including its ambiguities and ties to the term assimilation. Following, 
the term identity and its different subcategories such as national, collective, and ethno-
cultural identity will be discussed. The notions of alterity and otherness will also be 
discussed. To close out chapter two, the concepts of a nation, nation-state, and citizenship 
as a criterion of belonging to a nation-state will be examined. 
In the third chapter (German context) I focus on the key notions in relation to the German 
context. Here it shall be portrayed how concepts such as national identity and citizenship 
came to life and how they are applied in German society. Since my fieldwork took place 
in a village, the difference of urban and rural settings, in regard to how integration is 
approached and achieved, will be highlighted as well. 
In chapter 4 (Methodology, Ethnography, Reflexion), I will first expose the process 
leading me to find the research topic and the questions relevant for this thesis. Following 
a description of the methodological approach including the methodological tools I used 
for this endeavor, I will give an ethnography on Lauchringen and the informants who 
participated in my research. To finalize chapter 4, I shall discuss the notions of 
intersubjectivity and native anthropology in regard of the interactions with my 
environment during my fieldwork. 
The fifth chapter (Results, Analysis, Discussion) entails the presentation of my results 
including its analysis and discussion. Here the focus lies on how interactions with 
migrants, children of migrants, and/or refugees possibly shapes the participants practice 
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of othering. It is then examined how the process of othering impacts the establishment of 
a national identity which in return will show how national identity affects the approach 
towards the integration process. 
To conclude the thesis, in chapter 6, I will discuss how national identity impacts the 





















“We are living in a world of globalization, which brings different traditions and 
civilizations into closer and closer contact.” (Rüsen 2004: 118). One form of this 
phenomenon is currently happening in Germany where the local population is exposed to 
new influences due to the arrival of refugees over the past few years.  
The year 2015 must be highlighted, given the fact that around one million refugees 
reached Germany (lpb 2017), which resulted in 476.649 asylum demands (Brühl 2016). 
Since that number was significantly higher compared to the two previous years – 2013: 
127.000 asylum demands, 2014: 202.000 asylum demands –, the remarkable influx 
during 2015 sparked a political and societal debate about migration and integration in 
Germany (lpb 2017).  
A political controversy flared up after the German Chancellor Angela Merkel decided to 
take in the refugees who were stranded on the Balkan-route in the fall of 2015 (Monklet 
2016). This controversy is about whether Germany should remain a – by tendency – 
ethnic homogeneous nation-state, allegedly shaped by a Christian core culture 
(Leitkultur), or more so a society in which people from different backgrounds – ethnic, 
cultural, religious, multicultural that is – live together (Münkler 2016). These two 
diverging approaches constitute the central question of the political debate (Münkler 
2016). 
The political debate and its intensive coverage by the media also shaped the debate 
among the local population. While some see newcomers as a source of enrichment and 
strengthening beneficial to an open society, others view them as a potential threat to both 
national security and national identity (Münkler 2016). These different approaches 
became visible through various events that have occurred since the fall of 2015. 
In the early fall of 2015, at the central station of Munich and other cities across Germany, 
welcoming manifestations were held by Germans for the newcomers who arrived. Those 
manifestations can be seen as counter manifestations to the attacks on refugee houses 
which had increased significantly during the summer of 2015. While those attacks were 
sending the message to the newcomers and to those who were thinking of coming to 
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Germany that refugees were neither welcome nor safe in Germany, the welcoming 
manifestations aimed at showing another, friendly and open Germany (Münkler 2016). 
At first, the optimism of those who supported the welcoming culture 
(Willkommenskultur) with its slogan “Refugees welcome” seemed to dominate the public 
discourse. This was accompanied by beliefs that the integration of refugees is achievable, 
with the host society taking responsibility for the integration process as much as the 
newcomers. However, soon after, voices critical of the recent migration, mixed with 
resentments against refugees, became louder throughout society (Paulsen, Kortsch, 
Naegele, Mobach, Neumann 2016). 
The movement PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident), 
and with it the slogan “Lügenpresse” (lying press), gained momentum. This slogan was 
used to attack and break the interpretational sovereignty of the quality press and to make 
room for conspiracy theories such as the current migration being a secret plan to 
exchange the German people (Münkler 2016). 
The debate grew heated, especially after the new year’s evening of 2015/2016. During 
celebrations in German cities, specifically Cologne, Hamburg and Stuttgart, sexual 
assaults in disproportional high numbers took place. The perpetrators were mostly men of 
North-African or Arabic origin. However, not all of them were refugees and only a small 
part had come to Germany in 2015 (Münkler 2016). Nonetheless, it took the intensity of 
the debate about integration to new heights. In the populistic discourse it has become 
normal to see refugees as a threat, as intruders or parasites (Friese 2017). 
Roughly a year later, on December the 19th 2016, a terror attack on a Christmas market in 
Berlin, carried out by an Islamic terrorist, contributed to the erosion of trust among the 
population towards justice and security authorities (Fiedler, Jansen, Beikler 2018). As a 
response, the asylum law was accentuated by the government (WELT 2017). 
Some might even argue that this debate –   
“In Germany, the multiculturalism debate is really a debate about the protracted problem 
of nationhood after Nazism, and it is led in virtual absence of the foreigners (Ausländer) 
themselves, who are even denied the very status of immigrants.” (Joppke 1996: 455)1 –  
                                                          
1 Original citation, no modification was made. 
6 
 
has led to a division of the German society in addition to dramatical changes within the 
political landscape, namely the rise of the right-wing party AfD (Alternative für 
Deutschland) advocating for conservative and national ideals, while seeking arguably 
nationalistic aims (Münkler 2016). Since the fall of 2018, the AfD is now represented in 
every German Landtag (provincial government). 
Considering the different reactions, to the previously described events of the year 2015, 
among the local population, as well as the change of the political landscape with the rise 
of the AfD and the decline of the until now major political parties, the debate about 
integration is seemingly closely linked to the issue of how Germany and the German 
population defines and perceives itself, in short: the national identity.  
Therefore, in Germany, the debate about integration is simultaneously a debate about 
national identity.  
This seems plausible since, according to the sociologist Albert Scherr, migration must be 
considered as a “process that changes social reality and challenges the self-description of 
societies as nations.” (Scherr 2013: 4). Or as the philosopher Mark J. Barnard puts it:  
“National consciousness and identity can also be analysed by examining emotive issues 
triggering public responses, such as immigration. Immigration in Germany has provoked 
from some quarters an alleged Überfremdungsängste and concomitant fears of a loss of 
German identity.” (Barnard 2008: 19).2  
Feeding into this statement of Barnard, the economists Casey and Dustmann stated that, 
due to the recent migration movement, “’identity’ became one of the most recent 
additions to the public debate on immigration and minority related issues.” (Casey, 
Dustmann 2010: F31). 
Therefore, it seems appropriate to ask how the majority society of Germany perceives 
integration and consequently its national identity. More precisely, I want to find out how 
national identity impacts the stance on integration among the local population of my 
home-town Lauchringen. The question of how national identity shapes the perception of 
integration is, in other words, a question of how the majority group of Germany envisions 
the “vivre ensemble” with the newcomers. 
                                                          
2 Original citation, no modification made. (Author’s note: Überfremdungsängste = fear of superalienation). 
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Hence why I shall now turn towards the issues that arise out of the intersection between 
migration, integration and national identity. 
  
1.1 Identity, Alterity 
As the political scientist Mai’a K. Davis Cross states: “[…] in light of the increasing 
impact of identity on the degree and legitimacy of integration, identity and integration are 
mutually constitutive.” (Davis Cross 2012: 244). And when it comes to the question of 
identity, the term culture is not far, as the anthropologist Lauren Leve is reveals: 
“Indeed, as the space between culture (as a taken-for-granted order of symbols, 
institutions, structures, values, and/or beliefs) and identity (as a reflexive construct or 
experiential modality through which one knows oneself and claims recognition) has 
seemed to shrink, identity has become, in effect, a kind of metaculture: culture—to use 
the old Hegelian terminology—not just in itself but for itself.” (Leve 2011: 513, 514). 
In addition to the intersection of identity and culture, topics such as patriotism and 
nationalism play a role in the debate about German identity as well.   
“The central issue is whether Germany is to become a multicultural society, consisting of 
people of different ethnic origins and religions sharing common citizenship and basic 
values of a civil society, or whether it should become an ethnically homogeneous 
country” (Blank, Schmidt 2003: 290).  
It is argued that this issue bares questions of not only limiting immigration, “but also one 
of dual-citizenship (self-definition of the nation) and of voting rights for non-citizens 
(political co-determination)” (Blank, Schmidt 2003: 290). According to Azdouz3, identity 
has become – on a political level – a tool to mobilize voters (Azdouz 2018: 1). This 
underlines the importance of the question of identity – for the notion of integration – for 
majority and minority groups alike. 
This brings up the question of how Lauchringen’s local population perceives the concept 
of dual-citizenship. If integration and identity are intertwined, then notions that can 
constitute identity, such as culture, citizenship, nation, and questions of how one 
perceives those notions to define one’s own identity are of importance.  
Consequently, since Germany depends on immigration – if it wants to maintain its 
population numbers – the society must define or redefine itself and develop a new or a 
changed identity (Münkler 2016). More precisely, through the arrival of the newcomers, 
Germans are challenged to rethink their collective, or national identity and to decide what 
                                                          
3 Rachida Azdouz is a psychologist and expert on intercultural relations. 
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parts of national identity are elementary and indispensable and what parts are more likely 
belonging to the past (Münkler 2016). 
According to Herfried Münkler, a political scientist, such a collective self-reflection can – 
if it doesn’t lead to a permanent division of society – have a rejuvenating effect in which 
a political order is self-assuring and renewing itself. Such self-renewals are usually 
connected to crisis and catastrophes, in the German context for example lost wars. 
Currently such a self-renewal comes by the challenge by the foreign, the preoccupation 
with ‘the other’, through which the reassuring of the self arises. The catastrophe of ‘the 
others’, of the refugees – catastrophe as in escape, flight, and displacement – is replacing 
the experience of the own catastrophe or crisis – World War II and post-World War II era 
– at least if one doesn’t face the fate of the refugees with complete indifference. Hence 
why ‘the other’ matters.  More specifically the question of how to deal with ‘the other’, 
how much foreignness the Germans want to bear and where the approximation towards 
‘the others’ from their own self is indispensable (Münkler 2016).  
This shows that the notion of alterity and otherness is also relevant, along with national 
identity, when it comes to the integration debate.4 When challenged to rethink the own 
identity, one’s own history needs to be taken into account because “It is history where 
people formulate, present, and discuss their identity, their belonging to each other, their 
togetherness, and, at the same time, their differences from others.” (Rüsen 2004: 119). 
However, through the globalization process, the definition of one’s own identity becomes 
more complex. This is mostly due to the confrontation of traditional historical identities 
with steadily changing life conditions. Such accelerating change becomes a problem for 
the traditional differentiation “between the internal realm of the life of one’s own people 
and the external realm of the lives of others.” (Rüsen 2004: 119). Through, what Rüsen, a 
cultural scientist and historian, calls “universalistic elements of cultural life, such as the 
internet and important sectors of the culture industry,” the internal and external realm 
become intermixed. This calls for a redefinition of the supposed differences between 
one’s own culture and the culture of ‘the other’. Such differentiation is fundamental for 
establishing one’s identity (Rüsen 2004: 119).  
                                                          
4 The notion of alterity and otherness are included in following parts of this chapter, before being explored 
more precisely in chapter 2. Theoretical inspiration  
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Rather often, the narrative used to establish an identity is of ethnocentric nature. Such 
narratives are based on the uneven relationship between the “image of oneself and the 
different image of others in such a way that the necessary self-esteem of a powerful 
historical identity” is coming at the expense of the “otherness of others.” (Rüsen 2004: 
119). And compared to France or the USA, countries where it is more likely to find a 
civic conception of nationhood, “Germany is a prime example for continuing influences 
of ethnic understandings” (Peters 2002: 6). However, since identity usually is constituted 
of several layers of identity – multiple identities so to speak – it is plausible that 
“identities are always bound by context, and the same speakers may activate very 
different representations of the same others when the context changes. Identities are fluid 
not only across time and space, but even as they pertain to the same subjects at the same 
point in space and time.” (Neumann 1998: 400).     
This is of interest to my research. National identity may be expressed by participants in 
different ways, depending on whether they talk about citizenship, about German culture, 
or about how they define integration.  
The issues, brought to light in the wake of the recent debate about migration and 
integration, are a challenge for Germany. Münkler argues that Germany will come out of 
this challenge as a changed country. It is facing its future and is struggling with the 
question of what this future will be. And while there are several approaches and 
interpretations of integration – as it will be portrayed in chapter 2.1 –, it is undeniable that 
Germany and its population are facing an integration process after the influx of refugees 
and migrants in the past years (Münkler 2016). 
This process of integration and deciding what future Germany shall have, depends on the 
coining die of the notion of nation, or national. Münkler says it could be seen as an old 
model from the 19th century, becoming irrelevant and eventually disappear in the 21st 
century, or the idea of the national could remain a strong factor when it comes to 
developing political systems in the future. This depends mostly on how the national is 
defined: ethnic or socio-cultural? Exclusive or inclusive (Münkler 2016)? I am curious to 
see how the participants express their national identity and whether it shows to be 
oriented more towards an ethnic/exclusive or socio-cultural/inclusive identity.  
10 
 
At this point, it is useful to take a closer look at the different opinions surrounding the 
debate. Here, the different approaches on how Germany should carry itself in the wake of 
the influx of refugees in 2015 become visible. 
 
1.2 Migration and integration debate in Germany 
European societies display a cultural diversity which has become characteristic for the 
democratic Europe of today. However, there are considerable differences in how 
European societies approach both established foreigners, recent newcomers – migrants 
and refugees – and minorities overall. In other words, the dealing and embracing of 
cultural diversity across European countries differs considerably (European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles 2005). And while there might be differences, today “Toutes les 
sociétés d’accueil sont […] aux prises avec la nécessité de développer un modèle 
d’aménagement du pluralisme ou de repenser le modèle existant.” (Azdouz 2018: 28). 
Therefore, it is of interest to see how Germany and the German society define or redefine 
its understanding of itself (national identity) and its understanding of what cohesiveness 
(integration) means.  
In Germany, cultural diversity is seen quite critical – at least among a vast part of the 
majority population – if one considers the following: 
“More than one-third of Germans (30.8 percent) think that “people who have always 
lived here should have more rights than those who have moved here later.” Nearly half 
(47.1 percent) agrees with the sentence: “There are too many foreigners living in 
Germany.” A clear majority (54.1 percent) believes that “someone who is new someplace 
should be content with less in the beginning.”” (Foroutan 2013: 5). 
While such critical opinions foster perceived differences between the self and ‘the other’, 
or in this context, between the local population and the newcomers, even well-intended 
remarks can lead to a reinforced difference between the self and the other. For example, 
Angela Merkel initiated an integration-summit, only to address the ‘foreigners’ with ‘you 
should be at home here’, a phrase which reproduces the ‘we vs they’ imagination. As an 
alternative, the formulation ‘We all want to be at home here, together.’ is offered 
(Schiffer 2013: 13). The ‘we vs they’ imagination and the request-like statement ‘you 
should be at home here’ underlines what Moos, a Germanist and historian, suggests: 
Oftentimes, integration is understood in a way which results in the request for adaptation 
of migrants to the majority society (Moos 2010), a request which places the responsibility 
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for a successful integration on the migrants, and simultaneously gives the major society 
the interpretational sovereignty over the integration debate. 
It is argued that German society is at a starting point of a learning process towards 
managing inclusion and diversity, something that will become more and more important 
as Germany itself becomes increasingly diverse, ethnically and culturally that is (Bither, 
Ziebarth 2016). Or in other words:  
“In terms of actively embracing this diversity both in policy and public perception, 
Germany is still at the beginning of its own learning process. The future of social 
cohesion and integration success will also in large part depend on supporting diversity 
and inclusion policies and civil society initiatives as well as good communication with 
the receiving society about immigration and integration.” (Bither, Ziebarth 2016: 17). 
Therefore, the integration process outcome strongly depends on the local population. It is 
argued that natives tend to ostracize and stigmatize newcomers when it is thought that 
newcomers are not committed enough to assimilation (Maxwell 2017). Such commitment 
is often judged and evaluated by the local population based on the national, ethnic, 
religious, and cultural background of the newcomers. It was found that newcomers who 
share the same race, skin color, or religion as the host-society population are more likely 
to be commonly accepted. Further, if the newcomers come from a country which is 
considered culturally similar or compatible with the culture of the host-society, the 
chance of being accepted from the local population also increases (Maxwell 2017).  
An indicator for the growing importance of the notion of culture within the integration 
debate is the following. As result of the Integration Law of 2016, the integration courses 
for newcomers now include almost twice as many units about norms, values, and cultural 
habits as the previous integration courses (Bither, Ziebarth 2016). The importance of the 
question of cultural compatibility for the integration debate seems to be undeniable.  
In general, the two opposing standpoints in the migration and integration debate support 
either a positive (welcoming) or negative (rejecting) approach on migration. While those 
1) who are against the immigration (of refugees) can be separated – based on their 
arguments – into at least two groups, others 2) welcome immigration and oppose the idea 
of the ethnic coherent nation-state by saying that Germany hasn’t been that since a long 
time (Münkler 2016). 
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Münkler differs between the 1a) right-extremists who support a program of ethnic-
cultural revision where the growing diversity should be reversed, and the 1b) right-wing-
populists who reject any further immigration, based not necessarily on ethnic reasons, but 
who justify their rejection of immigration on a disposition which perceives Islam critical 
if not as a threat. Among this group it is claimed that Muslims are trying to Islamize 
European societies through an undisclosed strategy (Münkler 2016). 
This being said, there does not seem to be a political unitary amongst right-conservatives, 
right-nationals, and right-radicals. However, what unifies these groups, is the rejection of 
the refugee and migration politics of the government (Münkler 2016). Meanwhile, In the 
summer of 2016 the first complete Integration Law was passed in Germany.5 This 
integration law – by looking at the main measures of it – is seemingly mostly targeting 
those refugees and asylum seekers who are in Germany since 2015. Angela Merkel called 
the law a ‘milestone’. However, the law also got criticized for implying the assumption 
that the newcomers are generally unwilling to integrate (Bither, Ziebarth 2016). At the 
same time, those who support or salute an open migrant society and those who are 
positive towards it, are not a coherent group either (Münkler 2016). 
On one hand, there are those who 2a) support an open society – which includes the 
acceptance of migration – in general but are skeptical if the German society can absorb 
the annual intake of one million refugees. On the other hand, there are those who 2b) 
consider the concept of a post-migrant society as a stratagem to not only surpass the 
national-cultural imprint of society but also to surmount the nation-state as such.  
Between those two views, one finds the supporters of conviviality who 2c) advocate an 
ideal of living together where people, regardless of their ethnic background or religious 
beliefs, are attached to each other in solicitude. Conviviality is understood as a concept 
where everybody changes to get along with each other. The integration concept of 
                                                          
5 “Main measures of the new integration law include: 1) mandatory integration and language courses for those asylum 
seekers most likely to become recognized refugees, sanctions through cut of benefits for those who fail to attend; 2) 
restriction to choice of residence location in the first three years for those asylum seekers unable to fully provide for 
themselves; 3) suspension in most parts of Germany of the priority review regulation for job openings for the next three 
years which requires that employers can only give a job to an asylum seeker if no German nor EU citizen is available 
for the job; 4) creation of 100,000 low-skilled job opportunities for asylum seekers in mostly municipal or welfare 
organisations, such as handing out food in refugee shelters or taking care of green spaces. Source: Bundesregierung, 
“Grünes Licht im Bundesrat. Integrationsgesetz setzt auf Fördern und Fordern,“ July 8, 2016. https://www. 




conviviality is not based on a one-way integration of migrants into an existing, 
homogenous society, but on a reciprocal integration of everybody into an immigration 
society in which the citizens share a common general principle (Münkler 2016).  
Conviviality can be loosely translated into “living together” (Nowicka, Vertovec 2014: 
342). Generally, conviviality tends to consider individuals in terms of their 
interrelatedness. More precisely, 
“This entails focusing on the ‘with’ of conviviality, more than on ‘living’, which […] 
opens up the path to understanding human relations in a sense of interdependency at the 
root of human existence. In this way, conviviality has a conceptual family resemblance to 
several other notions currently in public and academic circulation, including 
cosmopolitanism, civility, trust, multiculture and multiculturalism, diversity, integration, 
cohesion and social capital.” (Nowicka, Vertovec 2014: 342). 
While there seem to be resemblance between conviviality and the just mentioned notions, 
conviviality simultaneously seems to present an alternative to those approaches that focus 
on national or ethnic terms – for example the notion of multiculturalism – when looking 
at human encounters within a diverse society (Nowicka, Vertovec 2014: 342).6 
According to Paul Gilroy7  
“Conviviality is a social pattern in which different metropolitan groups dwell in close 
proximity, but where their racial, linguistic and religious particularities do not – as the 
logic of ethnic absolutism suggests they must – add up to discontinuities of experience or 
insuperable problems of communication. In these conditions, a degree of differentiation 
can be combined with a large measure of overlapping.” (Gilroy 2006: 40). 
This lets us assume conviviality as a concept which doesn’t deny the uniqueness and 
specifics of an individual and of a group the individual feels part of, while simultaneously 
offers a broader inclusive frame for each individual and for different groups.  
Additionally, conviviality also enables the individuals inside the broader inclusive frame 
to identify – at least to an extent – with the other: 
“There are institutional, demographic, generational, educational, legal and political 
commonalities as well as elective variations that intercut the dimensions of difference and 
complicate the desire to possess or manage the cultural habits of others as a function of 
one’s own relationship with identity. Conviviality acknowledges this complexity and, 
though it cannot banish conflict, can be shown to have equipped people with means of 
                                                          
6 “It goes hand in hand with the trend towards ‘active citizenship’ that privileges individuality and targets individuals as 
agents, providing them with individual opportunities and choices (Soysal, 2012). In this context emerges also the 
criticism of the ideal cosmopolitanism as unrealistic, ‘exploded’ notion (Braidotti et al., 2013). Instead, the scholars 
seek for empirically robust and constructive new foundations for cosmopolitanism, and we believe that the concept of 
‘conviviality’ is here more productive than another hyphenated mutated version of it.” (Nowicka, Vertovec 2014: 342). 
7 Paul Gilroy is a British historian and will be the founding Director of the Centre for the Study of Race and Racism at 
University College London in August 2019. 
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managing it in their own interests and in the interests of others with whom they can be 
induced heteropathically to identify.” (Gilroy 2006:40). 
Consequently, conviviality is the central theory of a post-migrant society where living 
together is understood as a symmetric learning process (Münkler 2016).  
Behind the reasoning of the post-migrant society is the claim that the classic nation-state, 
as developed in the 19th century, is replaced by an immigration-society in which migrants 
and their descendants – based on the principle of equality – can arrogate the same rights 
as the host-society, or local population, in this thesis’ context, the Germans. This, 
Münkler argues, would mean the local population should not be able to claim special 
merits which migrants would have no access to (Münkler 2016). 
Consequently, this would call for a replacement of national identity by a vision of 
cultural diversity, since national identity puts immigrants in an obligation to provide. 
Instead, Münkler argues, ‘Unity in diversity’ would be the fitting catchphrase for a post-
migrant society. The general narrative of national history would be replaced by discursive 
arenas in which permanent negotiation processes take place (Münkler 2016). 
Considering those aspects, it becomes clear what the critics of a post-migrant society are 
so heavily opposing: The end of hegemonic aspirations. Until now, German culture and 
German history had claimed those aspirations as guardians of national identity (Münkler 
2016). 
Critics of the post-migrant society however, are not only the triad of right-conservatives, 
right-nationals and right-radicals who also strongly oppose the government led by the 
conservative Party CDU (Christian Democratic Union), but also the CDU itself. As 
Scherr puts it: “Integration means, especially in the conservative political spectrum, 
assimilation in relation to what is construed as the German “leading culture” 
(‘Leitkultur’).” (Scherr 2013: 6). 
 
1.3 Leitkultur 
“[…] we live in a time in which “culture” has become a powerful form of political currency, a 
morally and legally compelling aspect of personal and collective being that can be deployed as 
the basis of political claims.” (Leve 2011: 517). 
An example of how culture takes on the form of a political currency is when the so-called 
welcoming culture (read: support of concept of multiculturalism) was countered in 2017 
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by then Minister of Interior, Thomas De Maizière (CDU) when he contributed to the 
debate about the existence or non-existence of a German core culture (Leitkultur).  
Leitkultur could be described as an idea “based on a vague concept of national identity 
based on common history and culture.” (Scherr 2013: 6). The ruling party of Germany, 
CDU, defines Leitkultur programmatically as follows: 
“In this way, Germany is more than a country of birth or a residence. Germany is our 
spiritual home (‘Heimat’) and part of our identity. Our cultural values – influenced by our 
origin in the ancient world, the Jewish-Christian tradition, enlightenment, and historical 
experiences – are the foundations for societal cohesion and, additionally, shape the 
leading culture in Germany, to which the CDU especially feels obligated. We expect that 
those who join us will both respect and acknowledge this.” (Scherr 2013: 6, 7). 
De Maizière caused a stir with publishing his propositions (Al Jazeera 2017), in the 
spring of 2017, about what is considered German and what constitutes Germany. He 
published his propositions in an article where he also stated that “migrants must accept a 
“dominant culture” that includes shaking hands and rejecting full-face veils.” (Al Jazeera 
2017: 1). He received support as well as criticism throughout the political spectrum. He 
declared that “We are an open society – we show our face.” and that “We are not burqa.”, 
while also stating that all religions are “glue for society…in the Christian Church, in the 
synagogue and in the mosque”. Nonetheless he insisted that “Our country is shaped by 
Christianity,” and that “We live in religious peace”. A circumstance which, according to 
De Maizière, is due to the “absolute supremacy of the law over all religious rules in the 
state and society.” (Dearden 2017: 1). De Maizière further argued that a consensual 
Leitkultur would support integration and foster cohesion, insisting that parts of that 
Leitkultur are non-negotiable. Those non-negotiable parts would be “mutual respect and 
the rule of law over religion” as well as the statement: “We remain part of the West, 
proud Europeans and enlightened patriots.”. The term patriot was defined by De Maizière 
as someone who “loves his country and does not hate others”, adding that the national 
anthem and the national flag are considered core parts of German identity (Dearden 2017: 
1). The statements made by De Maizière seem to underpin the point made by Scherr 
according to whom integration is understood as assimilation into the Leitkultur.  
The discussion about a Leitkultur is not a new one but resurfaced during the current 
debate about the intake of refugees when a rhetoric of a clash of cultures, including 
constructs such as a Christian-Jewish core culture and Western Christian civilization was 
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adopted (Münkler 2016). Consequently, Scherr states that the Leitkultur is “clearly 
designed to exclude Islam and Muslim immigrants.” (Scherr 2013: 7). Such sentiments 
seem to be common among the majority population in Germany, considering that, 
according to a study of 2015, 61% of Germans believe that Islam does not fit into the 
Western world, and that 57% of Germans see Islam as either dangerous or very 
dangerous (Postel 2018). This suggests that the debate is also religiously charged.8  
Originally, the term Leitkultur was coined in 1998, by “Bassam Tibi, a Syrian-born 
German political scientist in an attempt to define a set of values and norms that could 
serve as a consensual basis of European societies.” (Nordbruch 2011: 11). While this 
seems like an attempt to establish a foundation for a civic, European-wide identity, the 
meaning of the term was soon reframed, undergoing “an ethno-culturalist re-reading, 
suggesting the existence of authentically German cultural traits guiding and framing 
German social and political life” (Nordbruch 2011: 11). Following this perspective, 
immigration should only impact the demography while “culture, values and political 
structures should be protected against immigration-induced changes.” (Nordbruch 2011: 
11), which, again, hints at an understanding of integration as assimilation rather than a 
symmetric integration process. 
It could be argued that – due to an overlap between the notions of identity and culture, in 
addition to the still existing ethnic understanding of German nationhood (Peters 2002), 
and the way the term Leitkultur is mostly used in debates – Leitkultur is a construct which 
accentuates a hierarchy between the majority population (read ethnic Germans) and 
minorities (read migrants), placing the hegemony over the integration debate strongly in 
the majority population. How the local population of Lauchringen uses the concept of the 
Leitkultur within the integration debate is of interest since it reveals an important part of 
their national identity and how they perceive their own culture.  
Connected to the concept of Leitkultur is the question of how the notion of integration as 
such is perceived and used in the German context. 
 
 
                                                          
8 The islamization of the debate is highlighted in one of the following chapters (1.5) 
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1.4 Notion of integration in the German language and German debate 
The circumstance that the concept of Leitkultur attributes the interpretational sovereignty 
over the integration debate to the majority society can be explained if we look at how the 
notion of integration is used in the German language. Together, Böcker, Goel, and Heft9 
offer some insight (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010):   
From a philosophical standpoint, integration can be understood as the connection of a 
plurality and its transformation into an intrinsic coherent whole, an entireness. The 
sociological understanding of integration is one of growth of society through inclusion 
and consolidation of new members (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010).  
The definition of integration and its – to this day used – sample sentence in the German 
dictionary10: “Die I. der hier lebenden Ausländer ist nach wie vor ein dringendes 
Problem.“11  (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010: 305) is exposing the hegemonic usage of the term 
integration within the migration debate. Such perspective sees the inclusion of minorities, 
in this context the foreigners, into the ‘normal’ dominant German society as a problem or 
as problematic (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010: 305).  
If one follows this perspective, the interpretation of the concept of integration positions 
the ‘foreigners’ in another country than Germany and in another culture than the 
‘German’ culture, resulting in the drawing up of clear differences between ‘foreigners’ 
and ‘the Germans’. Further, it suggests that they – the foreigners – show deficits 
concerning German knowledge and German values, which would hinder their integration 
into the German society, the creation of an entireness (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010).  
On this basis, integration is formulated as a one-sided cultural adjustment, which must be 
made by ‘the other’ and less as a creation of equal political, economic and juridical 
participation that should be guaranteed by the majority society (Böcker, Goel, Heft 
2010). 
The vocabulary used in the current integration debate, of political, societal, and medial 
nature, supports this claim that the responsibility for an integration is put on the migrants. 
This becomes visible by looking at the following terms: integration-deficit, integration-
difficulties, integration-needy, integration-barrier, integration-obstacle or integration-
                                                          
9 Böcker, a political scientist; Goel, a social anthropologist; Heft, a cultural scientist. 
10 See: https://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/Integration  
11 Translation: The integration of the here living foreigners is still an urgent problem.  
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unwillingness. These terms ascribe a deficiency to those who are excluded from the 
majority society (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010).  
Through those terms, the deficits ascribed to the migrants serve as a justification for their 
exclusion from the majority society while constructing the majority society as the norm, 
because the terms imply that the ‘others’ should and could integrate, if they would only 
want to do so. This is rejecting any responsibility by the majority society (Böcker, Goel, 
Heft 2010).  
Another example for the hierarchy within the integration debate is the discussion about 
whether migrants have an Integrationspflicht, a duty to integrate, a duty which should be 
constituted by law, including possible sanctions for failing to integrate. Such rhetoric, 
declarations of obligation to integrate communicate mistrust, contributing to an 
estrangement of the migrants (Münkler 2016).  
This duty to integrate is understood as cultural assimilation while political, social, and to 
a lesser extent, economic integration is prevented, rendering the notion of integration 
contradictory. Those who are structurally denied access to a self-determined and equal 
societal participation, due to their otherness, are then made responsible for their lack of 
access to resources and institutions based on the argument that they would not be 
integrated well enough (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010).     
For example, migrants, especially those with a precarious residence status, have less 
access to the labor market, to educational institutions and to the cultural and social life of 
the majority society. The resulting lack of integration into those structures of the majority 
society are often perceived – from the majority society – as a lack of either integration-
willingness or integration-competence. This moves the responsibility for the alleged 
missing integration into the majority society, not only from the structural level to the 
individual level, but also from the majority society to ‘the other’, the ‘foreigners’.  Terms 
with positive connotations such as integration-will, integration-readiness or integration-
ability have the same effect (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010). 
Overall, as mentioned above, the term integration is used in the German debate in a way 
which transports a paradox demand: The existence of a difference, which should be 
removed in order to achieve integration, is the conceptual basis of the integration 
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understanding which stands on the differentiation between a ‘self’ and an ‘other’ 
(Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010). 
It is problematic that the members of the majority society claim the right to deliver 
integration-diagnosis. By determining integration-offers and integration-support and -
programs, the majority society positions itself as the norm. From this privileged position, 
integration-indicators and integration-goals are defined. This has a crucial impact on the 
‘other’. Even if they meet and fulfill the expectations, the dominant majority society still 
owns the privilege to modify the criteria for a successful or unsuccessful integration. In 
this sense, integration only exists as a demand, but never as a secure status. The ‘other’ 
can try as hard as one can, to integrate, the suspicion of only superficial and strategic 
assimilation while keeping the ‘other’ inside always remains (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010). 
If such patterns of hierarchy and interpretational sovereignty over the integration process 
are expressed by the local population will be examined. 
In Germany, ‘the other’ has become, for the most part, the Muslim. This process has been 
amplified by the events of 9/1112 and the new year’s eve 2015/201613. Naika Foroutan, 
social scientist and head of the German Centre for Integration and Migration Research, 
argues that in the German context, ‘the other’ has been – starting with the Iranian Islamic 
revolution in 1979 and intensifying after 9/11 – the ‘Muslim’ (Foroutan 2013).  
In the late 1960s Germans perceived themselves as proper, punctual and hard-working. 
As a contrast, “the figure of the immigrant – who at the time was a southern European 
guest worker from Italy, Spain, Grecce, or Turkey”, with Muslim Turks being the 
majority within the group of guestworkers – “was considered unambitious, lazy and 
always late” (Foroutan 2013: 9). 
 
1.5 Otherness - The Islamization of the debate 
With the continuation of the migration and integration debate, it became more and more 
emotionally charged (Enste, Nauck, Schneider 2016). While the number of arrived 
refugees decreased in 2016 – 280.000 registered refugees in 2016 – the public discussion 
intensified after the events of new year’s evening 2015 in German cities such as Cologne, 
                                                          
12 9/11: Terror attacks on the World Trade Center in New York and the Pentagon in Washington D.C., USA.  
13 During celebrations in German cities, specifically Cologne, Hamburg and Stuttgart, sexual assaults in disproportional 
high numbers took place. The perpetrators were mostly men of North-African or Arabic origin. 
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Hamburg and Stuttgart. Furthermore, terror attacks in Berlin and Würzburg contributed 
to the rise of insecurity and discomfort amongst the local population (lpb 2017).   
One of the fears of the local population is the potential development of parallel societies. 
Would those societies include a parallel justice, the sharia law? And would Islam, the 
religion most refugees belong to, be an obstacle for integration? Those skeptical 
questions were fueled by the imagination of a culture, impossible to neither assimilate or 
integrate. A culture, imported by the foreigners and through which they would separate 
from and oppose the culture of the host-country (Münkler 2016).  
As an argument for that reasoning, it was brought up that the Italians, Polish, Yugoslavs 
and other migrants who came to Germany and stayed, had become – more less – 
Germans, while this seemed less the case with Muslim migrants, regardless of which 
country of origin they had migrated (Münkler 2016).  
The ‘Islamization’ of the refugees and migration debate caused more obscurity than 
clarity (Münkler 2016). It became less of a rational exchange of arguments and 
knowledge but more so a debate where notions – since the rise of the Pegida movement – 
such as superalienation, Christian West, and Umvolkung (exchange of a people) became 
tools for mobilization of the political right. Those beliefs, which till then had been banned 
to the very edge of the political spectrum, gained acceptance deep into the middle of 
society. With it, new-right ideology, namely islamophobia, xenophobia and the rejection 
of the Europe-project had become socially acceptable (Münkler 2016). We shall find out 
later what role religion plays for the participants. 
For Schiffauer, a social anthropologist, the construction of the “Muslim-Other” is mainly 
based on two aspects which are considered focal in regard of the European community of 
shared values. For one, Schiffauer argues that there is a general assumption that Muslims 
are not ready for democracy, due to the lack of an enlightenment. The second point 
concerns the equality of man and woman. Usually, the Islamic family is considered a 
place of authoritarianism, patriarchalism, misogyny and domestic violence (Schiffauer 
2004).  
With this perception, the Islamic family is portrayed as the direct opposite of the 
egalitarian and liberated European family. Overall, Islam as a world religion is ascribed a 
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certain value. However, in detail it seems difficult for most Europeans to imagine the 
estimable contribution Islam could make in benefit for the European civic society, or 
what Europeans could learn from Islam. In addition to the mistrust, fear for one’s own 
identity is fueling such views, or simply put, one fears a growing influence of Muslims 
(Schiffauer 2004). 
Consequently, Münkler states that there are tendencies of making Islam responsible for 
problems of socio-cultural segregation. Such tendencies lead to problems that are 
solvable – from a social standpoint – are being declared unsolvable due to alleged 
irreversible religious influence. This reinforces Islam-labelling. It becomes evident that 
Islam is tried to be excluded from a European identity. Because the integration of 
migrants of Muslim faith is not wanted, its integration is labelled as impossible with the 
above shown reasoning (Münkler 2016).  
The self-foreign-differentiation used behind the ideology of superalination and 
Umvolkung, is tapered to the point where the imagination of a threat coming from the 
outside becomes the invasion of one’s own space by the foreign. The own space is the 
own nation, culture or race, while the foreign is everything which doesn’t belong to it or 
opposes it. Neither a differentiation within the foreign nor the imagination of a productive 
connection between the foreign and the self is existent in this ideology. Only this allows 
the thought of superalienation to prosper (Münkler 2016). 
Further it needs to be considered that, if one sees parallel societies as a centre of a foreign 
culture and not as a social problem area, and if one declares that Islam doesn’t belong to 
Germany, one denies any chance of integration into the German majority society 
(Münkler 2016).  
This was the case when the current minister of interior Horst Seehofer (CSU)14, in an 
interview with the popular newspaper Bild, only few days after the start of his mandate in 
mid-March 2018, stated that, according to him, Islam does not belong to Germany. The 
head of the ministry of interior, which to his wish was extended to a ministry of Heimat, 
further said that “Germany had been “shaped by Christianity”, and that the country 
should not give up its own traditions.” (BBC 2018: 1). He then attempted to separate the 
Muslims living in Germany from their religion by saying that  
                                                          
14 CSU (Christlich-Soziale-Union = Christian social union), the Bavarian sister party of the CDU 
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“The Muslims who live among us naturally belong to Germany […] That, of course, does 
not mean that we should, out of a false consideration for others, give up our traditions and 
customs. […] Muslims need to live with us, not next to us or against us.” (BBC 2018: 1). 
 
1.6 Integration in Germany 
In this chapter (1.6), I shall focus on the notion of integration from a political perspective 
concerning Germany whereas in chapter 2.1 I will highlight the notion of integration 
from a sociological standpoint. 
According to the German government “Integration is a prerequisite to social cohesion in 
a country open to the world in which people with the greatest possible variety of ethnic 
backgrounds live together in peace, lawfulness, and mutual respect.” (Population Council 
2006: 598). But what are the essential and most vital factors to achieve a successful 
integration of migrants and refugees into a society?  
And how does it impact the attained integration process, if the representation of space is 
mostly associated with images of “break, rupture, and disjunction”, leading to the 
assumption that societies, nations, cultures etc. are separated by clear and natural 
differentiation of space (Gupta, Ferguson 1992: 6)?  
Following the government of Germany, there exist deficits of integration among the 
migrants – and its following generations – who came to Germany in the second half of 
the past century. These deficits are described as “lack of mastery of the German 
language, weaknesses in education and training, higher unemployment, lack of 
acceptance of basic rules of our coexistence, and violation of the law, not least women’s 
rights.” (Population Council 2006: 598).  
These deficits “carry with them the danger that living together becomes living near one 
another and, in the worst case, living against one another.” (Population Council 2006: 
598). The ascription of deficits is placing the responsibility solely within the groups of 
the migrants (Böcker, Goel, Heft 2010). Further, the statement implies that the factors for 
a successful integration are language, education, employment, following rules and laws. 
These factors cover social, economic and political aspects of integration. Whether one of 
those is a true indicator of a successful integration remains to be seen.  
Since Germany hopes to avoid another ‘lost generation’ concerning the recent migrants 
that arrived in the country in the past years, the successful formula for integration is, 
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according to the government, “identification, participation, and responsibility.” 
(Population Council 2006: 598).  This can be achieved by collaboration of the  
“state, the civil society, and the migrants themselves. It is critical, first of all, that 
immigrants be willing to adapt to life in our society, accept our Constitution and entire 
legal system without reservation and show a visible sign of affiliation with Germany, 
particularly by learning the German language. This requires personal initiative, diligence, 
and personal responsibility. In exchange we require from the host society acceptance, 
tolerance, civil engagement, and the willingness to sincerely welcome people who 
lawfully live with us.” (Population Council 2006: 598). 
 
This statement of the German Government evokes the necessity of dissecting the notion 
of integration as much as other notions that come along with the topic of integration such 
as alterity, nation, identity. It is stated by the government that there needs to be a  
“common understanding of integration that establishes mutual duties and rights: for 
migrants as well as the native population. He who makes demands must also promote 
their fulfillment. He who claims rights must also fulfill duties. The basis for this is, along 
with our values and cultural self-image, our free and democratic system as developed 
from German and European history and given constitutional shape in the Constitution.” 
(Population Council 2006: 598, 599). 
It is noteworthy that – although the government stressed the importance of an equal effort 
by the state, the host-society and the immigrants and aims for a common understanding 
of integration – at the end of the statement, the federal government lists six points that it 
intends to focus on, in order to improve the integration process, and those points concern 
almost exclusively the immigrants. The first four points are  
“1. Further development of integration courses 2. Promotion of the German language 
from the beginning 3. Ensuring good education and training, increasing labor market 
opportunities 4. Improvement of the living situation of women and girls, making equal 
rights a reality” (Population Council 2006: 599).  
With the assumption of the integration courses (1), mentioned in the first point, being 
solely for immigrants, it leaves only point 5 and 6 as points that could concern the local 
population. And with “5. Support of integration on-site” and “6. Strengthening of civil 
society.” being rather vague, the government does not provide any information on how 
the effort of the local population or the state could or should look like. (Population 
Council 2006: 599). 
While there are several levels to the meaning of integration – political integration, 
economic integration and societal integration – it is argued that the essential level of 
integration, regardless of how one defines integration, is the one concerning societal 
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integration. Only if, and when this level is reached, one can speak of a successful 
integration (Münkler 2016). And although the state can provide resources to facilitate 
integration, integration as such is a task and an exercise for the society and 
simultaneously a realm of experience for everyone, newcomers and local population alike 
(Münkler 2016). 
According to the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), Germany’s strength of 
migration policy lies in the labor market integration of migrants. While there is also a 
lack of political integration, its major weakness lies in the societal integration 
(Bertelsmann-Stiftung 2016). 
This – Germany’s weakness in terms of integration on a societal level –  might be due to 
the in past debates about integration often neglected aspect of how to involve the host 
society in the process of pinning down what a society of immigration is constituted of 
(Bither, Ziebarth 2016). To pin down how a society of immigration is supposed to be, or 
supposed to come to life, comes with the necessity to determine what integration means.  
And while the service and frame provided and given by the German state is quite clear, it 
remains rather unclear how the majority population of Germany is approaching the 
integration process of newcomers (Bither, Ziebarth 2016). 
The most important aspects regarding the societal integration are neither the willingness 
nor the readiness of integration of the immigrants but their acceptance within the majority 
society of the local population (Münkler 2016). Therefore, the question is on what terms 
the local population is ready to accept the newcomers and whether they expect 
assimilation rather than a symmetric integration process. 
Hence why this thesis focuses on the understanding and perception of the notion 
‘integration’ and the thereby accompanying self-perception of one’s own identity 
amongst the local population of Germany, more specific the local population of 
Lauchringen, a small town in the southwest of Germany. 
 
Synthesis of chapter 1 
Since 2015, the debate about migration, integration and consequently about national 
identity has gained new attention and importance in Germany. Two approaches seem to 
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lead the discussion in this national context, namely the notion of Leitkultur, which 
demands assimilation of newcomers and is overall more skeptical towards migration, 
seemingly having a homogenous image of Germany, and the approach which supports an 
open, multicultural, and heterogeneous society with equal rights for migrants and non-
migrants alike.  
This debate is also heavily influenced by the discussion of the ‘other’ which has become 
equal to the ‘Muslim’, as well as by a usage of the term integration that fosters hierarchy 
between the local population and newcomers.  
In this thesis, I question how the perception of national identity affects the understanding 
of integration among the local population of Lauchringen.  Therefore, it is now time to 
turn towards the key notions that provided me with theoretical inspiration. These notions 





















2. Theoretical inspiration 
In this chapter I will highlight the key notions that provided me with a theoretical 
framework for this thesis. Based on the question of how national identity shapes the 
perception of integration among the local population of Lauchringen, several key notions 
need to be explored. The two key notions standing out are national identity and 
integration. I now turn to the notion of integration to show certain ambiguities and 
difficulties the concept of integration entails. Following that, the notions of identity, and 
alterity and otherness will be portrayed as they are relevant for both integration and 
national identity. Afterwards, the notions of nation and citizenship are highlighted as their 




When it comes to the notion of integration, different perspectives and approaches 
determine what integration stands for. In this chapter, I will outline several approaches 
before coming to the definition of integration I use for this thesis. 
2.1.1 Ambiguities and difficulties of the concept of Integration 
From a sociological perspective, there are two different layers to the concept of 
integration. Firstly, here is the individual integration which usually happens either 
through “birth and socialization or by immigration and naturalization.” (Kreckel 1995: 6). 
The other form of integration is the structural integration.  
“From this point of view a society is “integrated”, if its different parts are held together in 
a common social order. As Talcott Parsons has argued, the basic value of consensus 
between the members of a society is the main pillar of social order. In this assumption he 
was a close follower of Émile Durkheim, who claimed that a common moral order is the 
precondition of solidarity and social stability.” (Kreckel 1995: 6). 
According to the sociologist Durkheim “l’integration […] est une propriété de la société 
elle-même.” (Fortin 2000: 2). In other words, integration is what allows a society to exist 
while differences among the individuals exist as well.  
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Important, when it comes to the notion of structural integration, is the distinction between 
the integration into a society and the integration of a society. More precisely, it means 
that  
“le concept d’intégration “peut caractériser l’ensemble d’un système ou de la société – ce 
qu’on peut appeler l’intégration de la société ou integration systémique. C’est alors la 
propriété du groupe dans son ensemble. Mais il peut aussi caractériser la relation des 
individus ou d’un sous-système à un système plus large – ce qu’on peut appeler 
l’intégration à la société ou intégration tropique” (Billion 1999: 3, 4). 
The integration of a society is coined as system integration, while the integration into a 
society is described as “intégration tropique”, or social integration.  
The sociologist Giddens also differs between, social and system integration. Such 
differentiation allows us to cope with “basic characteristics of the differentiation of 
society” (Giddens 1979: 76). He describes social integration as the “Reciprocity between 
actors (relations of autonomy/dependence)” while system integration is understood as 
“Reciprocity between groups or collectivities (relations of autonomy/dependence)” 
(Giddens 1979: 77).   
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
Society itself as a concept has made some changes in the past. It went from a traditional 
society (communauté organique) or Gemeinschaft to a modern society (société 
contractuelle) or Gesellschaft (Fortin 2000). This differentiation is coming from the 
sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies.15 Referring to Tönnies, Münkler describes the difference 
between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as follows: In a Gemeinschaft, individuality is 
usually consumed and absorbed, bestowing the individual with significance only as a 
member and part of the community while a Gesellschaft works due to individuals who act 
as individuals, trusting that the socio-economic mechanism is leading to an integration 
(Münkler 2016). In other words, relationships in a Gesellschaft are more likely to be 
‘instrumental’, while “Gemeinschaft-based relationships tend to be affectual” (Waters: 
                                                          
15 “Tönnies was the first sociological writer to use the German terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as complementary 
analytical categories.  In doing this, he defined an older traditional Gemeinschaft world in which relationships emerged 
out of social interactions of a personal nature and personal emotional attachments, which he called a “natural will.”  
Such relationships were important in the traditional world of feudalism and reflected recognition of shared 
characteristics, especially personal loyalty to family, ethnic relationships, professional memberships, shared religious 
community, and feudal rank. […] These Gemeinschaft relations were maintained in the context of private sentiment and 
loyalty, rather than simply productivity in the marketplace.  In contrast, in more modern Gesellschaft societies, 
interactions were more “rational,” and reflected impersonal relationships mediated by money, and in particular cash 
wages, or what Tönnies calls “rational will.”  These relationships typically meant that people calculate the value 
relationships.” (Waters 2014: 2).   
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2014: 3). The sociologist and anthropologist Arthur K. Davis described Tönnies 
differentiation of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft by ascribing elements such as “family 
relationships, traditional folk customs, close-knit neighborhood ties, and face-to-face 
contacts.” (Davis 1959: 269) to a Gemeinschaft while adding that Gesellschaft, as in a 
modern society, “involves such elements as rationality, formalized conventions, and 
limited-purpose contractual relationships.” (Davis 1959: 269). 
For Tönnies, social groups bear characteristics similar to those of a Gemeinschaft, “as the 
members think of such a grouping as a gift of nature or created by the supernatural will.” 
while the interaction of social classes constitutes “the basic characteristics of the 
Gesellschaft” (Tönnies 1957: 255, 256).   
Therefore, a society and its integration status depend on its type of solidarity. Coming 
back to Durkheim, he differentiates between “solidarité mécanique” and “solidarité 
organique”. The former has a solidarity which “dérive des ressemblances entre individus” 
while the latter is “fondées sur l’interdépendence et complémentarité des différents 
individus et groups.” (Fortin 2000: 3). The “solidarité mécanique” seems to apply to a 
Gemeinschaft, while a “solidarité organique” seems to be tied to the characteristics of a 
Gesellschaft. There is a fundamental connection between the type of solidarity, or in 
other words, social cohesion, and the integration of the individuals. The more a society is 
integrated – strong social cohesion, the opposite of an anomie – the more it can act as an 
integration-center for others (Fortin 2000). What, however, happens if the social cohesion 
becomes too thick? Can social cohesion become too thick and turn into a seemingly static 
unity, and therefore impossible to integrate ‘through’ it?  
What is also of interest is the usage of the terms Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in the 21st 
century in Germany.16 The way these two terms are used suggest that Germany sees 
                                                          
16 “Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft continue to be common words in modern German, irrespective of whether or not 
people know about what Tönnies and Weber wrote.  For example, the German word for “corporation” which is a group 
formed specifically to conduct business in the marketplace is “Gesellschaft,” and is usually translated today as such in 
this context.  The word Gemeinschaft is used in German to describe many relationships which include affective 
sentiments.  It is even used to describe the European Union which in German is called the “Europäische 
Gemeinschaft.”  The fact that Gemeinschaft (and not Gesellschaft) is part of the German-language description of the 
European Union apparently reflects the fact that Germans see the European Union as a more broad-based 
“community,” than a “corporation” with a narrower economic purpose. Thus in many ways the distinctions that 
Tönnies and Weber focused on in their sociology of the transition to modernity continue to be relevant to the modern 
German language.” (Waters 2014: 8, 9). 
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Europe as a community, which would allow to construct a European identity, in contrast 
to the non-European ‘other’. 
System integration and social integration 
In modern societies, usually two ways of structural integration exist. Those known as the 
social integration and the system integration. The social integration is “based upon 
concensus and explicit co-operation between the members of a society. As Durkheim 
would say, moral integration is social integration based upon solidarity.”, while system 
integration “operates without the bond of moral solidarity.” (Kreckel 1995: 6). More 
specifically, this means that  
 “System integration is achieved by means of standardized media of exchange, especially 
money and power. The structures of modern western state societies are characterized by a 
capitalist market economy based upon money and a democratic and bureaucratic state 
administration which actsa [sic] by means of formal-legal power. The argument now is 
that the circulation of money and the systematic application of bureaucratic power lead to 
“system integration” wherebye [sic] the isolated activities of individual and collective 
actors are co-ordinated anonymously, without requiring a common value-orientation or 
moral solidarity.” (Kreckel 1995: 6, 7), 
 
Or briefly, as long the given frame, in this case the capitalist market economy and the 
democratic and bureaucratic state administration, is stable enough, social integration is of 
little to no importance. This would also mean that as soon as the economic and 
democratic structures erodes, or the trust among the local population in the named 
structures decreases, social integration become focal again. 
This bears certain risks since an increasing reliance on social integration harbors the 
possibility of rising xenophobia and racism (Kreckel 1995). 
What is at question now is how the mixture between system integration and social 
integration function in a modern society, a modern nation-state so to say. 
2.1.2 Integration and the nation-state 
To answer this question, one must acknowledge that each modern state is “very strongly 
influenced by the western model of the nation-state” which is founded on “the early 
modern conception of territorial and dynastic sovereignty which eventually led to the 
notion of the sovereign nation state.” (Kreckel 1995: 7). Therefore, the notion of the 
nation, the nation-state is explored more profound in the following chapter. However, 
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some remarks in regard of the nation shall be made here as well since it is of relevance 
for the understanding of the meaning of integration in regard of national identity. 
Another influence, besides the sovereignty of a nation-state, came through the nature of 
the “revolutionary idea of peoples’ sovereignty”, something which brought different but 
similar “forms of modern parliamentary democracy” to light (Kreckel 1995: 7). 
Therefore, the assumption of democracy as the central element of the model of the 
nation-state, brings with it the question of identifying the people that partake in and 
exercise the democratic sovereignty. With a pragmatic and simple approach, one would 
come to the solution that all those who live on a specific territory are ‘the people’. 
However, this is not how the western model of a nation-state occurs.  
“Rather, the members of a nation are defined as a community of people held together by 
special bonds of blood, of history, of language, of culture, of religion etc. from which 
particular loyalties, rights and obligations are derived.” (Kreckel 1995: 7). 
 
Connecting these remarks with the previously made  
“[…] conceptual distinction between moral integration and system integration, it 
becomes now obvious that the nation-state model is not easily compatible with the 
pragmatic notion of mere system integration through anonymous market mechanisms and 
rational-legal domination. Instead, a common national identity, solidarity, sentiments of 
belonging and togetherness are called for. (Kreckel 1995: 7).17 
This would mean that a nation and its population is rather shaped according to the 
characteristics of a Gemeinschaft (solidarité mecanique) than of a Gesellschaft (solidarité 
organique). This shows the problematic connection between the western model of the 
nation-state and system integration, because structural integration, in the context of 
nation-states also relies on social integration, which carries the risk of ethnocentrism and 
xenophobia (Kreckel 1995).  
It becomes clear that integration is intertwined with notions such as nation, identity, and 
due to the question of belonging and togetherness, alterity and otherness18. But for now, 
back to the notion of integration. 
What is certain is that integration is not given but achieved through investing in it: 
“Integration ne va pas de soi et implique un long travail de la société sur les individus.” 
                                                          
17 Kreckel uses the term moral integration as a substitute for social integration. While this harbours the possibility of 
confusion, I want to stress that, if citations of Kreckel appear in which he speaks of moral integration, he means social 
integration. 
18 The notions of alterity and otherness will be discussed further on in chapter 2. 
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(Fortin 2000: 3). However, there are different approaches towards how such investments 
should be made. This becomes visible by looking at the dynamic between the notions of 
integration and assimilation.  
2.1.3 Integration vs assimilation 
The notion of integration – often used as a synonym for assimilation19 – went through a 
conceptual evolution. While the sociologists of the Chicago School were focusing on the 
aspects of cultural exchange between immigrants and the host-society, they neglected the 
general contexts in which immigrants arrived (Fortin 2000). As an example, the 
anthropologist Fortin names the United States, stating that: 
“Aux Etats-Unis, au tournant du siècle, le context économique en est un de prospérité qui 
attire les migrants européens. Cette réalité se traduit par une vision ‘ascendante’ de 
l’immigration en ce sens que le canevas théorique general de cette époque suggère une 
integration ou une assimilation des nouveaux venus au ‘mainstream’ américain, 
l’immigration constituent une excellente source de main-d’oeuvre.” (Fortin 2000: 3). 
Here, it becomes clear that immigration, and as mentioned in the previous chapter, the 
integration of migrants can be approached from different angles, e.g. from a cultural, 
social standpoint or from an economic standpoint. An economic standpoint seems to be 
close to the system integration, while cultural and social aspects of integration seem to 
fall under the aspect of social integration. 
If we look back in history, we can see the conditions that lead to concepts such as 
assimilation. And we can also find the limits of such concepts if applied in another time 
or era (Fortin 2000). The approach of the Chicago School doesn’t see the concept of 
integration as an intrinsic phenomenon of the society, but more as way to keep the social 
system as whole in a stable condition (Fortin 2000).  
The notion of a “cycle de relations raciales” comes into play here. The sociologist Robert 
E. Park talks about that cycle of racial relations as something general and universal, 
which exists because of the situation where several different groups live in the same 
environment, for example in cities. Therefore, integration is seen as a process which 
doesn’t lead to an ethnic homogenization but to a future in which everybody, independent 
of the origin, contributes actively to the maintaining and functioning of the society: 
“Dans cet esprit, l’integration ou l’assimilation ne suppose pas la suppression du passé 
                                                          
19 As seen in chapter 1; in the sense that integration is understood as adapting to the new culture of the host-society and 
leaving one’s own culture ‘behind’. 
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immigrant mais l’incorporation de celui-ci dans le present.” (Fortin 2000: 4). In such a 
scenario, the solidarité organique seems to be dominant, suggesting that the concept of a 
nation based on solidarité mécanique is rather obsolete. Furthermore, following that 
approach, assimilation does not reject new influences that come along with the presence 
of migrants. 
In the 1950s the notion of assimilation went through a change where it lost its dynamic 
and relational aspect and became “un espace où règne, en finalité, une culture dominante 
et où les particularités ethniques sont appelées à disparaitre.” (Fortin 2000: 5). The 
American sociology, in the 1950s and 1960s saw assimilation as a necessity and as the 
wanted outcome. However, this theory reached its limits in the following decades as it 
became clear that even after some time of sharing the same space, differences still existed 
among groups. This is possible because different structures can coexist within one society 
and because identity references vary depending on the circumstance (Fortin 2000: 5).20  
How blurred the lines between the notions of assimilation and integration can be, is 
illustrated in the following quote where an assimilation ideology is described as a method 
to achieve integration: “In assimilationist national ideologies […], immigrants may 
experience loss and nostalgia, but only en route to a whole new home in a new place. 
Such narratives are designed to integrate immigrants” (Clifford 1994: 307). 
It could be argued that assimilation is one of many tools to achieve integration. The 
sociologist Iceland, for example, offers three different variations how immigrants could 
be incorporated into a society, which are “assimilation, segmented assimilation, and 
ethnic stratification” (Iceland 2013: 15). Here, even within assimilation, differentiations 
are made. 
In line with the classic (spatial) assimilation theory, Iceland sees the process towards an 
integration into a society’s majority group as an experience made by immigrant groups 
by adopting “mainstream attitudes, culture and human capital attributes.” (Iceland 2013: 
16). While this theory seemingly calls for a pro-active group of immigrants who should 
adopt certain attributes, the segmented assimilation theory implies that “the host society 
                                                          




offers uneven possibilities to different groups based on social factors, including ethnic 
origin.” (Iceland 2013: 16), which would mean that even if an immigrant wants to adopt 
certain attitudes, he or she is at the mercy of the host-society, something which is going 
in the same direction as the usage of the term integration, earlier explained by Böcker, 
Goel and Heft.21 
The ethnic stratification theory argues that immigrants sometimes prefer to stay “within 
their traditional ethnic communities even when they could afford to live in other areas.” 
(Iceland 2013: 17). This choice, it is argued, is often nurtured by the fear of 
discrimination and prejudice immigrants receive from the majority society, especially 
when they move out of their traditional ethnic community. Further, prejudice and 
discrimination that come from the majority society is said to be used by the majority 
society to keep a distance to minorities (Iceland 2013). 
Such an ethnic stratification, regardless of its source, which is a retreat of subgroups into 
a community (Gemeinschaft) which then keeps its distance to the surrounding society 
(Gesellschaft), has also consequences for the liberal society. Since the liberal society – to 
enable its plural openness – is refraining from the development of a strong collective 
identity, it feels threatened by the formation of a closed community within its center. 
What both sides have in common is the fear of each other, which is certainly a 
suboptimal initial point for a successful and fruitful living together (Münkler 2016). 
The sociologists Alba and Nee see the development of the notion of assimilation as 
follows: 
“[…] in recent decades assimilation has come to be viewed by social scientists as a worn-
out theory which imposes ethnocentric and patronizing demands on minority peoples 
struggling to retain their cultural and ethnic integrity.” (Alba, Nee 1997: 827).  
And while they admit that, in the name of assimilation, there has been made “intellectual 
sins” in the past22, they claim that assimilation “offers the best way to understand and 
                                                          
21 See chapter 1 
22 “Warner and Srole […] in their classic account of assimilation among ethnic groups in New Haven, describe ethnic 
groups as “unlearning” their “inferior” cultural traits (inferior, that is, from the standpoint of the host society) in order 
to “successfully learn the new way of life necessary for full acceptance.” Warner also correlated the potential for 
assimilation with a hierarchy of racial and cultural acceptability, ranging from English-speaking Protestants at the top 
to “Negroes and all Negroid mixtures” at the bottom. The depiction of the ethnocentric tendency in classical […] 




describe the integration into the mainstream experienced across generations by many 
individuals and ethnic groups,” because for Alba and Nee,  
“as a social process that occurs spontaneously and often unintendedly in the course of 
interaction between majority and minority groups, assimilation remains a key concept for 
the study of intergroup relations.” (Alba, Nee 1997: 827). 
However, they acknowledge the fact that assimilation – in its old form – might not be 
appropriate for the contemporary migration processes. But instead of rejecting 
assimilation for today’s approaches of immigration and integration, they call for an 
amendment of the notion of assimilation. In that way, they argue, the factor of continuity 
can still be considered, while changing the terminology would separate “contemporary 
realities from past ones with new words.” (Alba, Nee 1997: 863). It is questionable 
whether a new terminology would construct such a division – meaning that the only 
difference of migrant experiences then and now is the language used to describe it – or if 
it is not more so the situation that immigrants today indeed face, at least partially, new 
experiences which would render a change of language appropriate. 
Considering the nature of the usage of the term integration, not assimilation, in the 
current debate, as explored earlier with the help of Böcker, Goel and Heft, one could 
argue that the term integration has taken on the meaning of assimilation, which proves to 
be problematic. Especially if one considers the following statement: 
“While immigrants themselves might assimilate to some extent, progress is predicted to 
be more evident among their children” (Iceland 2013: 16), who are – presumably – more 
likely to assimilate in the sense that they completely take on the culture of the host-
society through which they become similar or same as, or eventually a part of, the 
majority population. Such an approach seems to neglect any responsibility of the local 
population and perpetuates the idea of integration as a one-sided effort made by 
immigrants who – or ‘at least’ their children – eventually will be showing no different 
characteristics as the majority population. This implies that the culture of the host-society 
is something static which does not, maybe should not, change due to new and exterior 
influences. 
This gives us an opportunity to see a clearer differentiation between the notions of 
integration and assimilation. Brubaker, a sociologist, offers a definition of assimilation: 
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“In the general and abstract sense, the core meaning is increasing similarity or likeness. 
Not identity, but similarity. To assimilate means to become similar (when the word is 
used intransitively) or to make similar or treat as similar (when it is used transitively). 
Assimilation is thus the process of becoming similar, or of making similar or treating as 
similar. In the specific and organic sense, the root meaning is transitive. To assimilate 
something is to ‘convert’ {it} into a substance of its own nature, as the bodily organs 
convert food into blood, and thence into animal tissue . . . to absorb into the system, {to} 
incorporate’ (Oxford English Dictionary). Assimilation in this sense implies complete 
absorption.” (Brubaker 2001: 534). 
 
Brubaker argues that, if assimilation is used intransitively, assimilation seems neither to 
be analytically useless, empirically wrong, nor morally objectionable and might be fitting 
to study and analyze the experience of migrants (Brubaker 2001).  However, if used from 
a transitively angle, assimilation implies absorption, in the context of this thesis, of the 
newcomers into the majority society. The absorption, or assimilation, of newcomers into 
the majority society means making similar in social, cultural, ethno-cultural aspects, 
basically becoming indistinguishable from the majority population23. 
This should make the difference between assimilation and integration in regard of this 
thesis clear. While this understanding of integration allows a maintenance of culture, 
assimilation aims at substituting the culture of the homeland with the culture of the host-
country, the new homeland. Or as Jessica Bither, a program officer of the GIZ24, and 
Astrid Ziebarth25 define integration: “Integration is a transformative process rather than 
an end goal, and will continue to be rife with potential friction, as all change processes 
are.” (Bither, Ziebarth 2016: 23). This stands in contrast to the common understanding of 
integration as requesting the adaptation of migrants to the majority society, as eluded to 
by Moos in chapter 1.2., an understanding which shows great similarity to the transitively 
approach of assimilation. 
2.1.4 Definition of integration for this thesis 
By calling for a new terminology, findings and experiences from former migration 
processes are not meant to be minimized. They need to be considered as well, because 
                                                          
23 See Castles 1987: 9, 10. 
24 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) = German society for international cooperation. 




“Only by contrasting differences and similarities between the old and new immigration 
will scholars gain a deeper understanding of the meaning of ethnicity in this new era of 
immigration.” (Alba, Nee 1997: 865). 
With the need of a deeper understanding of the meaning of ethnicity, the need of a 
profound understanding of national identity comes along. To gain such understanding, a 
nuanced conceptual approach is required. Especially since there are some conceptual 
ambiguities. In a general approach the concept of “intégration évoque à la fois un état de 
‘cohésion’ et le chemin qui mène à cet état.” (Fortin 2000: 5). To avoid a generalization, 
the concept of integration must be analyzed from different angles, such as economic, 
social, political, and cultural angles. 
 This analytical deconstruction allows to show the plurality of the integration process and 
to situate it in a historical and social context. At the same time, one must be cautious 
towards “la tendance à atomizer un processus” (Fortin 2000: 5). 
In addition to that, it is difficult to agree on the indicators to measure the integration 
process. For example, 
“on peut très bien évaluer les réussites scolaires, les niveaux de formation ou les modes 
d’insertion professionnelle, comme autant d’éléments d’appréciation à la comprehension 
de l’évolution trajectoires immigrantes mais, l’interprétation depend toujours des valeurs 
attachées aux indices de références. En cela, les indicateurs ne peuvent ‘mesurer 
l’intégration’ parce qu’ils ne mesurent, en fait, que des manifestations sociales aux sens 
les plus divers: on peut réussir scolairement et professionnellement et etre, par exemple, 
un militant intégriste opposé aux droits de l’homme, […]; on peut à l’inverse etre sans 
instruction et chomeur et assumes ses responsabilités familiales ou citoyennes, […] 
(Costa-Lascoux 1994: 259).” (Fortin 2000: 5, 6). 
This consideration seems to make it almost impossible to measure the extent of any 
integration. One can be integrated socially but not economically or politically, or one can 
be integrated economically but not socially or politically and so on. Furthermore, the vast 
amount of different notions and concepts which one finds within the discussion 
concerning the definition of integration make it difficult to establish common ground for 
a debate about integration. 
Münkler argues that integration on the societal level is the most essential one (Münkler 
2016). Consequently, since this thesis focuses on the approach of the local population 
towards the notion of integration, the integration on a societal level, or social integration, 
is the one which is of the most importance here. Therefore, I understand integration, 
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similar to what Münkler describes as “Konvivialismus” (conviviality26), as a process 
where everybody changes to get along with each other. This concept of integration is not 
based on a one-way integration of migrants into an existing, homogeneous society, but on 
a reciprocal integration of everybody into an immigration-society in which the citizens 
share a common general principle and in which living together is understood as a 
symmetric learning process (Münkler 2016). Such an idea of integration distributes the 
responsibility equally – as a symmetric learning process suggests – between the local 
population and the newcomers. Such a symmetric process is basically “le chemin qui 
mène à cet état” of integration and the immigration-society, or post-migrant society 
which is based on a common general principle is the “état de ‘cohesion’” which is 
achieved by it (Fortin 2000: 5). 
Since it is argued that collective identities are less distinct in liberal societies, and 
therefore integration into an open society is more facilitated through individuals than 
through groups (Münkler 2016), it is now necessary to look at the notion of identity. 
 
2.2 Identity 
In today’s social life, identity has become a strong and potent organizing presence, “a 
social fact, or so it would, at least, seem.” (Leve 2011: 513). Whether on an 
individualistic or collective level, it is without a doubt that “being, in the sense of 
belonging – to ethnic, national, religious, racial, indigenous, sexual, or any of a range of 
otherwise affectively charged, socially recognizable corporate groups – is among the 
most compelling of contemporary concerns.” (Leve 2011: 513). 
And not just due to migration flows as mentioned earlier by Casey and Dustmann27, there 
are other factors such “global flows in trade, politics, and the media” which contribute to 
a “greater interpenetration between cultures”, rendering the notion of identity, which has 
always been “multiplex […] even more culturally complex” (Narayan 1993: 682).  Or as 
the anthropologist Deirdre Meintel puts it: 
“Les migrations de main-d’oeuvre, les flots de réfugiés […], ainsi que la mobilization 
d’autres categories sociales en minorités revendicatrices de droits […] sont autant de 
facteurs qui ont contribué à faire de l’identité, définie comme un sentiment 
                                                          
26 See chapter 1.2 
27 Page 1, or: Casey, Dustmann 2010. 
38 
 
d’appartenance à un groupe ou à une communauté, un important sujet d’intérêt dans notre 
discipline.” (Meintel 1993: 10). 
One possible definition of identity is the following: 
“Identities refer to shared representations of a collective self as reflected in public debate, 
political symbols, collective memories, and elite competition for power. They consist also 
of collective beliefs about the definition of the group and its membership that are shared 
by most group members. We understand identities to be revealed by social practices as 
well as by political attitudes, shaped by social and geographical structures and national 
contexts” (Davis Cross 2012: 238). 
This exposes the complexity of the notion of identity. As seen, identity constitutes itself 
out of numerous different influences. Also, it shows how identity plays a role in the 
context of integration. More precisely, the way identity is used and understood also has a 
direct impact on the process of integration: 
“’ethnocultural identity’ leads to restrictive, exclusionist policies (Germany), a civic 
identity to inclusive immigration and naturalization policies, be they of a more 
assimilationist (France) or a more ‘multicultural’ type (United States, Great Britain)” 
(Peters 2002: 6).  
What stands out here is that a civic identity does not necessarily equates to supporting a 
multicultural society where a symmetric integration process is the norm but that a civic 
identity might still favor assimilation over conviviality.  
The reason for those different outcomes is that an ethnocultural identification with a 
nation emphasizes ascriptive characteristics that are more less static “and in many cases 
not voluntarily acquired, such as birth, extended residency” and biological and cultural 
kinship ties, while the notion of civic identity emphasizes  
“a “metaphorical” kinship, created by participation in a common political community, 
characterizing the content of identity as the shared political rights, duties, values, and 
political institutions shared by members of a given territory, irrespective of their cultural 
heritage and nativity.” (Byrne 2013: 53).  
Through references to Kreckel’s work28, the following paragraph will explore the layers 
of complexity associated with the notion of identity. 
The first level of identity is the term ‘identical’ which can be understood as something 
which is same in quality and appearance. As an example, Kreckel uses a coining machine 
which produces identical coins. The second level is the identity of one specific coin, 
meaning the continuity of existence over time and space. This means that “”uniformity of 
                                                          
28 Kreckel 1995 
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appearance” and “sameness over time” are the two basic and straightforward meanings of 
the term “identity” in everyday language.” (Kreckel 1995: 2). However, this becomes a 
bit more complex when it comes to establishing an identity of changing objects: “Thus, if 
we cross a particular bridge over a water we may well identify this water as a stream with 
a specific name, notwithstanding the fact that we are perfectly aware that one can never 
step into the same river twice.” (Kreckel 1995: 2). Nonetheless this is ignored when we 
identify human beings and chose to ignore any biological and mental changes. Kreckel 
calls this phenomenon the “assumption of physical continuity which ignores the 
permanent biological transformation of the human body.” (Kreckel 1995: 2). Such 
assumption of continuity is essential if one wants to  
“apply the concept of “identity” to human beings: Although the process of physical 
ageing and of mental transformation through experience, learning, forgetting etc. is 
always going on, every human being can be identified as the same person throughout his 
or her entire lifespan.” (Kreckel 1995: 2). 
This portrays the complexity of any attempt to establish an “identity of a changing object 
or a living being” since it “is based upon complicated ontological assumptions of 
continuity.” (Kreckel 1995: 2). 
2.2.1 Individual identity 
According to Assmann, a cultural scientist, Identity is understood as the reassuring of the 
self in a social context and can be constituted on three different levels. First, there is the 
assembling of data, for example in state documents, and takes the function of personal 
labeling. Second, the foundation of identity can be understood as the 
internalizing/internalization of social norms. The internalization of social norms could 
also be seen as a way of moral integration. And third, besides bureaucratic identification 
and social space of reciprocal claims and obligations, the question ‘Who am I?’ can be 
answered in the private-biographic space of self-discovery and sense-orientation. 
Examples for possible orientations in the private-biographic space are religion, art, or 
psychotherapy (Assman 1993).  
However, all these forms of individual identity are intertwined with a social, if not to say 
collective identity. State documents place an individual within a group of members of a 
state, internalized social norms are usually imposed by the environment and a private-
biographic space such as religion places an individual within a community of people 
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sharing the same faith. In other words, individual and social, collective identity is 
difficult to separate because “human beings do not only perceive each other as distinct 
individuals with an unmistakable personal identity, but also as members of social groups 
or incumbents of social roles.” (Kreckel 1995: 3).  
Any individual is frequently identified with its gender, religion, job, party-membership, 
family or its national background. Not seldom, individuals accept such identifications 
from the outside and identity “with their social attributes: In this case, a person “is” his 
role. He “is” a man, a professor, a sociologist, and a German. He acts as such, and he is 
treated as such.” (Kreckel 1995: 3). Regardless whether those social identities become 
internalized parts of an individual personal identity or whether they are perceived as 
exclusively external role attributes, it becomes evident that personal identity is shaped by 
social influences which place an individual within certain types of groups (Kreckel 
1995).  
The assumption of continuity gives the notion of identity a certain level of statics. 
However, it is important to stress that people always have been much more mobile and 
their identities less static than “typologizing approaches of classical anthropology would 
suggest.” (Gupta, Ferguson 1992: 9). According to the anthropologist Deirdre Meintel  
“l’identité est changeante, plurielle, et en constante reconstruction. Par ailleurs, certaines 
identités peuvent être profondément ressenties sans pour autant s’inscrire au sein de 
collectivités spécifiques.” (Meintel 2008: 311). 
It becomes clear that identifying a human being “as the same person throughout his or her 
entire lifespan.” (Kreckel 1995: 2) is at least difficult, if not impossible, since the 
assumption of continuity cannot be upheld because individuals can change membership 
of states, can convert to another religion, take on different jobs, internalize new and 
different social forms and so on.  
Now one might argue that some aspects cannot change, for example the national, or the 
ethnic background. This brings us to looking closer at collective, specifically national 





2.2.2 Collective identity, national identity 
While Assmann also names egalitarian, hegemonial and minority identity as forms of 
collective identities29, the focus shall be on national identity30. When it comes to 
collective, national identity, the matter is complex: “European countries were (and in 
many ways still are) facing the Sisyphean task of defining their identities within newly 
evolved political frameworks.” (Consonni 2010: 107). Peters, sociologist and political 
scientist, sees three types of collective identity: the primordial (ethnic), cultural, and civic 
identity. Another idea of collective identity, close to the “concept of a ‘civic’ national 
identity” is the – in the German context called Verfassungspatriotismus – constitutional 
patriotism. Yet, “In any case, it is often opposed to ethnic or ethnocultural conceptions of 
nationhood” (Peters 2002: 5). 
Nonetheless, it is argued that culture is an important source of collective identity. 
Assmann says that the question of ‘Who are we?’ is of much more importance in non-
Western societies than the question ‘Who am I?’ (Assmann 1993). This would go hand in 
hand with the assumption by Münkler, that in liberal modern societies – if one wants to 
describe European/Western cultures as such – the individualism is more distinct than in 
other societies, where collective identity is still of higher value31. Therefore, if culture is 
of higher importance for the collective identity in non-Western societies, Western 
societies would likely be greatly shaped by a civic identity – in the German case 
Verfassungspatriotismus – linked to the individualistic characteristics. We will see later if 
the individualism trumps a collective identity when it comes to the opinions on the 
integration process. Or in other words, if a civic national identity – which supports 
individualism – outweighs an ethnic or ethno-cultural national identity. 
Before the development towards a strong individualism in modern societies, the 
development of a national identity prospered, an identity which leveled down the 
uniqueness of an individual and highlighted the commonalities, even if those 
commonalities had to be invented first (Assmann 1993).  
                                                          
29 See Assmann 1993: 241-244 
30 Since I want to explore how national identity impacts the perception of integration. 
31 See Münkler 2016 
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Relying on invented commonalities shows that national identities are a highly fragile 
construct since “it is logically inadmissible to invest social groups or even nations with a 
quasi-personal identity.” due to the major difference that, compared to a human being, 
nations “do not have a mind, they do not have a memory, they cannot have a soul.”. And 
while a nation can, through a representative, acquire the quality of a legal person, the 
nation is still a group and groups cannot “acquire a “collective personality” or a “group 
soul”.” (Kreckel 1995: 3).  
“Homo sapiens sapiens in his wisdom is able to ascribe identity to everything, to persons, 
to trees, to clouds, to gods - and also to nations and to corporations. But he himself is the 
only one who has an identity as long as he has his personal mind and memory. Thus, 
whenever a particular nation is attributed with an “identity” of its own which goes 
beyond the mere identification of the temporal and territorial continuity of its political 
existence, we move into the field of ideology.” (Kreckel 1995: 3). 
Although a national identity may be a constituent part of the social identity if it is referred 
to the majority of inhabitants of a region – but only if they, as example “perceive 
themselves as “Germans”, and if they are perceived as such by others” (Kreckel 1995: 3) 
– it has to be met with caution because it is still a construction of “we-group”, more so a 
pseudo “we-group”. 
We-groups whose members are usually bound by loyalty and specific obligations and 
solidarity towards the overall goals of the group as well as towards the other members, 
and whose members can also identify themselves with that specific group, are usually 
“Family- and kinship-groups” and to an extent also sport teams or work groups, in short, 
groups where “loyalty and emotional attachment to the group are obvious normative 
expectations.” (Kreckel 1995: 4) 
However, such notion of a “we-group” doesn’t apply to any nation, simply because the 
“we-group” becomes a pseudo-we-group given the fact that the nation is too big and 
therefore too anonymous to speak of a “we-group” dynamic (Kreckel 1995). 
Furthermore, 
“on sociological grounds, all claims of “national unity” or “class unity” have to be met 
with extreme caution. If faced with such claims,” one “should always be prepared for the 
possibility that the imagery of “national identity” or “class solidarity” is being used in a 




Therefore, speaking of a national identity transports the image of the nation as a we-
group, even though they are “not small primary groups, but huge and anonymous 
secondary groups.”, meaning that the establishing of a “common social we-identity” 
among inhabitants of modern state societies can only take place if “strong stereotypes are 
mobilized which minimize internal differences and concentrate on the uniqueness of 
common national qualities.” (Kreckel 1995: 5). However, it is argued that the 
accentuation of common cultural, linguistic, historical and “even ethnic characteristics 
tend to be abstract and emotionally sterile,” unless it is coming along with the reverse 
effect of the “we” and “them” differentiation, which means that 
“all members of the abstract we-group are highly valued, non-members are devalued and 
potentially excluded. Indeed, as Norbert Elias (1965/1990) has shown, this is the usual 
price to be paid for the formation of anonymous we-groups - the social division between 
“The Established and the Outsiders” which is produced and stabilized by means of 
positive and negative stereotypes. That is, in such cases we are not faced with genuine 
we-group formation, but with a “pseudo-we-group” which is not based upon the social 
ties and common culture of its members, but upon the discrimination and exclusion of 
outsiders.” (Kreckel 1995: 5), 
 
rendering “ideas of culturally and ethnically distinct places […] perhaps even more 
salient.” (Gupta, Ferguson 1992: 10). 
If the so-called national identity, therefore the self-perception of a nation, is strongly 
influenced by an ethnic and cultural understanding of belonging, ethnic, or ethno-cultural 
identity comes into play as well. 
2.2.3 Ethnic, ethno-cultural identity 
Among gender, sexual orientation, age and class, “ethnicity is one of the dimensions of 
identity key for the construction and negotiation of status” and therefore also one “of 
power in state societies” (Alonso 1994: 391). This suggests that ethnicity, or more ethnic-
identity, is still a major factor when it comes to achieving integration and equality among 
residents and citizens of one nation-state. When it comes to ethnic identity,  
“l’identité ethnique se définit comme un sentiment d’appartenance à un groupe auquel les 
ancêtres ‘veritables ou symbolique’ des individus appartenaient, un sentiment d’unicité, 
d’unité, de passé historique et d’avenir commun d’une communauté” (Meintel 1993: 11). 
 
It needs to be stressed that this feeling of belonging is subjective, as  
“ethnicity entails “a subjective belief in . . . common descent because of [subjectively 
perceived] similarities of physical type or of customs or both, […]” […] Ethnic affiliation 
is calculated contextually, through the concatenation of ethnic boundary markers […] 
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culturally constructed indexes of categorical identities endowed with differential worth 
and purpose.” (Alonso 1994: 391). 
Strategies to reinforce an identity are “for example, language learning and use, religion 
and other aspects of socialization.” (Meintel 2002: 100). However, social frontiers 
between different groups should not be taken for granted, otherwise the ethnic culture 
becomes homogenized. As a result, cultural conventions such as language, religion, 
norms and expectations, are assumed to be monolithic for people of a specific ethnic 
identity. This leads to the belief “that there is one pure, easily identifiable set of ethnic 
traditions, religion and speech.” (Meintel 2002: 101). 
Some argue that it will be necessary to establish a model of “multiple levels of 
ethnocultural identity that fits the prevalent situation around the world, and more 
precisely, the pluralist context of multicultural societies.” (Bibeau 1997: 17). Therefore, 
the anthropologist Bibeau offers three levels of ethno-cultural identity, which are root 
identity, citizenship identity and reconstructed identity: 
“(i) root identity which has developed through foundational experience in the culture of 
origin in which the person has been socialized; (ii) citizenship identity which is based on 
the process of attaining civil rights and legitimizing social participation in the host 
country where the person has been transplanted; and (iii) reconstructed identity which is 
worked out in response to the processes of separation from the original culture, 
immigration and resettlement in the host society or exposure to foreign cultures.” (Bibeau 
1997: 17). 
 
It is important to consider that individuals can “claim several identities without denying 
any of them.” (Meintel 2002: 116). This can be the case for “immigrants and their 
children and grandchildren […] and even for those who develop international solidarities 
through experience of travel or activism.” (Radice 2009: 146, 147), or as Bibeau called it, 
through exposure to foreign cultures.  
In a sense of individual identity, the ethnic identity “est […] involontaire; elle est tout 
simplement transmise par la generation antérieure. C’est un aspect de la personalité 
auquel un individu ne peut se soustraire.” (Breton 1983: 26). However, considering the 
blurred lines between ethnic and cultural identity, in addition to following the reasoning 
of Bibeau, such a root identity could also be turned into a reconstructed identity, at least 
the cultural part of an ethno-cultural identity. 
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The ethnic identity, as described by Meintel, represented and likely still represents a big 
part of a person’s general identity or better said of a person’s multiple identities. The 
sociologist Portes explains that “in society, ethnicity was securely established at the core 
of a man’s identity.” (Portes 1997: 800).  
And while ethnicity is still focal for the question of one’s identity,  
“what matters is how well the others, with whom one interacts and to whom one is 
compared, manage to perform, and what alternative identities and sets of standards are 
available to the individual.” (Barth 1969: 25).  
A compelling concept of identity equips individuals and groups alike with self-esteem. 
And since identity usually is “grounded in a difference from the otherness of others, the 
positive evaluation of oneself logically leads to a negative view of the otherness of 
others.” (Rüsen 2004: 120). This shows that ‘the other’ – on individual or 
collective/group level – plays an important role in establishing one’s identity. Therefore, 
we shall now turn towards the concepts of alterity and otherness. 
 
2.3 Alterity/Otherness  
The relationship between anthropology and the notion of alterity or otherness, is 
characterized by some as a difficult one. The anthropologists Rapport and Overing offer 
some insight: 
“By definition anthropology’s primary object for study has been the Western 
imperialized other (while sociology has had the task of objectifying the West’s own 
internal subaltern classes). Thus, as anthropology is the academic discipline most overtly 
involved in an objectified imagery of otherness, it has become the obvious target of much 
post-colonial critique” (Rapport, Overing 2003: 9). 
However, today’s approach on alterity is a different one, as anthropology now finds itself 
in an “age of self-reflection”. Hence why it joined  
“other post-colonial voices in a critique of the grand narratives of modernism. […] One 
thing is certain. The programme of decolonizing our ways of thinking about otherness 
means that the anthropology practised today is not the same as yesterday’s.” (Rapport, 
Overing 2003: 10). 
As seen above32, ethnicity is still an essential attribute of individual as well as collective 
identity. This suggests that, consequently, an ethnocentric view is more less common 
amongst all people. Considering this assumption, the ethnocentric construction of ‘the 
                                                          
32 Chapter 2.2.3  
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other’ follows “a process through which alterity is reduced to a familiar form that is 
easily accessible to self.”. Any process of othering is based on “structures of identity and 
difference” and is more about establishing the self-identity than it concerns itself “with 
the empirical reality of the other”, be it a neighbor, enemies, trading partners, “conquered 
peoples, or spirits that populate other worlds.” (Rapport, Overing 2003: 12). 
In regard of national, ethnic, cultural, or religious belonging, globalization transforms 
national and international landscapes, which results in the necessity of adequately 
adapting the conceptual frameworks delineating both “alterity” and “otherness” (Ribeiro 
2006). The process of globalization leads to the establishment of an intercultural context. 
Within this context, identity-formation based on “the conceptual separation of cultures” 
poses a fundamental weakness because it leads to “a mutual devaluation in intercultural 
relationships”, potentially even to “a fundamental and universal clash of civilzations” 
(Rüsen 2004: 120). 
This reveals that structures of identity and of the self are crucial when it comes to 
positioning oneself towards an alleged stranger. Structures and identities that emphasize 
inclusivity are more likely to support permeable “boundaries designating otherness […] 
while for others” those boundaries “are rather rigid, which” shows the emphasize of more 
exclusivist values (Rapport, Overing 2003: 12). 
One way through which rigid boundaries could become more permeable might be the 
social contact theory. This theory suggests that intergroup prejudice can be reduced 
through positive interaction between individuals who belong to different groups. On the 
flipside, interactions of negative contact experience potentially increase stereotypes and 
negative emotions towards ‘the other’ (McKeown, Dixon 2017). This would mean that 
interactions, if of positive nature, could lead to embracing an approach towards ‘the 
other’ that allows permeable boundaries and inclusivity as characteristics of one’s 
identity. Negative experience in return could support the fostering of an exclusivist 
ideology. 
Such exclusivist ideology usually assumes a superiority of oneself towards all others. 
This strategy allows one to disempower others.  An example for that type of ideology and 
practice is the conquering of the Americas by the Europeans, where, based on the 
47 
 
principle of inversion, differences between the self and ‘the other’ were understood as 
absolute. The Europeans, at least its bourgeoning ruling classes, defined the cultures of 
America “as an ensemble of negations” which had “to be contrasted with the civilized 
and cultured society” of Europe (Rapport, Overing 2003: 13). 
These developments were strongly influenced by an exclusivist approach embedded in a 
bold eurocentrism. The common characteristics of ethnocentrism are a centralized 
perspective, asymmetrical evaluation, and teleological continuity (Rüsen 2004: 118). 
Ethnocentric narratives, in a historic context, rely on unbalanced relationships “between 
the image of oneself and the different image of others” in a way which builds up the self-
esteem necessary for “a powerful historical identity […] at the cost of otherness of 
others.” (Rüsen 2004: 119). 
“An insightful observation of Mason (1990: Ch. 2) in his discussions of Eurocentrism is 
that the imagery of the exotic that was used for the American Indian was but a projection 
of the imagery signifying both lack and excess already in use by the European upper 
classes for their own internal other. Europeans, in conquering the Americas, in particular 
Amazonia, fixed the status of Native Americans at the level of the lower echelons of their 
own society, placing them alongside the Jew, the mad, the wild, the child, the peasant, the 
Gypsy and the witch.” (Rapport, Overing 2003: 13).  
What is the most significant point here, is that the imagery of ‘the other’ is nothing but a 
projection of the own internal other. Putting that in the context of European 
colonialization in almost every part of the world and the therefore resulting western 
hegemony, which resulted in an “‘inferiorization’ of excluded others”, 
“it can be argued, as Edward Said has done, that the Orient is a product of a Western 
hegemonic exoticism, the same can certainly be said for Native America as it too became 
the primitive other to Europe’s civilized self” (Rapport, Overing 2003: 14). 
The counterpart to the exclusivist approach is described as follows: 
“[…] the achievement of the social state itself, and hence of the world of the interior, 
requires the force and creative powers of those different from self. Without consuming 
the powers of others, there can be no fertility and no productive capacity. Such an 
anthropophagic strategy of dealing with alterity follows the inclusivist route: we 
incorporate the powers of the other into our own body—and body social.” (Rapport, 
Overing 2003: 15). 
It is important to state that neither approach can claim interpretational sovereignty over 
‘the other’, since one approach is always the familiar one to one person while the other 
approach seems strange from a certain standpoint (Rapport, Overing 2003). One could 
argue that the definition of alterity and otherness can also be applied on the two different 
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approaches. There is no self without ‘the other’, therefore without an exclusivist 
approach, there could be no inclusivist approach either.   
The way social life is imagined today, by each individual and by a broader society, must 
also be influenced by either preferring either the inclusive or the exclusive solution on 
how to deal with otherness. The preference of an inclusive approach is more likely to be 
shared with an egalitarian political strategy – which goes along with “social philosophies 
that stress social symmetry” – while the exclusive solution is more likely to go hand in 
hand with a hierarchical political strategy and is “attached to social asymmetry.” 
(Rapport, Overing 2003: 16). 
Attached to questions of otherness is the notion of culture. Azdouz calls for a nuanced 
approach when it comes to the notion of culture:  
“La culture est quelque chose de vivant. La faire survivre ne suffit pas, il faut prôner sa 
vitalité. Et pour évoluer, elle doit se frotter aux autres cultures. Si on tente de la conserver 
telle qu’elle est, on la momifie.” (Azdouz 2018: 1).  
She continues with stating that this approach of culture is necessary for both the host-
society as well as for the newcomers (Azdouz 2018: 1).  
This brings us to the question how culture is defined, or if it can be defined at all. At 
least, one would think it can be defined since culture is often the used as an equivalent for 
a society into which the newcomers are expected to integrate. However, the notion of 
culture is among the more complex notions as 
“Culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the English language. This 
is so partly because of its intricate historical development, in several European languages, 
but mainly because it has now come to be used for important concepts in several distinct 
intellectual disciplines and in several distinct and incompatible systems of thought.” 
(Williams 1983: 87).33  
                                                          
33 In general, one could assume culture as something which constitutes itself through 
“the relations between general human development and a particular way of life, and between both and the works 
and practices of art and intelligence. It is especially interesting that in archaeology and in cultural anthropology the 
reference to culture or a culture is primarily to material production, while in history and cultural studies the reference is 
primarily to signifying or symbolic systems. This often confuses but even more often conceals the central question of 
the relations between ‘material’ and ‘symbolic’ production, which in some recent argument - cf. my own Culture - have 
always to be related rather than contrasted. Within this complex argument there are fundamentally opposed as well as 
effectively overlapping positions; there are also, understandably, many unresolved questions and confused answers. But 
these arguments and questions cannot be resolved by reducing the complexity of actual usage. This point is relevant 
also to uses of forms of the word in languages other than English, where there is considerable variation. The 
anthropological use is common in the German, Scandinavian and Slavonic language groups, but it is distinctly 
subordinate to the senses of art and learning, or of a general process of human development, in Italian and French.” 
(Williams 1983: 91). 
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What has become obvious through Azdouz’ quote is that culture – as “the relations 
between general human development and a particular way of life, and between both and 
the works and practices of art and intelligence.” (Williams 1983: 91) – is something that 
changes and evolves constantly by the simple fact that it is steadily under influence of 
other cultures and of change coming from within. 
Therefore, if culture becomes the most important factor in differentiate between different 
ethnic groups, “One is led to identify and distinguish ethnic groups by the morphological 
characteristics of the cultures of which they are the bearers.” (Barth 1969: 12). However, 
it is crucial to acknowledge that even though “ethnic categories take cultural differences 
into account, we can assume no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and 
cultural similarities and differences.” (Barth 1969: 14), meaning that the thinking in 
patterns of ‘we’ and ‘them’ needs to be challenged. This would make it easier to analyze 
the development of differences, differences in a world in which spaces are culturally, 
socially and economically interconnected while being “traversed by relations of 
inequality.” (Alonso 1994: 400). 
If social and cultural boundaries are contested, it is necessary to examine the meaning of 
‘we’:  
“The word ‘we’ is situational in that it can refer to a variety of collectivities depending on 
the context. It implies both inclusion and exclusion: by logical extension, the word ‘we’ 
implies ‘they’.” (Eriksen 2015: 2). 
One concept where alterity and otherness are of importance is the concept of the nation, 
which also entails the concept of citizenship. These two notions, nation and citizenship, 
shall be explored in the following sub-chapters. 
 
2.4 Nation 
For almost two centuries now, the dominant structure in terms of political units is the 
nation-state (Neumann 1998). A nation-state is defined as “hegemony protected by the 
armour of coercion”. It can be, in a narrow sense, “equated with government, functions 
by command and coercion”, while in a broader sense, a nation-state equates to a civil as 
well as a political society (Alonso 1994: 381).  
And while nation-states were “once thought fully consolidated”, many are now 
confronted with ‘sub-nationalism’ within their borders. Even though it has been long 
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prophesied that the era of nationalism would come to an end, “nation-ness is the most 
universally legitimate value in the political life of our time.” (Anderson 2006: 3). 
Nonetheless, the explanation of the construct of a nation is still object to many disputes. 
All three notions, nation, nationality and nationalism remain rather difficult to define, not 
to speak of the difficulties any attempted analyzation of those notions is bearing: “In 
contrast to the immense influence that nationalism has exerted on the modern world, 
plausible theory about it is conspicuously meagre.” (Anderson 2006: 3).  
Anderson approaches the idea of a nation as follows: 
“My point of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that 
word’s multiple significations, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts 
of a particular kind. To understand them properly we need to consider carefully how they 
come into historical being, in what ways their meanings have changed over time, and 
why, today, they command such profound emotional legitimacy.” (Anderson 2006: 4). 
 
2.4.1 Imagined nation 
While the nation-state plays an important role in encompassing a political and civil 
society, the imaginary framework legitimizing its nature renders it out of the question 
with regards to the debate about immigration and integration. 
This imagination is the foundation of any nation and becomes clear if we look at what 
Anderson has to say: 
“It is an imagined political community – and imagined as both inherently limited and 
sovereign. It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never 
know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of 
each lives the image of their communion.” (Anderson 2006: 6). 
This echoes the pseudo we-group Kreckel refers to in regard to national identity in 
chapter 2.2. Contributing to the thought that collective, national identity is based on 
inventing commonalities, it can be argued that “Nationalism is not the awakening of 
nations to self-consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist.” (Anderson 
2006: 6). And since inventing goes hand in hand with imagining, it seems right to turn 
towards the three dimensions of imagining a nation, as a community, as limited, and as 
sovereign. 
The limited nation 
The first dimension in the imagination of a nation is the nation being imagined as limited. 
It is imagined as such because regardless of the amount of people living within the 
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territory, a nation has boundaries beyond which another nation lies. No nation imagines 
itself as encompassing all of mankind. As Anderson puts it: 
The most messianic nationalists do not dream of a day when all the members of the 
human race will join their nation in the way that it was possible, in certain epochs, for, 
say, Christians to dream of a wholly Christian planet.” (Anderson 2006: 7). 
This imagination of a limited territory and therefore the existence of other nations beyond 
the borders, brings along an inevitable ‘we-and-them’ thinking, as seen in chapter 2.3. 
From which it is not far to a ‘we-versus-them’ approach, which has become, amongst 
some positions at least, part of the integration debate.  
The sovereign nation 
As the second dimension of imagination, Anderson argues that the nation is imagined as 
sovereign since the idea of a nation came to life during revolution and Enlightenment 
which destroyed the legitimacy previously held by the hierarchical dynastic and divinely-
ordained realm. 
Coming to maturity at a stage of human history when even the most devout adherents of 
any universal religion were inescapably confronted with the living pluralism of such 
religions, and the allomorphism between each faith’s ontological claims and territorial 
stretch, nations dream of being free, and, if under God, directly so. The gage and emblem 
of this freedom is the sovereign state.” (Anderson 2006: 7). 
This implies that a sovereign nation-state would draw a clear line between political order 
and religious aspects which may shape the lives of its citizens. 
The nation as a community 
The third dimension of imagination is the imagination of the nation as a community. 
Because despite there exist exploitation and inequality amongst the population of any 
nation, it is nonetheless “conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.” (Anderson 2006: 
7). It is such perceived fraternity which has led to millions of people not just to kill but 
more so to willingly die for these limited imaginations in the past centuries. 
Here, it is remarkable that the nation is imagined as a community. This means that it is 
imagined as a Gemeinschaft, therefore not as a Gesellschaft, not as a society. Even 
though the society is seen as the result of the development of a community, as explained 
earlier.34 This would indicate that a society is not necessarily bound to one single nation 
and that the imagination of a nation as a community, bears difficulties in terms of a 
                                                          
34 See chapter 2.1 
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symmetric integration process taking place since a community is usually not considered a 
multicultural construct. 
If we look at the rise of nationalism and nations as such towards the end of the eighteenth 
century, Anderson doesn’t see it as a simple production of the “erosion of religious 
certainties”, nor is he “suggesting that somehow nationalism historically ‘supersedes’ 
religion.” He wants to understand nationalism “by aligning it, not with self-consciously 
held political ideologies, but with the large cultural systems that preceded it, out of which 
– as well as against which – it came into being.” (Anderson 2006: 12).  
The two cultural systems that stand out are the “religious community and the dynastic 
realm.” which both were usually – similar as nationality today – “taken-for-granted 
frames of reference” (Anderson 2006: 12).  This shows that also the nation-state, while 
by some at least being taken for granted, might undergo drastic changes in the future.  
“We can summarize […] that the convergence of capitalism and print technology on the 
fatal diversity of human language created the possibility of a new form of imagined 
community, which in its basic morphology set the stage for the modern nation.” 
(Anderson 2006: 46). 
 
2.4.2 Variation of nation 
However, this doesn’t mean that today, a nation is simply imagined as a political and 
non-cultural formation. Peters offers two different conceptions of nationhood, the cultural 
nation (ethno-cultural) and the nation-state (civic). The ethnocultural conception of 
nationhood is based on a “common genealogy and descent ties, a common history, shared 
cultural traditions and customs as constitutive elements of the nation or of national 
identity.” (Peters 2002: 4). Seen from the civic perspective, a nation is considered as “a 
political community, or more specifically as a self-governing, democratic polity with 
legal and political equality among its citizen-members” (Peters 2002: 4).  
In addition to that, Peters offers a more differentiated view on the conception of 
nationhood. Through the splitting of the term ‘ethno-cultural’ into the two components 
ethnic and cultural, and through the inclusion of the idea of a working-class solidarity, 
four different conception of nationhood are highlighted. All four of them are grounded on 
the criteria of equality or commonality among members of a nation. Equality or 
commonalities are constituted through “common descent or shared history, a shared 
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cultural heritage, or membership in a liberal-democratic political community 
(citizenship)” (Peters 2002: 4) or said working-class solidarity.  
Resulting out of these different commonalities are the four types: “an ethnic conception 
(Volksnation), a cultural conception (Kulturnation), a political conception 
(Staatsbürgernation) and a ‘class’ conception (Klassennation).” (Peters 2002: 4). Since 
the ethnic conception partly relies on cultural commonalities, the distinction between the 
‘cultural’ and ‘ethnic’ type bears a certain fuzziness.  
Peters further argues that the class conception is not relevant anymore since it is 
historically outdated – class nation applied to the former GDR – and that it leaves us with 
“a tripartite model” – ethnic, cultural, and political (civic) that is – which is applicable 
more broadly (Peters 2002: 4). 
Considering the above given explanation of Peters, it seems plausible to connect the 
following notions to the respective concepts of nation. For the cultural and ethnic 
conception – since they seem to be strongly intertwined – the notions of alterity along 
with (national) identity seems of high importance, meaning that the ethno-cultural 
perception of a nation comes with strict separation between the self and ‘the other’. 
The political conception of the nation would arguably put the factor of citizenship at the 
top of its priorities while certainly also being linked to identity, based on shared sets of 
rules and values. That is if citizenship is understood as a sign of belonging to the majority 
society of a nation-state. 
Therefore, depending on the approach one takes towards a nation-state, the perception of 
integration – civic or ethno-cultural – is likely to differ as well. Since the notion of 
alterity and otherness was explored previously, it is now time to focus on the notion of 
citizenship and its meaning for integration. 
 
2.5 Citizenship 
In the classic democratic nation-state, holding a citizenship comes with certain rights and 
duties. Rights come in the form of “having the right to vote and to stand for political 
office, enjoying equality before the law, and being entitled to various government 
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services and benefits.”. Duties, or obligations, come in the form of paying taxes, obeying 
the laws, and if necessary defending your country (Castles 1998: 223). 
This shows the connections of privileges and duties a citizenship brings with itself. 
However, a member of the society, which is not a citizen, usually still has certain duties 
such as obeying the laws and paying taxes, without enjoying all of the privileges. 
The definition of citizenship, from an anthropology standpoint, can be seen as follows: 
“Anthropologists have theorized citizenship as a status whose criteria subaltern peoples 
challenge and contest as they move toward full, rather than second-class, membership in 
states […] Scholars have also theorized citizenship as a category through which people 
are disciplined into particular kinds of subjects even as they struggle with the terms of 
their belonging.” (Blackburn 2009: 67). 
This approach leaves immigrants of any sort, who do not own a citizenship of the country 
in which they reside, as second-class members of the nation-state. As an alternative to the 
concept of national citizenship, the idea of a global citizenship is supported by 
institutions like the UN and international NGOs which support human rights transcending 
and crossing international borders (Radice 2009). However, nations sometimes ignore 
international laws and treaties, therefore “it nonetheless seems to be the case that the 
basic unit of accountability is still the nation-state” (Skrbis, Kendall, Woodwart 2004: 
124). 
Recalling how the average nation-state came to life, strongly influenced by alterity35, 
devaluating ‘the other’, by inventing ethno-cultural commonalities, it might not surprise 
that “many citizenship projects were framed in biological terms; in terms of race, blood 
lines, stock, intelligence, and so forth.” (Rose, Novas 2008: 440). Consequently, such 
projects of biological citizenship produced, in the 19th and 20th century, citizens who 
perceived their allegiances, distinctions, and nationality, at least partly, in biological 
terms. Citizens established the link between their fellow citizens and themselves and 
drew the line of distinction between them and non-citizens, ‘the others’, at least party in 
biological terms (Rose, Novas 2008).  
Any type of claimed homogeneity of a nation-state, whether on biological or ethno-
cultural basis, came and still comes frequently “at the cost of oppression of minorities”. 
Which means that homogeneity of a nation-state is oftentimes a consequence of the 
                                                          
35 See chapter 2.3 
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victory of the ruling elites of the respective nation-state (Skrbis, Kendall, Woodwart 
2004: 125).  
However, due to the effects of globalization, national forms of citizenship become more 
and more challenged and nation-states can no longer be perceived as a cultural, ethnic, or 
religious unity tied to a single national economy. Furthermore, political and economic 
migration cast doubt on the capacity of nation-states to demarcate its “citizens in terms of 
place of birth or lineage or race.” (Rose, Novas 2008: 439, 440). If a homogeneous unit 
of a nation is unrealistic, questions of how national identity is established are congruous. 
The link between citizenship, identity, and nation surfaces when taking into account that 
“common rights of citizenship do not accommodate the needs of minorities or the legal 
and political rights of indigenous people” (Blackburn 2009: 66).  
It is argued that if “special claims of racial or ethnic minorities” are opposed, it usually 
covers-up another, “unmarked, ‘identity politics’,” which is an “actively sustained 
historical positioning and possessive investment in Whiteness.”. Such defensive response 
is generally mobilized, most aggressively by the Right, but stretches throughout the 
political spectrum (Clifford 2000: 97). 
This goes hand in hand with the desire of opponents and critics of migration to keep 
privileges and the interpretational sovereignty over national identity as explained earlier 
by Münkler.36 Fittingly so, some bring up “the question of racism in Europe and the 
danger that “this ‘European consciousness’ will be constructed in exclusionary and 
discriminatory terms, based upon the perceived threat of being swamped by ‘desperate 
masses’ from the south”.” (Piché 2013: 153). Such constructed ‘European consciousness’ 
reminds me of the usage of the term Gemeinschaft in describing a European 
community.37 
In opposition to that development, it is argued that the formation  
“of new minorities with distinct cultures, identities and institutions, is an irreversible 
process, which questions existing notions of national identity and citizenship”. For 
Castles, “multicultural models appear to offer the best solution, but there are substantial 
obstacles to their realization”.” (Piché 2013: 153). 
 
                                                          
36 See chapter 1.2 
37 See chapter 2.1.1  
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Castles argues that multiculturalism is more likely to be accepted and embraced by the 
local population if immigration is linked to economic growth, and with it an improving or 
at least the maintenance of the living standard. If this is not the case, people perceived as 
‘the other’ might be labelled as scapegoats by the local population (Castles 1987). This 
reminds us of the assumption made earlier that a strong system integration might be able 
to cover up a relatively weak social integration.38 And in return, a weak social integration 
proves problematic if the system integration is rather liable.  
While the future importance of the notion citizenship remains to be seen, it is evident that 
the possession or non-possession of a citizenship is critical to the idea of integration 
because “National citizenship may entail a feeling of being accepted by the state or the 
community, as emphasized by applicants for naturalization.” (Ersboll 2014: 861). Here it 
seems plausible that, due to the different levels of integration and different approaches of 
a nation, the possession of citizenship marks mostly the acceptance by the state in the 
context of a civic nationhood. Whether obtaining citizenship has positive effects on 
integration into a nation-state shaped by ethno-cultural approach of nationhood arguably 
depends on the conception of political community in which the concept of citizenship is 
used.  
 The concept of citizenship can be examined through “three different conceptions of the 
political community: a national, a republican and a societal one.” (Bauböck 1998: 33).  
The national one highlights that the “relevant community to be included in citizenship 
has a life of its own, independent from the state by which it is presently organized”. The 
relevant community can be of religion, language, of a shared historical experience or of 
imagined common descent (Bauböck 1998: 33). This form seems to leave little to no 
space for newcomers to achieve that type of citizenship. 
The republican conception of political community is “self-referentially focused on the 
political community which takes priority over other affiliations such as ethnic, religious, 
or societal ties. It extols the virtues of patriotism and active participation in politics.” 
(Bauböck 1998: 33). To hold that kind of citizenship, the state must be ready to grant 
                                                          




political rights to all its residents. This seems to be in accord with the afore mentioned 
constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus). 
Lastly, the societal conception is the most inclusive: 
“It refers to the population which is durably subjected to a state power and depends on this 
power for a garantuee of its fundamental rights. Because of the internal territorial organization 
of modern states, society so conceived is basically identical with the resident population of a 
state.” (Bauböck 1998: 33). 
The most inclusive conception seems to be the most plausible and appropriate one, 
considering the contemporary situation: 
“the societal conception of citizenship must be the bedrock for a liberal answer to the 
challenge raised by international migration. The national and the republican versions 
should be rejected for two reasons. First they rest on an unrealistic, or even mythical, 
description of societal boundaries in modernity which ignores the powerful forces of 
territorial structuration of societies by the state system. Secondly, by excluding from the 
political community and the rights of citizenship populations who are nonetheless 
subjected to political power of states these conceptions violate the basic liberal principle 
of equal concern and respect […] for everybody who depends on a government for a 
guarantee of her or his rights.” (Bauböck 1998: 35). 
 
Most likely, considering the current developments of the notions of nation and 
citizenship, eventually, immigration will lead to the uprising of “multicultural societies, 
leading in turn to new concepts of citizenship” and the nation-state (Piché 2013: 154). 
Ever shifting landscapes which are shaped by new technologies, the flows of markets, 
and the rising mobility of populations challenge the classical notion of citizenship, that is 
tied to the imagination and the terrain of a nation state (Ong 2006). And “while in theory 
political rights depend on membership in a nation-state, in practice, new entitlements are 
being realized through situated mobilizations and claims in milieus of globalized 
contingency.” (Ong 2006: 499). Hence why: 
“A simple opposition between territorialized citizenship and deterritorialized human 
rights is not able to capture the varied assemblages that are the sites of contemporary 
political claims by a range of residential, expatriate, and migrant actors.” (Ong 2006: 
504). 
More appropriate, a unification of both, territorialized and deterritorialized approaches 
could form milieus where problems “of the human are crystallized and problems posed 
and resolved.” (Ong 2006: 504). Therefore, the development towards a societal form of 
citizenship seems to be the most fitting form for today’s context and today’s challenges. 
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How the notions such as citizenship, national identity, and integration are connected and 
impact each other is made evident in the following quote, which also exposes how 
ethnocultural and civic identities affect integration policies: 
“Often, the basic legal principle for the conferral of citizenship status is also brought into 
the picture: ius sanguinis is seen as connected with an ethnic conception of nationhood 
and 'exclusionist' policies; ius soli with civic national identity and inclusive policies” 
(Peters 2002: 6). 
As the last quote indicates, the different birthrights – jus sanguinis and jus soli – also play 
a role in the perception of national identity. How the birthright in Germany affects the 
national identity will be part of the following chapter. 
 
Synthesis of chapter 2 
To find out how national identity shapes the understanding of integration, several key-
notions and their interrelations are to be considered. Since the concept of integration 
implies the existence of different groups – be it of national, civic, ethnic, cultural, or 
religious forms of belonging – it is necessary to dissect how different conceptions of 
notions such as nation, national identity, and citizenship affect the process of othering 
which in turn affects the approach towards ‘the other’, which ultimately impacts whether 
the majority population of the host-society favors either an asymmetric integration 
process based on assimilation into the dominant culture of the host-society, or a 
symmetric learning process based on the idea of conviviality.  
The concept of identity is based on the differentiation between the self and ‘the other’, on 
individual as much as on a collective scale. What is critical is the idea of a continuity of 
identity of an individual and a collective alike, since identity is multi-layered and exposed 
to a steady change, through intrinsic process as much as through exterior influences. 
The development of a collective identity of a nation, or national identity – which 
determines what and who is part of and belongs to the nation – depends to a great deal on 
the conception of a nation. An ethnic or ethno-cultural conception of a nation relies on a 
sense of belonging based on common descent, therefore favoring a citizenship concept of 
jus sanguinis. Such conception implies a rather rigid differentiation between the self, in 
this case the national community, and ‘the other’, newcomers of any sorts that is. A civic 
conception of a nation is founded on the belief of shared basic norms and values, 
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regardless of ethnic, cultural, or religious backgrounds. This conception, which usually 
favors the citizenship concept of jus soli, seems to offer a – compared to the former 
conception – more fluid differentiation between the self and newcomers. Nonetheless, the 
conception of any nation is usually based on imagined and invented commonalities 
between the local population. 
It is assumed that a national identity of ethnic or ethno-cultural approach promotes a 
rather exclusive stance towards ‘the other’, including the belief of one’s own superiority 
over ‘the other’. Whereas a civic national identity suggests an open and permeable 


























3. German context 
In this chapter, I highlight how national identity came to life in Germany as well as the 
role citizenship policies plays. I shall also look at migration to, and otherness in 
Germany. Furthermore, the differences of rural and urban settings, in regard of the 
integration of newcomers, are also portrayed at the end of chapter 3. 
3.1 Development of the German national identity  
Germany, as a nation-state, was only founded in 1871, making it a relatively young and 
sovereign country (Schönteich 2013). Even though this is not where the history of 
German collective identity starts39, given the frame of this thesis, we shall skip over some 
time periods and focus on how the German national identity was shaped towards the end 
of the 20th century. But before that, a few milestones in the development of the German 
national identity need to be highlighted:  
3.1.1 The German people – Das Volk 
The creation of a common German national identity was based on the perception of other 
nations, for example France, “which were gradually all constructed as inferior in relation 
to the German one” (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 79). It was those circumstances which gave 
birth to the idea of the Volk, a specific interpretation of the concept of community. This 
concept was linked closely to the concept of ethnicity and gained “prominence in relation 
to the national project until very recently.” (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 79)40.  
The concept of the Volk was based on the idea of Johan Gottfried Herder, a German 
philosopher41, who saw the “Volk (people) forming a Blutsgemeinschaft (community of 
blood), and the Volksseele (national soul) and the Volksgeist (national spirit) forming a 
specific historical individuality”. He further saw nationalism detached from state, 
citizenship or politics, while considering nations as rooted in culture, ethnicity and 
                                                          
39 The Historian Fried sees the beginning of a collective German identity around the 10th century when a multicultural 
mixture of tribes, living between the Rhine, Danube and Oder, were united under a superordinate regime: The Holy 
Roman Empire led by the Ottonians and Staufers (Staas 2015). 
40 “The concept of the Volk especially stressed the factor of a common bloodline of all the members of the nation, 
which – like one big family – were all perceived as of a common descent, of which the common language is an 
important constituting factor. Germany thus developed an idea of ethnic origin and common identity, which was far 
more ideological than the concept of ethnicity and that strongly linked ideology and – perceived – biological factors. 
This concept was directly related to the devaluation of other nations and ethnic groups” (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 79). 
41 Herder lived from 1744 to 1803. 
61 
 
language, meaning that nations are organic and not artificially constructed (Berger 1997: 
24).  
Here it comes to mind how Kreckel42 argued that nations cannot have a soul and how 
Anderson43 argued that nations are imagined, therefore constructed, as shown in chapter 
2. It seems like the concept of the Volk was the starting point of mixing ethnic – or 
biological – with cultural – or ideological – factors, possibly laying the foundation for the 
blurry ethno-cultural approach of nationhood in Germany. 
It was J.G. Fichte, also a German philosopher44, who doubled down on Herder’s 
approach, by “putting the German collective identity above everyone else’s.” (Berger 
1997: 24). Consequently, the German nation was described as particularly original and 
unique which had to be protected against contamination by other nations.45  
The German national identity was built on ideas of superiority against everything which, 
and everyone who was non-German. It is important to note that the idea of being German 
was tied to biological factors, implying that someone who migrated to Germany would 
never be able to become German. The belief of superiority however was not limit to 
either ethnicity nor culture46. 
With the emergence of a German nation-state, the two understandings of an ethno-nation 
and a nation-state became intertwined, with “state policies throughout the history of 
German nation-states intended to build a closer entity of ethno-nation and state, thus 
redrawing boundaries of both entities.” (Ohliger 1999: 104). And while “the “civic” 
nations of the West, defined nationhood by state territory and adherence to abstract 
political principles (such as liberty and equality)”, in Germany, due to the strong 
imagination of an organic community, nationhood was “based on the “ethnic” model of a 
linguistically and culturally unified group, a “community of destiny” 
(Schicksalsgemeinschaft)” (Joppke 1996: 467).  
                                                          
42 See chapter 2.2.2 
43 See chapter 2.4.1 
44 Fichte lived from 1762 to 1814 
45 “Salvation lay solely in the vigorous defence from all foreign influences of its own culture and language” which was 
considered as the original language (Ursprache) of mankind (Berger 1997: 24). 
46 “while the future political shape of the German nation remained contested and uncertain,” another factor for 
identification, besides ethnicity and culture, came into play. The economy, due to massive economic expansion during 
the 1850s/60s, became a field “in which the Germans could demonstrate their superiority.” (Schulze 1989: 1008). 
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Here, an already existing ambiguity between Germany and the West47 was reinforced and 
resulted in “Germany’s ethnocultural legacy of nationhood” (Joppke 1996: 467).  
3.1.2 Weimarer Republik, Nazi-Regime  
Another focal landmark for the collective memory of Germany constitutes the time of the 
Weimarer Republik, which peaked shortly in the 1920s (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012). In the 
beginning of the Weimarer Republik the economic success had carried into the German 
nation-state. The economic success veneered “deep fissures in German society” and 
daubed rifts “between the political parties” (Schulze 1989: 1009).48 This seems to be an 
example for Kreckel’s thought of strong system integration being able to make up for 
weak social or moral integration.49   
With the world economic crisis of 1929 adding up to the “pressure of reparations for 
World War I”, the young republic became too weak and ended up as “the precursor for 
the National Socialist dictatorship.” and was “finally gradually taken over by right-wing 
extremist political powers.” (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 80).  
During the Nazi regime, which ended the democracy in Germany after Hitler came into 
power (Caldwell 2008), the thought of a German ‘race’, superior to all other ‘races’ 
reached its peak, culminating in “extreme degradation of ‘non-ethnic Germans’,” 
resulting in the attempt to govern them “and even extinguish other groups and nations.” 
and leading to “the unprecedented genocide of the Holocaust by the National 
Socialists.”(Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 79).  
3.1.3 FRG  – Bonn Republic 
Between 1949 and 1990, in the context of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), the 
Nazi past of Germany usually served as the foundation for the basic narrative of the 
country. This narrative made “any identification with the nation contentious as well as 
difficult.” (Welch, Wittlinger 2011: 44). 50 
                                                          
47 In France and the UK, there was an emphasis “on the political construction of the nation, via the concept of 
citizenship and the concept of constitutional development respectively.”, while the German case was more so based on 
the “special emphasis on history, culture and ethnicity” (Berger 1997: 10, 11). 
48 During the time-span of 1918-1935, concepts of the public, nation, law and citizen were steadily discussed as 
“political players took positions on which rights and procedures should replace monarchial rule with popular self-
government.” (Caldwell 2008: 40). 
49 See chapter 2.1.1 
50 While the Nazi past was the foundation for the basic narrative, in the aftermath of the Holocaust and WWII, the 
immediate past of National Socialism was barely discussed. This, it is argued, was “in fact the precondition for a 
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During those 41 years, the Bonn Republic struggled to place World War II and the 
Holocaust in the historical consciousness of the country, as 
“a characteristic historical compromise between the Nazi past and the democratic present 
continued to fuel a German skepticism toward any emphatic idea of democracy and 
freedom in the restorative climate of postwar culture.” (Brunkhorst 1992: 128). 
The bourgeoisie were mostly conservative and supported the opinions of right-wing 
intellectuals such as Carl Schmitt, Arnold Gehlen, Ernst Jünger and Martin Heidegger. 
These intellectuals shared the belief that “the egalitarian concept of freedom of the 
Western democracies was in essence little more than a mixture of Bolshevism and 
Americanism” (Brunkhorst 1992: 128).  
3.1.4 The historian-dispute – Historiker-Streit 
During the 1980s, a debate took place among historians, in which the historical identity 
of the citizens of West Germany was heatedly fought out, took place. Revisionist 
historians, by relativizing or historicizing Nazi crimes, tried to “remove the Nazi stigma 
that had been the central feature of postwar German historical consciousness”, and 
instead tried re-establishing “the continuity of German history and identity that had been 
interrupted from 1933 to 1945.” (Federico 1993: 350). 
Within this debate, Germanys ambivalent relation to the West and modernity, became 
visible once again. Contributing to the debate, the philosopher and sociologist Habermas  
“asked whether Germany’s orientation toward the West would in future be understood 
merely pragmatically, as a system of alliances and economic ties, or whether it would 
mean “a new, principled intellectual orientation” to the West’s enlightenment culture. 
Would Germany embark upon the path of a nation-state, resuscitating the notion of a 
German Sonderbewußtsein between East and West, or would it instead develop a post-
traditional identity, one marked not by nationalism but by “constitutional patriotism”, a 
readiness to identity with the political order and the principles embodied in the Basic 
Law?”51 (Federico 1993: 350).  
 
Within this debate, one can see how the ambivalence between belonging to the East or 
West also carried into the debate about the approach of national identity. 
This situation of being between the East and West was epitomized in the existence of two 
German nation-states, the GDR and the FRG. 
                                                                                                                                                                             
successful and stable democracy in the Federal Republic.” (Berger 1997: 87). According to Lübbe, to exclude the 
“consciousness of their own involvement with the Nazi” was what made it possible for the larger part of the West 
German population “to turn to the new democracy with such amazing speed.” (Berger 1997: 87, 88). 




3.1.5 GDR – East Germany  
The GDR desired ethnic homogeneity. This was evident in the strict segregation between 
the local population and foreign labor migrants (Münkler 2016). While there were a 
relatively small number of foreigners residing in the GDR, “the state did its best to keep 
them residentially and even culturally separate from its citizens.” (Eley, Palmowski 2008: 
8). The wish for cultural separation becomes visible when considering that “GDR 
officials expected Spanish émigrés who had sought refuge from the Franco regime during 
the 1950s to remain loyal to their distinctive Spanish nationality”, whether they were in 
possession of GDR identity documents or not (Palmowski 2008: 75).  
When GDR citizens became FRG citizens, they had little to no experience with the 
‘foreign’, the ‘other’, leading to the consideration of the GDR as the most German 
Germany there ever was (Münkler 2016). 
With the end to the era of the block confrontation, which had given the reason to the 
imagination of belonging to the East and West respectively, Germany needed a unifying 
narrative due to the growing heterogeneity (Münkler 2016). 
3.1.6 Post-unification 
Once the process of unification started, it became clear that the chosen approach was the 
one of ‘system integration’52. Between July and October 1990, first the “West German 
currency and the free market system were transferred to East Germany”, followed by the 
“West German constitution and the legal system” (Kreckel 1995: 9). Remaining aspects 
of the system integration of East Germany were either replaced or “incorporated into the 
western system.” (Kreckel 1995: 9). Opposing the perception and fear in the neighboring 
countries, based on the memory of the German unification of 1871,  
“[…] the absence of nationalist rhetoric was quite spectacular: The second unification of 
Germany was rather a cool procedure. It was performed as a conscious act of system 
integration, with little concern for moral integration.” (Kreckel 1995: 9). 
This would mean that the post-national identity which was dominant in the Bonn republic 
got carried into reunited Germany. However, the political scientists Welch and Wittlinger 
argue that “Whatever the depth of the postwar cosmopolitanization” was, the identity 
discourse shifted from post-national to national once again in the wake of the unification 
                                                          
52 See chapter 2.1.1 
65 
 
(Welch, Wittlinger 2011: 46). After 1989, many historians, mostly from the Bonn 
Republic, supported “the alleged ‘normality’ of the nation-state” (Berger 1997: 2). 
This approach acknowledged full culpability “for crimes committed during the Third 
Reich” while also promoted “the articulation of a positive identification with the German 
nation, and rather confident conduct in general.” (Welch, Wittlinger 2011: 46, 47).   
The emphasizing of a positive identification with Germany came along with a newly 
found self-confidence among the population in terms of perceiving its own nation. This 
led to a rise of nationalism in the reunited Germany. Nationalism had never fully 
disappeared. Extreme right-wing organizations had noticeable success in elections in the 
1950s, the late 1960s and the mid-1980s. After the unification, right-wing nationalism 
found its way into society and had “impact on the political spectrum of centre-right” and 
“to some extent even on section of the left in Germany.” (Berger 1997: 1). 
Such “extremism of the centre” became visible in a “remilitarisation of foreign policy”, 
stricter asylum laws, as well as in the public discourse which “steadily shifted to the 
right” (Berger 1997: 1). 
3.1.7 21st Century 
Since the beginning of the 21st century, “Germans have broken a series of taboos, both in 
their foreign policies and their national dialogue with their past.” (Hampton, Pfeiffer 
2007: 371). The general understanding that Germany plays a much more reserved role in 
world politics, once considered as a solidified idea based on the historical past and “the 
collective memory that Germany incited and lost two World Wars.”, began to change 
(Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 80). This change had its roots in the new confident approach of 
the 1990s, as explained above53. 
Along with this newly found confidence goes the debate about the German identity in 
contrast to immigrants. A prime example is the book “Deutschland schafft sich ab” 
(Germany Does Away with Itself), published in 2010 by Thilo Sarrazin, then executive 
board member of the Bundesbank and former Berlin state finance minister (Foroutan 
2013). The book was remarkably influential and “has marked a new German self-
perception of superiority.” (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 80). The controversial book, released 
                                                          
53 Chapter 3.1.6  
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in 2010, supported claims such as Muslims being “less intelligent because of their 
cultural ties,” preferring “to live off the state rather than work,” and having “too many 
children (while well-educated native Germans are having too few).” (Foroutan 2013: 6).  
It became a best-selling book – with more than 1 million copies being sold – in 2010 
(Foroutan 2013), and quickly “obtained the status of the most successful non-fictional 
book in post-war-German history.” (Nordbruch 2011: 10). 
Sarrazin, who is also a politician and a member of the SPD (Social-Democratic Party of 
Germany) argued that Germany would do away with itself, based on a demographic 
change, specifically the rise of immigrant groups. Amongst those groups, Sarrazin 
singled out Muslims who, according to him, would be – based on their culture and/or 
religion – not only less economically effective but also less intelligent than others (Mühe, 
Schiffauer 2012).  
This suggests that the feeling of superiority is not bound to a belief of biological strength 
but more so to a self-perception of cultural and economic superiority. Mühe and 
Schiffauer point out that 
“It is nevertheless a nationally and culturally determined perception of superiority, where 
the understanding of culture is very essentialising, defining cultures as fixed and 
inflexible entities, and thus to a certain extent takes the place that was formerly inhabited 
by a similarly fixed and essentialising understanding of ‘race’.” (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 
81). 
This means that today, the self-perception of the German society is based not necessarily 
on ethnic homogeneity, but rather on cultural and economic superiority. Nonetheless, 
there still resides a rather strong “understanding of national identity based on ethnic 
origin” throughout society and politics alike (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 81).  
In the new federal states (former GDR), the determination of identity is still rooted 
strongly in an ethnic imagination, opposed to the Western part of Germany where identity 
is mostly defined culturally (Münkler 2016). Here the fuzziness of differentiation 
between ethnic and cultural identity comes back to mind. 
Since it seems like there are discrepancies within Germany concerning how to define 
German-ness, it consequently suggests that the integration of the German society towards 
the inside is relatively weak, which renders – following the logic of Fortin54 – the 
                                                          
54 See chapter 2.1 
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German society less capable of acting as an integration center for newcomers. Or in other 
words: 
“As the national identification and moral integration of East and West German citizens is 
not very strong, the mechanisms of system integration carry the main burden of societal 
integration. This means that in case of a prolonged economic crisis the absence of a 
secure basis of moral integration could turn into a problem. The temptations might be 
there to substitute it by pseudo-we-group identification and an increasing discrimination 
of foreigners.” (Kreckel 1995: 9). 
The rising importance of cultural aspects becomes clear in the debate about a German 
core culture, Leitkultur. With the diversity of the population of Germany had grown 
significantly since the arrival of the guestworkers, discussions about a Leitkultur, a 
dominant and guiding culture, arose as well. In the year 2000, the then member of 
parliament Friedrich Merz of the CDU – Merz left politics for over a decade but recently 
announced his campaign to be elected head of the CDU when Angela Merkel steps down 
in December 2018 – coined the notion “deutsche Leitkultur” (German leading culture) 
which would demand that immigrants accept German morals, customs and habits 
(Chemata 2013: 37). This is the re-reading of Bassam Tibi’s term Leitkultur, as explained 
in chapter 1.55 
The new significance of alleged cultural differences affects mostly Muslims. After the 
events of 9/11, the image and perception of Muslims has changed drastically, including in 
the German public discourse (Foroutan 2013).  
The German Institute for Human rights conducted a study, finding out that terms such as: 
backwards, undemocratic, intolerant and fanatic are general associations and attributes 
that are linked to the Muslims in Germany. Further it is portrayed that being Muslim and 
Islam are “perceived as in stark contrast to being German. After 9/11 “Muslims” have 
been largely perceived as a security threat, leading to alienation and estrangement.” 
(Foroutan 2013: 6). Incidentally, 75 percent of the participants of that study responded 
negatively to the question if Muslim culture fits into the Western world, while 21.4 
percent agreed that there should be no further Muslim immigration to Germany. These 
results are similar than the one from other several studies, revealing the strong rejection 
of Islam and Muslims in Germany. One study of the University of Münster concluded 
that islamophobia, and simultaneously the negative perception of adherents of any other 
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non-Christian religion, in Germany is stronger than in any other European countries 
(Foroutan 2013).  
Those sentiments are sometimes externalized through violence and aggressions, exercised 
by parts of the local population. There is also structural and systematic discrimination 
considering that 
 “[…] people of Muslim background are less likely to be hired; if their name is recognizably 
non-German, they may not even get a job interview. They have a harder time finding an 
apartment for the same reasons, and students with a migration background are less likely to 
receive teacher recommendations for higher-education opportunities” (Foroutan 2013: 6, 7). 
Around 2006, policymakers and politicians began discussing about threats to the social 
cohesion. Initiatives such as the German Islam Conference, established by the former 
Interior minister Wolfgang Schäuble, or the integration summit, initiated by Angela 
Merkel, aimed at creating “a national framework for dialogue between the German state 
and Muslims living in Germany.” And exploring “new concepts on how to deal with 
diversity in a changing Germany”. (Foroutan 2013: 7).  
While those events were mainly addressing the aspect of social cohesion in Germany, 
another motivation behind the initiatives was – based on the growing need for foreign 
skilled and high-skilled workers – “creating a more welcoming climate for foreign 
workers” (Foroutan 2013: 7). This shows that the economic situation might have pushed 
the policymakers towards addressing issues of social cohesion to the benefit of the 
economy. However, the realization that Germany depends on foreign workers is only 
slowly “trickling down into the general population.” (Foroutan 2013: 7). 
Today, a part of German society is sticking to the belief of ethnic homogeneity – or as 
Tina Marie Campt56, puts it:  
“One effect of […] a homogeneous conception of German identity is the conflaction of 
“German” with “white”, by implication rendering German cultural identity a form of 
“racial” identity. Thus constituted, German cultural identity excludes any form of 
ethnicity as “other” in relation to itself.” (Campt 1993: 113).  
– and doesn’t want to imagine anything else for the future. On the other hand, others are 
open to the world, liberal-minded and don’t see Germany as an exclusively ethnic-
defined country (Münkler 2016).  
                                                          
56 Campt is the Director of the Barnard Center for Research on Women, and Professor of Africana and Women's 
Gender and Sexuality Studies at Barnard College. 
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Considering Campt’s statement, it seems plausible to assume that in Germany the lines 
between cultural identity and racial identity became at least blurred, if not to say almost 
non-existent. How important the self-perception of one’s, in this context, cultural/racial, 
or ethnocultural identity is to the development of a society becomes clear in the following 
quote: 
“Through its cultural heritage a society becomes visible to itself and to others. Which 
past becomes evident in that heritage and which values emerge in its identificatory 
appropriation tells us much about the constitution and tendencies of a society.” (Collier 
Sy-Quia 1997: 75)  
 
3.2 German citizenship policy and its impact on national identity  
Through the universalism and the enlightenment of the French revolution, the citizen was 
no longer defined by its origin and history, but by the obligation to a certain political 
order, namely democracy. Through the normative humanism of the enlightenment, the 
identity of ‘the human’ was accessible for everyone who was fighting against political 
standardization and societal conventions (Assmann 1993). 
However, this community of peoplehood had no political concretization in Germany. 
More so, the German nationalism of the 19th century focused on collective identity. The 
democratic concept of a nation which governs itself through the parliament was replaced 
by an organic concept of a nation which made the descent – contrary to the vote – the 
criteria of belonging. Active forms of democratic decision-making process were replaced 
by affective obligations (Assmann 1993). Or in other words, the 
“prepolitical German nation, this nation in search of a state, was conceived not as the 
bearer of universal political values, but as an organic cultural, linguistic, or racial 
community – as an irreducibly particular Volksgemeinschaft.” (Brubaker 1992: 1).  
As a consequence of the German nation-state, passports gained significance.57 The afore-
mentioned ethnic conception of the German nation – which “delineates “insider” from 
“outsider” based on kinship ties” – also impacted the definition of citizenship, which was 
                                                          
57 Those identity-papers contributed to a stronger differentiation between foreigners and natives and became a sign of 
national sovereignty. Furthermore, such documents led to a privileging of natives when it came to accessing resources, 
namely the access to labor (Münkler 2016). Slowly, the symbolic identity ascribed to a passport, grew stronger opposed 
to the identity of the real person, which resulted in the rising business of producing and selling fake passports. This led 




“based on the principle of descent.” (Schönteich 2013: 205). This ethnic definition of 
belonging to the German nation was manifested in the Wilhelmine Citizenship Law of 
1913, stating that  
“citizenship was to be conferred via descent (jus sanguinis) rather than birth on territory 
(jus soli). Blood-based citizenship was a defensive measure against the huge Slavic and 
Jewish migration on the open eastern flank of the Reich.” (Joppke 1996: 467). 
Here it becomes visible that citizenship was directly used to distinguish the Germans 
from the ‘other’. Furthermore, a “völkisch conception of citizenship in Germany 
following World War I” occurred through a radical ethnicization in the wake of the  
 “crushing military defeat that brought about the separation of large territories with 
former German citizens. It was only during this phase, in which the German Reich as a 
nation-state had been politically weakened, that the ethnic conception of citizenship 
became an instrument of a revisionist policy.” (Gosewinkel 2008: 38).  
This policy was mainly aiming at regaining territories of former German settlers and also 
at “”bringing home” ethnocultural Germans from Middle and Eastern Europe.” 
(Gosewinkel 2008: 38). 
In the Weimar Republic, citizenship decided about the belonging to the nation-state while 
also framing the rights and duties of citizens, and further constituted an element of 
national identity (Caldwell 2008). Until the Nazis “introduced uniform national 
citizenship”, no uniform or central citizenship existed within the German nation-state 
(Gosewinkel 2008: 37).  
Under the Nazi regime, citizenship held the meaning of belonging while the factor of co-
determination of citizenship became irrelevant due to the dictatorship (Caldwell 2008). 
The determination of belonging and citizenship legislated in the form of the Nuremberg 
Laws, which “broke with the principle of equality before the law associated with the 
German Rechtsstaat.” and left no possibility for active participation. The citizenship law 
under the Nazis “referred to the identity of Germans, not to the ability of citizens to 
organize socially.”, nor constituted it “a set of rights and duties”. (Caldwell 2008: 54, 55). 
The jus sanguinis also enabled and still enables ethnic Germans to receive the German 
citizenship when they migrated to Germany. By law they “have a right to receive a 
German passport immediately,” regardless of the environment they are arriving from, and 
regardless of their knowledge of the German language and regardless any cultural 
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differences (Bauer, Zimmermann 1997: 143). This proves the importance of jus sanguinis 
within the German citizenship policies.  
While the jus sanguinis is still applied, the Wilhelmine Citizenship Law was not changed 
for almost a century until modifications were made to the citizenship law in 2000. Due to 
a reform in 2000,  
“For the first time, children born to foreigners in Germany automatically receive German 
citizenship, provided one parent has been a legal resident for at least 8 years. Moreover, 
the law provides for entitlement to naturalization for immigrants who have been living 
for at least 8 years in Germany with a permanent residence permit.” (Schönteich 2013: 
205). 
At the same time, Germany was officially declared an immigration country and “the 
necessity to urgently design integration policies” was realized by politics (Mühe, 
Schiffauer 2012: 77). This shows that the importance of citizenship concerning 
integration is recognized and it acknowledges that “major changes in the national self-
understanding” took and take place (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 81). 
 While the possibility of naturalization exists, this does not mean that, once a migrant 
acquires the German citizenship, the migration background becomes irrelevant. This 
becomes evident if one considers the following: 
"The New Immigration Act also addresses German citizens with migrant background and 
assigns integration courses to those lacking sufficient language skills and integration into 
the economic, cultural and social life in Germany. Ethnic origin, but also geopolitical 
dimensions come in at the point where some migrants are exempted from integration 
courses and language proficiency, that is, persons from highly industrialised countries 
such as Australia, Canada and Israel” (Urbanek 2012: 339). 
In September 2008, another hurdle, so to speak, to the naturalization process has been 
added. From now on, applicants to naturalization need to pass “a national naturalisation 
test, which demands detailed knowledge about Germany’s culture, history and society.” 
and which is applied in all the federal states of Germany. Before that, there had been 
certain naturalization tests in Baden-Württemberg, amongst other federal states, which 
had specifically targeted Muslim immigrants by asking “questions about private attitudes 
in a discriminatory manner.” (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 82). While some of those tests are 
still in use, Germany also introduced tests about language proficiency of spouses who 
wish to unite with their partners in Germany.  
“The difficulty of obtaining the necessary language skills in rural areas of Turkey, 
combined with the fact that such requirements were not applicable to citizens from, for 
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example, the USA or Japan, increased the perceptions that this was targeted at especially 
preventing immigration from Turkey.” (Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 82). 
The described measures have led to the fact that Germany hosts “the highest number of 
third-country nationals in Europe” while having “one of the lowest naturalisation rates”, 
representing “a major barrier to civic participation.”, something which Norbert Lammert, 
the until recently president of the federal parliament recognized: “”Our problem in 
Germany is not too high an immigration rate, but rather too little naturalisation,” he said” 
(Mühe, Schiffauer 2012: 82). 
This leads to the assumption that integration is understood as assimilation, where 
migrants who seemingly show similarity “to the majority population, already belong.” 
(Urbanek 2012: 339). For Urbanek, a political scientist, this is a “process of ethnicization 
– with religious connotations – […] as the migrants focused on in the parliamentary 
debate are […] Muslims.” (Urbanek 2012: 339).  
The described opening towards jus soli suggests a movement away from a strictly ethnic 
understanding of belonging towards other factors of belonging such as either 
constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus) or cultural virtues.  
However, as just highlighted, cultural belonging is still defined by ethnic and/or religious 
connotations. This brings us to the next chapter, where migration to Germany and its 
connected perception of otherness is explored. 
 
3.3 Migration and Otherness in Germany 
Essential for the establishment of any identity is much more the encounter with other 
worlds, than with one’s own. Experience of ‘the other’ is part of the experience of the self 
(Thadden 1998). Hence why this chapter shall highlight the history of migration and 
otherness in Germany. 
3.3.1 Guestworkers 
Significant migration movements towards Germany took place in the 1960s and early 
1970s, when Germany recruited guestworkers (Gastarbeiter) due to the shortage of 
industrial workers in West Germany. While guestworkers came from several Southern 
European countries, the majority constituted migrants from Turkey. Originally, the idea 
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of this recruitment was that the guestworkers, as the name implies, only stayed for a 
definite time and eventually would return to their home countries (Scherr 2013).  
The recruitment came due to the economic uprising of the 1950s and 1960s, called the 
Wirtschaftswunder and guest-workers were appreciated, at least based on their 
contribution to the economic rise of the country. However, “Given the political and social 
context, interaction with German society remained confined to a few facets of daily social 
relations.” (Nordbruch 2011: 3). 
When Germany was hit by an economic crisis in 1973, the recruitment of guestworkers 
ended. However, only a small part of the guestworkers returned home. The majority 
chose to stay in Germany and additionally, was joined by family members who migrated 
to Germany, leading to the paradoxical situation where the stop of recruitment of 
temporary labor migrants “resulted in the permanent immigration of families.” (Scherr 
2013: 3, 4).  
3.3.2 Post-unification 
After the unification of the GDR and FRG, increased migration “of ethnic German re-
settlers, non-ethnic German immigrants and asylum seekers re-opened questions of 
nationhood,” revealing once again a tension between inclusive and exclusive approaches 
of national identity (Barnard 2008: 2).  Compared to the annual 5000 residents of foreign 
origins receiving the German citizenship in the 1980s, the amount of citizenships claimed 
by ethnic Germans in the timeframe of 1988-1991 poses a contrast with more than one 
million ethnic Germans coming to Germany from the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. 
The citizenship law enabled them “to claim their citizenship by right, however tenuous 
their connections to any actually existing German society.“ (Eley 2008: 233). 
In the 1990s, an opening towards the European community took place while 
simultaneously “a resurgence of aggressive far-right nationalism […] was targeting 
“foreigners” or resident “immigrants” as alien intruders deemed not to belong to the 
nation.” (Eley 2008: 234). Such resentments mounted in “pogrom-like attacks on 
immigrants of predominantly South-Asian and African backgrounds” in the early 1990s, 
namely in Hoyerswerda, Mölln, Solingen and Rostock-Lichtenhagen. Those events 
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brought more attention to the debates “about the place of migrants in unified Germany” 
(Nordbruch 2011: 7). 
The aforementioned history of immigration into Germany had also an impact on the self-
definition and perception of the local population, reshaping “the boundaries between in- 
and outsiders of the national community.” (Nordbruch 2011: 6), portrayed in the 
following passage: 
“While in the late 1940s the debates about ethnic German “expelled” persons (“Vertriebene”) 
and refugees focused on social problems caused by the massive influx from Eastern Europe, in 
the 1960s and 1970s the non-German origin of the “guest workers” was central to 
controversies surrounding labour migration. In a similar way, the term “foreigner”, which was 
increasingly usesd in the 1980s to refer to immigrants, reinforced the image of a temporary 
culturally and ethnically foreign population.” (Nordbruch 2011: 6).58 
One can spot that the terms culturally and ethnically were used in an equal manner to 
distinguish immigrants or “foreigners” (Ausländer) from the local, meaning ethnic 
homogenous, population. 
As a consequence, the term “”foreigner problem” (“Ausländerproblem”)” (Nordbruch 
2011: 7)59 became a commonly used notion to point out the non-membership of this part 
of the population in German society. This also pertained to “immigrants, who had 
acquired German citizenship, or those born in Germany” to immigrant parents, basically 
leading to the situation where everyone with a migration background, be it due to 
migration or parents who immigrated, is “perceived as foreign in mainstream public 
debates.” (Nordbruch 2011: 7). 
I will now briefly focus on the urban and rural differences in the German context before 
giving insight in the methodological frame and tools used during the research. 
 
3.4 Rural vs urban settings in Germany 
I shall now turn to the current situation concerning the differences between rural and 
urban environments in Germany, with regard to the integration process of newcomers. 
The demographic situation in Germany is as follows: 15% of the population lives in 
villages populated by less than 5,000 people, 27% live in small towns (5,000 – 20,000 
inhabitants), another 27% populate cities of a size between 20,000 and 100,000 people, 
                                                          
58 Original citation, no modification has been made. 
59 Original citation, no modification has been made. 
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and the remaining 31% of the population lives in larger cities (above 100,000 people) 
(Bangel, Faigle et al. 2017). The locality of my fieldwork, Lauchringen, considered as a 
village in the daily life interaction, with roughly 8,000 inhabitants falls into the “small 
towns” category. 
Since a majority of migrants tend to move to bigger cities such as Hamburg or Berlin, the 
integration of said migrants is mostly discussed in connection with the frame and settings 
of urban areas (Bamf 2018). The reason why the majority migrants, refugees among 
them, is settling in large cities is that cities usually offer better job opportunities and 
already existing social ties. However, large cities often lack the capacities to provide 
accommodation and other ressources (Katz, Noring, Garrelts 2016).  
Additionally, the distribution of refugees across Germany is based on a system where less 
populous, and poorer regions receive fewer refugees than regions that are more 
prosperous (Chase 2017). Therefore, cities, towns and regions that are home to the 
strongest economies receive the major share of the newcomers (Saunders 2015).  
To counter this development, a domicile requirement has been implemented into the 
Integration Act. As a result, integration processes will become more relevant in rural 
areas since the domicile requirements will lead to larger numbers of migrants “living in 
rural areas in the future” (Bamf 2018: 1). Because of the differences of social 
composition and structure between rural and metropolitan areas, integration processes are 
most likely to also play out differently (Bamf 2018). 
Generally, due to the economic dynamic, percentages of migrants and refugees in the 
Eastern part of Germany are lower than in the Western part. However, the AfD – 
fostering resentment against migrants and refugees – seems to be more successful in 
regions hosting relatively few refugees (Chase 2017). The chairwoman of the 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania Refugee Council, Ulrike Seemann-Katz argues that this is 
because people fear the unknown and that therefore, regions with few refugees are more 
likely to oppose migration. In addition to the factor of unfamiliarity, resentment towards 
the newcomers, based on a perceived preferential treatment refugees seemingly receive, 
exists among the local population (Chase 2017).  
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However, rural areas are considered to be more in need of migrants due to demographic 
changes, low birth-rates and aging of the population, plus the lack of labor and skills, 
often spurred by out-migration of the youth to bigger cities (Pollermann 2016). 
Advantages and Disadvantages of rural/urban settings in terms of integration 
Although differentiating between urban and rural areas is necessary, it is noted that there 
exists a certain fluidity between the both when it comes to advantages and disadvantages 
in terms of integration factors. There are, without a doubt, cities that are not that 
prosperous and attractive to newcomers while certain rural regions have not been left 
behind and do not suffer – at least significantly – from demographic changes and lack of 
labor and skills (Bangel, Faigle et al. 2017).  
Nonetheless, in a general way there are certainly differences. In rural communities, the 
distance between people is small. However, a strong sense of tradition makes it difficult 
to take on newcomers and new influences. While in cities, the integration process is often 
a task for institutions, in rural areas the integration process depends more on the direct 
contact/interaction with people (Quinn 2011).  
I shall now turn to some advantages and disadvantages of urban respective rural areas in 
regard of the integration process. 
Advantages of Urban settings 
Pre-existing social connections in cities can help speeding up the integration process 
(Katz, Noring, Garrelts 2016). In addition to existing networks, migrants and refugees 
usually find beneficial labor market conditions in an urban setting (Pollermann 2016). 
Disadvantages of Urban settings 
Urban areas face numerous challenges in terms of migration, such as high density of 
population, few available accommodations, high housing prices, and – as a potential 
consequence of the pre-existing social connections – the eventual establishment of 
parallel societies which could hinder “long-term social integration.” (Katz, Noring, 
Garrelts 2016: 6). The risk of the development of a parallel society within an urban 
environment is higher than in rural communities (Katz, Noring, Garrelts 2016). This 




Advantages of rural settings 
It is argued that, in opposition to the urban setting, rural communities offer stronger and 
more stable social ties and structures. Such a human proximity, and simultaneously a low 
degree of anonymity, then leads to a high readiness to help each other out (Alker 2011). 
This social proximity – coming from tightly knitted social and familiar ties that exist in 
rural areas – can be an advantage when it comes to the integration of newcomers, shown 
in studies that prove that prejudice is less present where people with different ethnic, 
national, or cultural background are in actual contact with each other (Alker 2011).  
Disadvantages of rural settings 
While a lower degree of anonymity in rural communities provides a stabilizing factor for 
the society, based on the little room for personal scope and social control it brings with it, 
such dynamic can easily turn into a challenge for integration in rural areas, not only for 
those with migration background – from another nation-state – but also for people 
moving to a rural community from another province or a neighboring village/town (Alker 
2011). 
‘The Other’, the Muslim 
Structural components, such as labor market and pre-existing social networks, aside, 
when a possible division between rural and urban areas is discussed the belief of the 
existence of opposing societal ideas of rural versus urban dwellers is of main concern. 
This entails opinions about immigration, integration and Islam: “The more rural, many 
think, the more intolerant. Or to put it differently: The larger the city, the fewer worries 
people have about integration.” (Bangel, Faigle et al. 2017: 1).  
56% of the population of small towns stated that they have personal contact with 
migrants living in Germany. In larger cities, the number increases to 70%. The different 
exposure and contact to migrants seem to affect the general approach towards migrants as 
well as towards Germans with migration background. For example, it was found that 
“The smaller the community, the greater the share of people who would reject a Muslim 
mayor. […] Nowhere is the support for a Muslim mayor as low as it is in small towns.” 
(Bangle, Faigle et al. 2017: 1). 
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The openness towards a person with a different cultural background becomes more 
obvious when it is asked whether it would be perceived as pleasant or unpleasant if a 
Turkish person would marry into one’s own family: “In rural areas, a particularly large 
number of people have reservations about someone from Turkey marrying into the 
family.” (Bangle, Faigle et al. 2017: 1). Those findings suggest that there is some truth to 
the assumption/cliché that the population of cities is overall more tolerant towards 
migrants and Muslims than the population of rural areas (Bangle, Faigle et al. 2017). 
However, regarding the fear of excessive migrants living in Germany, many country and 
city dwellers share similar views. 27% of the population in large cities and 34% of the 
population in small towns say that “they sometimes feel foreign in their own country” 
(Bangle, Faigle et al. 2017: 1). In conclusion, “Views in the city are not nearly as left-
wing liberal as many might expect, and nor is the countryside a refuge of 1950s-era 
attitudes. Some shifts in sentiment have taken place in both urban and rural areas.” 
(Bangle, Faigle et al. 2017: 1). 
The societal division seems not to take place among lines of urban and rural settings as 
much as it “can be found between regions, religious affiliations, age groups and income 
brackets rather than between city, town and village dwellers.” (Bangle, Faigle et al. 2017: 
1). This shows a certain fluidity between urban and rural settings. Also, as mentioned 
earlier, some urban areas are suffering under current developments while some rural 
regions are less affected than others. 
Consequently, the Theologian Wulz argues to not speak of the/a rural region/area but of 
numerous rural areas/regions (Wulz 2011). Therefore, I shall now focus on the province 
of Baden-Württemberg and the village Lauchringen where my study took place. 
Baden-Württemberg/Lauchringen 
70% of the province Baden-Württemberg consists of rural area (Alker 2011). Rural areas 
in Baden-Württemberg have become multicultural. After World War II, displaced people 
and refugees from the Eastern part of Europe were distributed among municipalities. 
Then, during timespan of 1950-1970, guestworkers settled in small communities where 
they were employed. And in the late 20th century, late repatriates came as well, rendering 
even small villages diverse (Quin 2011). 
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Today, 7,9% of the population in rural areas in Baden-Württemberg are foreigners, a bit 
below the average of 11,8% in all of Baden-Württemberg. The quota of people with 
migration background is significantly higher. While there is no specific date, it is 
estimated that people with migration background make up 16% of the rural population of 
Baden-Württemberg. In all of Baden-Württemberg one in four inhabitants has a 
migration background (Alker 2011). 
Synthesis of chapter 3 
Germany’s self-perception was and maybe still is impacted by the ambiguities of finding 
itself between East and West. Despite a history of migration and ‘foreign’ influence, the 
strong ethnic component of German-ness and the alleged particularity of German culture 
made and makes integration of migrants and the ‘other’ difficult. The past of the 
Holocaust and Nazi Regime as well as the temporary existence of two different German 
nation-states seems to weaken the intrinsic integration of German society.  
While Germany seems to come to terms with its reality of migration, migration is mostly 
accepted due to economic reasons. Alleged cultural change seems to be unwanted, mostly 
visible in the debate about Muslims and Islam in Germany. The fuzziness of ethnic and 
cultural definition of national identity seems to persist. While the citizenship policies 
have been modified and now seem more ‘migrant-friendly’, the reception of a citizenship 
seems to be much more a recognition of belonging of the nation-state and does not equate 
to being recognized and accepted by the majority population as being part of the majority 
population. 
Further, there are significant differences in terms of integration conditions depending on 












4. Methodology, Ethnography, and Reflexion 
4.1 Question of research 
This research explores how national identity and perceptions of migrant-integration are 
intertwined in Lauchringen, Germany. The ethnographic study was conducted in 2017, in 
the wake of the disproportional influx of refugees during the years 2015 and 2016. 
4.2 Goal of research 
The goal of this research is to achieve an understanding of how the local population of 
Lauchringen perceives integration, a thought process which also reveals something about 
the self-description of one’s own (national) identity. With the gained results of this 
research, I hope to contribute to the intertwined debate about integration and national 
identity.  
Methodology 
4.3 Methodological tools 
“Le travail ethnographique par excellence, c’est le travail de terrain (fieldwork)” (Izard 
2002: 470). Hence why, in the following I will expose the methodological tools I used 
during my fieldwork. These tools are participating observation and one-to-one semi-
structured interviews. The interviews took place between May and June 2017 while the 
participating observation took place during the complete duration of my stay in Germany 
from April to June 2017. 
4.3.1 Participating observation 
“Participant observation is accepted almost universally as the central and defining 
method of research in cultural anthropology.” (Dewalt et al. 1998: 259). 
Considering that for a majority of my life, I had been a member of the local population of 
Lauchringen, I became – just by my presence during my fieldwork – a member of the 
local population once again. Therefore, one could say that the participating observation 
constantly took place, especially since any participating observation can be summarized 
as a research: 
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“caractérisée par une période d’interactions sociales intenses entre le chercheur et les sujets, 
dans le milieu de ces derniers […]. Les observateurs s’immergent personnellement dans la vie 
des gens. Ils partagent leurs experiences” (Lapassade 1991: 24). 
Whether during family get-togethers, meetings with friends, encounters during public 
events such as concerts and village festivals, basically any informal conversation with 
any member of the local population was part of the participating observation and gave me 
the perspective of an insider. 
However, my role as a once again member of the local population was altered whenever 
the matter of an informal conversation shifted towards the topic of me being back home, 
positioning me automatically as someone who had been temporarily outside of the local 
population. Further, me explaining the reason for my temporary return – collecting data 
and doing fieldwork for my master’s thesis that is – positioned me automatically as 
someone who is returning to the local population only for a definite time-span, with the 
agency of doing research on the local population. 
This being said, participating observation allowed me to get a certain insight concerning 
the overall ambiance and mindset of the local population considering the current 
migration situation. With the help of semi-structured interviews, I aimed at exploring 
those feelings more precisely and profoundly.  
4.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
“la question tant débattue du “choix” de l’informateur se résout le plus souvent à l’insu 
de l’ethnologue, parfois contre son gré.” (Izard 2002: 473). 
The reason why I chose the semi-structured interview as a methodological tool is 
summarized in the following definition: 
“L’entrevue semi-dirigée consiste en une interaction verbal animée de façon souple par le 
chercheur. Celui-ci se laissera guider par le rythme et le contenu unique de l’échange dans le 
but d’aborder, sur un mode qui ressemble à celui d’une conversation, les thèmes généraux 
qu’il souhaite explorer avec le participant à la recherche. Grâce à cette interaction, une 
compréhension riche du phénomène à l’étude sera construite conjointement avec 
l’interviewé.” (Savoie-Zajc 2006: 296). 
During April and June 2017, I conducted twelve semi-structured interviews with as many 
participants. The interview guidelines were the same for each interview. Before the first 
interview, I conducted a test-interview with a family member which was helpful in 
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showing me critical points of my guideline as well as possible obstacles during an 
interview. 
Each interview was fully transcribed and then read several times to filter out the essential 
statements and themes that would guide my analysis and understanding of the perception 
of integration and other key notions in the local context. 
4.3.3 Interview guideline and themes 
After a period of introduction and small talk and getting to know each other – which was 
supposed to allow the participant to get comfortable in the setting – I asked the 
participants about their opinion on the general situation concerning the migration towards 
Germany and more specifically to Lauchringen. Following that, the conversation usually 
continued with questions about the participants’ socialization and past or recent 
experiences with immigrants. The next questions concerned the understanding and 
perception of the notion of integration, as well as questions about where one would place 
possible responsibilities when it comes to integration, and what eventual advantages or 
disadvantages the current situation would bring. 
The focus then usually shifted towards the local population and whether, or how, it is 
affected by the migration debate and how one could become a fully accepted member of 
Lauchringen. Subsequently, those issues lead to a bigger context, concerning not just the 
local population of Lauchringen but the national majority society of Germany.  
Here, questions about the perception of Germany as a nation-state, ‘German culture’ and 
‘being German’ were raised. Citizenship as well as identity issues were also discussed 
before ending the guideline with space for possible additional remarks by the participant. 
Most interviews, after being transcribed, displayed a similar structure as the guideline, 
however, some interviews took different turns, due to the semi-structured nature of the 
interview. Nonetheless all the topics contained in the guideline were usually treated. 
4.4 Choice of location 
“le terrain est le “laboratoire” de l’ethnologue: il est dans sa vocation de “faire du 
terrain”” (Izard 2002:  471). 
During the first year of my studies at Université de Montréal, I started to develop a new 
perspective on issues concerning my home-country Germany. This was most likely due 
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to the then new physical distance which eventually would also alter the emotional 
relation between Germany and myself. 
While my anthropological interests had previously been mostly directed towards Rwanda 
and its path towards reconciliation after the Genocide against the Tutsis in 1994, studying 
abroad in Montréal changed my interests significantly. I was, still am, now a (temporary) 
immigrant, and my social circle in Montréal consists almost exclusively of other 
immigrants and/or children of immigrants. Therefore, I automatically started to mull over 
notions such as integration, migration and identity. 
When, in the fall of 2015, the migration movement towards Germany began to reach new 
heights, I was immediately drawn to the question of how the task of the imminent 
integration of the newcomers would take place. It was then, I decided to write my master 
thesis, in a broader sense, about the integration process in Germany. 
During the procedure of narrowing down towards a more specific question, more fitting 
for the frame of a master thesis, I decided to focus on the local population of my home-
village and their perception of migrants and integration. This decision was mostly based 
on two factors.  
First, I had the impression that the public discourse was mainly focusing on the question 
of how the newcomers could and should integrate themselves, ignoring the 
responsibilities of the local population. With my research, I hoped to contribute to a more 
balanced approach towards integration, offering a counterweight to the dominant public 
discourse which focused on the responsibilities of the newcomers. 
Second, I chose to talk to and interview members of the local population with the 
following reasoning in mind: Being a (former) member of the local population myself, I 
imagined that it would be easier for me to establish contact and find willing interview 
partners as well as having already a certain level of proximity, comfort and trust with 
potential interview partners. The following quote of Jones supports this approach: 
“A basic aim of anthropological field research is to describe the total culture of a group of 
people. This description, as much as possible, should be made from the point of view of the 
people–i.e., the inside view. For the anthropologist to obtain such a description, he must 
become actively involved in the life of the people, communicate with them, and spend a 
considerable period of time among them. With these general goals as the primary emphasis, it 
seems obvious that the trained native anthropologist can produce the best and most reliable 
data, since he knows the language, has grown up in the culture, and has little difficulty in 
becoming involved with the people.” (Jones 1970: 252).  
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However, I needed to consider that while “insiders and outsiders may be able to collect 
different data; they also have different points of view which may lead to different 
interpretations of the same set of data.” (Jones 1970: 252).  
After spending several months reading up on key notions such as integration, identity, 
nation, citizenship and alterity/otherness, I came up with an interview guideline for the 
planned interviews. At first, the research was supposed to take place in the 
spring/summer of 2016, although the passing of my father in April 2016 led me to pause 
my studies for almost 5 months.  
Nonetheless, during those five months, back in Germany, I was able to gather some 
information through informal conversations, either as an active participant or as a witness 
of such conversations. Eventually, I returned to Montréal to pursue my studies. Re-
evaluating my preparation process, I decided to readjust and redefine my foundation of 
the thesis as well as for the participating observation and the interview guide.  The actual 
research then took place between April and June 2017. 
4.5 Studied population 
The research took place in the village named Lauchringen in the state Baden-
Württemberg. Lauchringen has an overall population of 7.630 people. As of April 2017, 
there are 93 refugees living in Lauchringen: 57 persons from Syria, 19 persons from 
Eritrea, 10 persons from Gambia, 4 persons from Georgia and 3 persons from Pakistan. 
On the official website of the municipality it says that the majority part of the refugees 
living in Lauchringen are families with children while there are also some individual 
persons. The refugees are partially accommodated in municipality-owned 
accommodations but also in private apartments. 
4.5.1 Criteria for participation 
The criteria for taking part in the study were the following: Participants had to be 18 
years of age or older at the time of the interview. Further, the participants should possess 
German citizenship – because this allows me to see how they relate their citizenship to 
their German national identity –, have lived in the locality for at least the past ten years 
and, have no – recent – migration background in their family, that is no migration from 
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another country to Germany in the past two or three generations. These criteria assure me 
that the participants are part of the majority population of Germany. 
Two of the twelve participants revealed during the interview that they either had a 
personal history of migration or that their parents had a history of migration. One 
migrated to Germany as a refugee from Eastern Europe when he was still a child. His 
family – ethnic Germans – moved to Germany. The other participant was born in 
Germany but before that, her parents moved to the USA and gave birth to her brother in 
the USA. Later they moved back to Germany. However, in terms of analyzing the 
participants statements, their family background did not prove to be relevant as to 
distinguishing the two participants – or their opinions – from the other participants and 
their opinions. 
Four of the twelve participants were women, eight were men. The potential participants 
were contacted personally by me, mainly via phone call. The participants I chose to 
contact were people that I knew in one way or another, either through the family 
environment, or my sister’s, my parents or my social milieu. As well, some participants 
were chosen because they are more less well known in the local community. I wanted to 
conduct interviews with people who I knew were in touch with refugees and immigrants, 
but also with people who had little to no contact with the named group. In all, 15 people 
were invited, 12 took part. The other three either declined the invitation or were never 
able to confirm a meeting moment. 
Of the twelve participants who were willing to conduct an interview, five uttered slight 
skepticism, either when I asked them about a potential interview and/or in the beginning 
of the actual interview, about whether they would be the right person to talk to about such 
topics. With the first contact with the potential participant, they received, either via e-
mail or on paper, the information sheet concerning my research as well as the declaration 
of consent that would be signed by the interviewer and the interviewee before the 
interview took place. 
Two of the participants came to visit me at my parental house where we conducted the 
interview. For the other ten interviews I went to the respective homes of the participants. 
The decision to where the interview should take place was left to the participants in order 
to guarantee them the most comfortable setting possible. 
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4.5.2 Participant and setting description 
In this section I will present Lauchringen as my fieldsite. First, I shall give a brief 
overview of each participant with relevant information concerning this research. Then, I 
shall highlight how the participants perceive themselves and their peers of the local 
population, especially in regard of openness towards ‘the other’ and the integration of 
newcomers.  
Socialization of participants 
I shall now turn towards a short description of the research participants. Here, the focus 
will be on the socialization of each participant. The age of the participants is the age they 
were during the interviews. How and why the participant was recruited is mentioned in 
brackets. To protect the privacy of the participants, all names have been changed. While I 
would like to point out more sociological factors as to why I chose the participants, I will 
retract from doing so to ensure the anonymity of the participants. 
Stephanie (I played sports with her during my teenage years in Lauchringen so I reached 
out to her once I was back in Lauchringen. I also knew that she is close friends with a 
child of a guestworker-family) 
Stephanie is a 30-year old woman who spent all her life in Lauchringen, along with her 
family: parents, siblings and majority of relatives. Her best friend is the daughter of a 
guestworker-family. Stephanie works as a nursery school teacher in a town next to 
Lauchringen. In her recreational time, she coaches young children at the local turnverein.  
In both her functions as a nursery school teacher and as a coach, she is in touch with 
children and parents who came to Germany in the recent years. While she recounts 
mostly positive experiences with migrants and refugees, she says that she experienced a 
few less pleasant encounters with migrants/refugees at work.  
Gundula (my mother suggested her as a participant, based on Gundula’s connection to 
local politics) 
Gundula, a 68-year old woman, is involved in the local politics. She, like Stephanie lived 
her whole life in Lauchringen. Before she retired, she worked at different jobs, for 
example as a dental assistant. Temporarily she was working in Switzerland. Besides 
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being a local politician, she is engaged as a volunteer at the church and at the FAZ 
(family-center).  
Gundula established contact with a refugee family in her neighborhood, which led to 
positive experiences according to Gundula. She further describes how she participated in 
a church/mosque exchange where a group of the church community visited a mosque in 
Lauchringen and vice versa.  
Regina (A close friend of the family, I asked her to participate knowing that she has little 
to no contact with neither migrants nor refugees) 
Regina, housewife of 58 years, lives in Lauchringen ever since. Most of her family still 
lives in Lauchringen. She states that she never been in contact with either refugees or 
migrants. However, she mentions, her granddaughter has a classmate who is a boy from 
Syria. Based on an experience she made years ago on vacation – she saw a woman with a 
headscarf and a scarf that covered the face which was only removed to eat – she says that 
wearing a niqab or a burqa seems like a nightmare to her.  
Kerstin (An acquaintance of my mother and sister. I assumed that she would be part of a 
group that has little to no contact with migrants and/or refugees) 
Kerstin, 54 years old, the fourth and last woman who participated in the research, is 
married to her husband with whom she has two children. She is self-employed. She grew 
up in the Bavarian countryside and came to Lauchringen in the late 1980s. After World 
War II, her parents emigrated to the USA. 
Kerstin says that she doesn’t really have contact to refugees, only punctual on the streets 
or at events at best. However, she had encounters with mostly Turkish families on various 
occasions. She describes those experiences as mixed, “good and bad”, while clarifying 
that in some of those families, the role of women seems questionable to her. 
Max (He is a politician. My mom suggested him as a participant to get the perspective of 
a politician. I contacted him by calling his assistant to arrange a meeting) 
Max, who grew up and still lives in Lauchringen, is 31 years old, married to his wife who 
is part of the local support group for refugees. He himself declares that he is not in direct 
touch with refugees, more so with their supervisors. This comes due to his profession as a 
politician. He expresses that he was in touch with migrants during his school days, in 
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which he had friends of Turkish origin. However, he utters mixed feelings about it, 
saying he felt the boundaries between him and them were made clear from the “Turkish 
side”. 
Michael (based on his profession as a police officer I assumed he would offer a certain 
perspective on my research questions. Him being a mere acquaintance of me, it was not 
difficult for me to approach him ask him to participate) 
Michael moved to Lauchringen from another village in the district ca 15 years ago. He, 
46 years old, is married and has two children. Due to his job as a police officer, he is in 
regular contact with migrants and refugees. His experiences with migrants and refugees 
are mostly of a negative nature. Outside of his work, he has no contact to refugees. 
However, he had Turkish and Italian classmates during his school days. One of his peers 
once said that it is difficult not to turn into a racist due to the many bad experiences on 
the job.  Michael says that one must remind oneself steadily that there are also other types 
of refugees, not judging all by some bad examples. But he admits that it is difficult if one 
has a “nightshift where you only deal with non-Germans”. He is conscious of the fact that 
due to his job he only encounters refugees when there are problems. 
Bert (part of the extended family) 
Bert is 42 years old, married and the father of two children. Born in a town next to 
Lauchringen, his parents moved to Lauchringen with him when he was one year old. Ever 
since he spends his life in Lauchringen. He rarely is in touch with refugees or migrants; if 
so it usually is within the frame of his activities as a member of the local soccer club. In 
his younger years, he had Turkish and Italian friends in school as well as in the soccer 
club. Today he still has some Turkish and Italian friends, although the contact is rather 
sporadic. 
Thomas (teacher at my former school. I asked him to participate because I thought it 
would be interesting to see how someone who works with children positions himself in 
regard of my research question) 
Thomas, 50 years old, is a teacher at an academic high school in a town close to 
Lauchringen. At the school, he is in contact with students, who are migrants, children of 
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migrants, and their parents. The migration background of majority of his migrant students 
is Turkish. Thomas describes himself as “a substitute dad for many of my 5th graders.”. 
The father of two grew up in Swabia, a region in the north of Baden-Württemberg. There, 
as a student himself, he had classmates who were migrants themselves. For the past 15 
years he has been living in Lauchringen. As a member of a church-community in a 
nearby village, he also is in touch with refugees who had been introduced to the church-
community by one of its members. The refugees made a good impression on Thomas. 
Christian (He is an acquaintance of the family, my mother suggested him as a participant 
based on the fact that he is in touch with refugees due to his profession) 
Christian, 60 years old, describes himself as someone who likes to broaden and further 
his horizon. He has traveled to several countries, claiming that he “saw the world” and is 
aware of the high standards of living that exist in Germany. Therefore, he says, “I cannot 
be mad at anyone who wants to come to Germany to have a better life.”. 
Christian, who is married and a father of two, is responsible, as an administrator and 
contact person, for several refugee houses in the district. Prior to that he was employed in 
an economic company in Switzerland. Due to his current position, he is in touch with 
refugees on daily basis. He utters that he sees good and bad sides of the situation: “There 
are those who are just trying to benefit from the situation – copycats, freeloaders –, but 
the majority people I meet at work were simply very unfortunate and lost all their 
belongings and their homes.”. What he sees problematic is that it takes a long time for the 
refugees to get a work permit. As a result, he saw people, coming into Germany highly 
qualified but couldn’t exercise their profession, and eventually they came in touch with 
drugs, and “after a while, they were done.”. 
Outside of work, he is barely in touch with migrants, if so, more Italian than Turkish 
migrants. 
Stefan (I contacted Stefan, an acquaintance of mine, to see the perspective of a young 
adult) 
Stefan is the youngest participant. He spent all of his 19 years in Lauchringen. His 
parents own a business in Lauchringen. Stefan doesn’t have regular contact with 
refugees. However, on two occasions he had encounters with refugees who recently came 
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to Germany. Both experiences, one at school – he attends an academic high school in a 
town near Lauchringen – and one at the family-center, are described by Stefan as highly 
positive and informative.  
In terms of being in touch with migrants or children of migrants, Stefan says that he has 
friends at school whose parents came to Germany as Turkish guestworkers. While had 
mostly good experiences with them, the contact is limited to within the school context. A 
bit similar than Max, he shares the feeling of being made aware by his Turkish friends of 
differences between him and them. 
Ulf (He is a friend of mine, based on previous informal conversations with him, I asked 
him to participate) 
Ulf, 29 years old, runs his own company. Ulf gave refugees the opportunity to do an 
internship at their company on multiple occasions. However, no internship, due to 
various difficulties – e.g. lack of understanding, lack of punctuality –, resulted in a 
permanent employment.  
Ulf recounts how he went to an event which aimed at informing those interested in 
employing a refugee. He says that it was very helpful and that he was surprised how 
many people showed up and participated in the event.  
During his childhood and youth Ulf played soccer at the local club where he got to know 
children of Turkish origins. He describes his experience surrounding his time at the 
soccer club as follows: “There, we were a team so we all fought and played together. So, 
no negative experiences.”. 
Manfred (personal acquaintance of me, I contacted him after hearing from my mother 
that Manfred was a member of the refugee support group) 
Manfred, married, retired and 70 years old, was encouraged by his son to join the local 
refugee support group. Through the support group, Manfred is in touch with several 
refugees, helping them with administrative tasks. However, Manfred is frustrated with the 
management of the support group as well as with the authorities and the government. 
Manfred himself has a migration background: “I know what it means to be a refugee.”. 
He was born in Eastern Europe and came to Germany at the age of 5. In his first years in 
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Germany he lived in a refugee housing project near Lauchringen. His parents and 
grandparents were (ethnic) Germans in Eastern Europe. 
------  
The setting 
As for the study location, Lauchringen is a village located in the south of Baden-
Württemberg, in the periphery of the black forest. It is not far from the border to 
Switzerland, which is the reason why it is not uncommon for people who live in 
Lauchringen to work across the border in Switzerland. Consequently, several participants 
stated that they believe to have more commonalities with north-Swiss people than with 
north-Germans.  
The population of Lauchringen stands at roughly 8,000 inhabitants. In the 1970s, the 
local textile company Lauffenmühle60 employed many guestworkers from Turkey. 
Today, around 1,100 people who live in Lauchringen are Turkish or have a Turkish 
migration background, constituting the largest minority within the population of 
Lauchringen. Overall, 54 different nationalities are represented in the Lauchringen 
population.  
System/structural integration (institutions) 
In a 2011 interview, mayor Thomas Schäuble stated that a tighter societal structure, as 
given in smaller communities, might ease the integration process, opposed to the setting 
of a bigger city. Most important, to him, is an openness that everybody must bring to the 
table, and that people are, whether of migration background or not, treated equally and 
are mutually respected. While he believes that reservations against newcomers or new 
influences are more common in rural areas, he thinks that those reservations can be 
removed or disproved easier within the small structure of rural communities (Stengel, 
Yazici 2011). 
                                                          
60 Lauffenmühle, to this day, is the biggest industry in Lauchringen, and, even though it employs less people (around 
250 employees in 2016) than during its peak in the 1970s (over 2000 employees), its important role for the economy in 
Lauchringen becomes visible when considering that the Lauffenmühle was nominated for the Große Preis des 
Mittelstandes (Grand Prize of the mid-tier) 2018, a prize which is the most sought-after and most important economic 
accolade in Germany. 
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Part of those structures are the local family center (FAZ) and the local refugee support 
group (Helferkreis). These two were brought up numerous times during my interviews 
when asked whether the participants think if Lauchringen as a society is more open or 
more closed towards newcomers. Besides the FAZ and the Helferkreis, the soccer club of 
Lauchringen as well as the turnverein of Lauchringen were both mentioned as positive 
examples for the integration of newcomers.  
Another event which was brought up by numerous participants was the ‘Nacht der 
Kulturen’ (night of the cultures), an event that takes place every other year in 
Lauchringen where members of the local population display parts of the culture – such as 
food, music, dance – of their respective homeland. The event is organized by the 
municipality, which received praise throughout the statements of my participants for 
being pro-active and being engaged in pushing forward the integration process. 
It seems like the structural integration is provided by institutions within the municipality, 
from sport clubs to FAZ or the Helferkreis which consists of volunteering members of the 
local population. Such structures seem to perpetuate integration, giving newcomers and 
local population alike a forum where interaction can take place. All participants 
acknowledged these efforts to further the integration.  
Social integration 
However, in regard of the social integration, the solidarity with newcomers among the 
local population, my participants perception of the local population was much more 
ambivalent. As Regina put it:  
“Well, the municipality surely is open. The society, the people [of Lauchringen], I think 
there are few, single ones who really make effort and who care. Those are not the bulk, it 
is only few who really care. You know, like the Helferkreis.” – Regina, 58, housewife 
The opinions about how the local population approaches the newcomers showed a great 
variety. 
Max stated that he hears critical voices when he attends the regulars’ table. However, he 
says, “we have 90 refugees and a population of around 8,000, so one cannot call it a 
‘refugee-crisis’.” He separates the local population into two camps. The first camp entails 
those members of the local population who are open-minded, and those who want to help, 
for example in the Helferkreis. The other group, according to Max, consists of those 
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“who don’t get information [about the integration of newcomers] and don’t want to be 
part of the whole, those who are not ready to receive information, who radicalize 
themselves.”. Within the first group, he says, are people who help for publicity and to 
ease their conscience for living in a society that’s doing well. The rest of the first group, 
to which he counts himself, consists of people who have a “in between mindset” of 
helping but also drawing clear lines and requiring effort from the newcomers: 
“you know, this requiring, I like that, it was discussed in the Helferkreis, about which 
things are for free. […] But my wife is very restrictive and says that they [refugees] 
always should do something for it as well, so they have to…work something for the 
community in order to get something, or they have to make their own money [selling 
cakes] and contribute out of their own pocket. It cannot be that they come here, and 
everybody gets new Nike-shoes.” – Max, 31, politician 
Concerning the part of the local population who is supposedly critical of migration to 
Lauchringen, Max recalls a public meeting upon the arrival of refugees in Lauchringen. 
He tells me how the public meeting entailed heated discussions and that many people 
were against accommodating refugees in the planned area. However, he remembers 
visiting that area few weeks later and that neighbors were checking in on the refugees on 
daily basis and that those who were most critical in the beginning became quite engaged 
in interacting with their new neighbors. 
Gundula referred to the same location, telling me how the local population developed a 
natural relationship with the refugees: “Some women started to bake pie and bring it next 
door and I found that really nice. Those are the beginnings [of integration].” And just like 
Max, she heard complains at first, about refugees starring at the locals, about “the 
refugees not putting their bike away in the right order”, things Gundula calls absolute 
banalities. She further shared a story with me where a neighboring woman complained to 
her about the newcomers. This woman told her that she would rather use her car to get 
from A to B as long as the riff-raff is here.  
Generally, Gundula believes that the younger generation of the local population is more 
open than the older generation. A belief shared by Stefan who told me: 
“Well, I would say, I think like in every other village, there are very different opinions, it 
drifts apart to a great deal. The younger ones are more open, more positive. Sometimes I 
hear negative voices, but more so when I talk to older folks. And in combination with 
alcohol it [the opinions] gets worse. And well, some of the negative comments may have 
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some truth to it and one should acknowledge that as well but other stuff is just cracker 
barrel talk.” – Stefan, 19, student 
He further says that the elders have different types of sorrows than the young people. But 
overall, he believes that the positive voices outweigh the negative ones. 
Ulf shared a story with me where he experienced a member of the older generation 
displaying prejudice against the newcomers. After a refugee had approached him in the 
parking lot of a supermarket, asking for directions, an older woman came up to him and 
asked if the refugee wanted money. Despite his experience, Ulf believes that the majority 
of the local population is more open than closed towards newcomers, “well, maybe also 
because one hopes that this would be the case.”. Those who are opposed to newcomers 
are not expressing their opinion openly, Ulf believes.  
Bert believes that the population of Lauchringen acts generally more open towards 
newcomers because “we also have, since a long time, many foreigners in our 
municipality. So, there as well, we have festivities with the Turkish community here.”. 
He also heard, like Gundula and Max, that lively interactions take place between refugees 
and their neighbors. He salutes those families for being so engaged with the newcomers 
in their neighborhood. He says it is good that the newcomers are accommodated within a 
living area and not in the periphery, to avoid a segregation like it was the case with the 
Turkish guestworkers. However, he also stated the following: “Of course, one can also 
argue like ‘well, do you want to live next door to such a new one?’ And so on, you know, 
the risk, those are always the fears that one has.”.  
A similarly ambiguous statement is made by Thomas when asked to describe the role of 
the local population. He expects the local population 
“to be unbiased. I would expect that. To take the people on unbiased, until they maybe 
get proven wrong, disabused. To handle it without prejudices. And also, to say ‘we can 
also benefit from it, at least from those who mean well and want to integrate.’ We can 
benefit from it because we need skilled workers, especially here in the country side. Yeah, 
That’s basically it.” – Thomas, 50, teacher 
In his estimation, the local population is relatively open, mostly because the population is 




Concerning the opinion among the local population, Christian believes that the positive 
approach is more common than negative, critical voices. The majority of people he is in 
touch with express positive opinions. However, he also was surprised by statements made 
by people he knows. He utters the concern that there might be a point where it could 
become difficult, but that this point hasn’t been reached yet, mostly because the number 
of refugees admitted to Lauchringen is absolutely bearable, “it must be bearable.”.  
Kerstin also says that, in her perception, the local population is “basically open. 
Obviously other [negative] voices exist too, but overall Lauchringen is open.”. She utters 
that it would be important to her that the local population is open, tolerant, and accepting. 
Kerstin knows many people who are engaged: “So, I think that’s really great, and I’m 
proud of that, that we are so involved.” She further uttered that she sometimes finds 
herself in situation where someone is talking bad about refugees and migrants. In those 
moments, she doesn’t remain silent and confronts the people about their views.  
Manfred, as many others before him, says that Lauchringen is very open, due to the 
history of Turkish migration “although the Turks integrated badly, that is more like 
ghetto-like.”. He expresses his belief that, similar than Ulf, many among the local 
population hold grudges but don’t make their anger public. As example for reservations 
against refugees, Manfred tells me a story where he was looking for apartments for a 
refugee he is supporting. As soon as it became clear that the apartment would be rented to 
a refugee, Manfred told me that the landlord immediately shut down and was not 
interested anymore.  
Manfred says that such behavior “must change. The refugees are here now, whether it is 
good or bad, they are here now, so one must deal with it.”. He further told me that he 
often gets into conversations with other members of the local population who talk to him 
about his engagement in the Helferkreis: “And they tell you ‘so great that you’re doing it’ 
but I can feel that they actually think to themselves ‘I wouldn’t do it’ or ‘I don’t support 
it’.”. 
Inspired by the statements of my participants, I decided to separate the twelve 
participants into three groups. Gundula, Stephanie and Stefan all voiced similar opinions 
according to which the younger generations tend to be more welcoming and open-minded 
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towards newcomers. Hence why I will look at Stephanie, Stefan and Ulf as the group 
which represents the young generation (18-30 years).  
As it became clear that many participants believe that there is a discord between those 
who are engaged in the integration process and the alleged majority which is either 
critical or indifferent to the integration process, two other groups can be established. 
Gundula, Manfred, and Christian constitute the group who stands for those who are 
voluntarily (Gundula and Manfred) or professionally (Christian) engaged with refugees 
that recently came to Lauchringen. The other group includes Regina, Kerstin, Bert, 
Thomas, Michael, and Max. This group consists of – according to the statements made by 
the participants – members of the local population who are not in touch with refugees and 
who are critical or indifferent to the issue. Within this group, Thomas, Michael, and Max 
are or were in touch with migrants or refugees, either directly or indirectly. However, this 
contact doesn’t come through a conscious decision as it is the case with Gundula, 
Manfred, and Christian, but through the circumstances of their profession (teacher, police 
officer, politician). 
Therefore, I will analyze the participants’ opinions – for the most part – in groups, which 
are: 
Group A (young generation): Stephanie, Stefan, Ulf 
Group B (engaged with refugees, and self-perceived as open-minded): Gundula, 
Manfred, Christian 
Group C (critical or indifferent): Regina, Kerstin, Bert, Thomas, Michael, Max 
4.6 Analytical inspirations 
Before focusing on intersubjectivity and native anthropology some general remarks to 
(anthropological) phenomenology shall be made: When trying to encapsulate the 
embodied and temporal structure of the experience of a human being, one has to be aware 
of “the existential fact that we are emplaced in a world that always outstrips the expanse 
of our being.” (Desjarlais, Throop 2011: 90). Therefore, no one is capable experiencing 
the world in its entire substance. This means that our consciousness always orientates 
towards certain objects of experience.  
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Due to the circumstance that we live in a world which surpasses our horizon, so to speak, 
the world is perceived as a phenomenon free of determination. However, this is not to 
imply that the world is neither structureless nor a mere unintelligible flux of sensations, 
qualities, and movements. It rather suggests that “we are never able to exhaust our 
experience of the world in which we are emplaced” (Desjarlais, Throop 2011: 90), simply 
because there is a never-ending occurrence of new experiences.  
The constantly changing horizon to our experiences 
“suggests a beyond from which we have come and a toward to which we could be 
headed. A morethan is always woven into the fabric of existence that constantly shifts as 
we attend to particular aspects of reality, while ignoring others. Uncertainty, ambiguity, 
and indeterminacy are the norm here.” (Desjarlais, Throop 2011: 90).” 
This awareness of only being able to grasp some parts of reality is certainly of 
importance for a researcher, during fieldwork as much as during the analysis. 
 
4.6.1 Key notions for the fieldwork: Intersubjectivity and native anthropology 
It is now time to explore the notions of intersubjectivity and native anthropology. Both 
these notions accompanied me during my research in the field. 
 
4.6.1.1 Intersubjectivity 
A brief definition of intersubjectivity is delivered by the anthropologists Desjarlais and 
Throop: “Intersubjectivity: the existential organization, recognition, and constitution of 
relations between subjects.” (Desjarlais, Throop 2011: 88). Or in other words: 
“For Husserl, intersubjectivity is the most basic quality of human existence, which is 
constitutive of the Subject and of the very notion of an objective world. By exploring the 
role of the living human body, empathy, tools, and the natural and cultural world, Husserl 
comes to see intersubjectivity as a domain of inquiry that spans the entire scope of human 
experience.” (Duranti 2010: 1,2). 
In the context of this research, the relations between subjects comes into play when the 
researcher interacts with his environment. How the actions of a researcher can affect the 
immediate environment, and the perception and interpretation of the researcher, becomes 
visible if one looks at the statement by Edward Sapir, anthropologist, who argues that the  
“true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals and, on the subjective 
side, in the world of meanings which each one of these individuals may unconsciously 
abstract from himself from his participation in these interactions” (Sapir 1961: 151). 
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The results of any research are inevitably tainted by the subjective perception of the 
researcher and his impact on his environment. The anthropologist Csordas places the 
meaning, or more precise the interpretation of an interaction or action, on the subjective 
side. Meanwhile, the interaction or action as such is put on the objective side: “In this 
sense the interaction and the interpretation constitute a dual locus of culture, the 
objective/behavioral and the subjective/meaningful.” (Csordas 2008: 111, 112). 
Further, one should also be aware of the thought that intersubjectivity is not solemnly 
focusing on micro-interaction between isolated individuals (Csordas 2008). 
Intersubjectivity is also about “a community of Egos existing with each other and for 
each other […] which, moreover (in its communalized intentionality) constitutes the one 
identical world” (Husserl, 1960: 107). 
Consequently, intersubjectivity is also impacting the way anthropological texts are 
written. Since the interaction between individuals as much as between the community of 
Egos is leading to a hybridity, or in other words, to intersubjectivity, the anthropologist 
Narayan is arguing  
“[…] for the enactment of hybridity in our texts; that is, writing that depicts authors as 
minimally bicultural in terms of belonging simultaneously to the world of engaged scholarship 
and the world of everyday life.” (Narayan 1993: 672). 
Earlier I mentioned that I grew up in the village where I did my fieldwork. While, based 
on the similar background, I share similarities with the local population, those similarities 
deserve a closer inspection since 
“The perception of similarity is in every case bound to a flashing up. It flits past, can possibly 
be won again, but cannot be held fast as can other perceptions. It offers itself to the eye as 
fleetingly and transitorily as a constellation of stars. The perception of similarities thus seems 
to be bound to a moment in time.” (Benjamin 1999: 695, 696). 
During my fieldwork, those perceptions of similarity were indeed temporarily won again, 
but were certainly not of long duration. This brings me to the notion of native 
anthropology, where it is discussed whether such similarities are connected to the 
situation where the researcher is either a “native” or a “foreign” anthropologist. 
4.6.1.2 Native anthropology 
When it comes to native anthropology, one must ask what makes an anthropologist 
“native” or “foreign”? Is it the fact that a researcher arrives from abroad, rendering him a 
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“foreigner” to the population and locality he came to study? Or is he a “native” because 
he shares the same culture than the local population?  
At a time, it was thought that the “classical” anthropologist studies “Others”, an endeavor 
in which he must assiduously become familiar with the different cultural world, while 
“native” anthropologists were believed to portray their own culture from a standpoint of 
“intimate affinity.” (Narayan 1993: 671). For a long time, research in the anthropological 
frame was usually understood as  
“a task carried out by an “outsider” or “stranger” who enters a society and attempts to learn 
about the way of life of its people. Thus, most discussions center on problems encountered by 
the outsider. But there is another vantage point from which research can be conducted–that of 
“insider”, the person who conducts research on the cultural, racial, or ethnic group of which he 
himself is a member.” (Jones 1970: 251). 
Nonetheless it was long thought and taught that a research should be done outside of 
one’s own culture, since it was deputized that one who works among one’s own people 
would not be able to maintain a necessary degree of objectivity. It was argued that the 
experience of a research should initially gained in a different culture.  
However, this approach was thrown overboard when it came to international, foreign 
students, who came to study at American universities to achieve their Ph.D. in the USA:  
“It is an undeniable fact that most African students in American universities are Africanists 
who have conducted field work in their own society and are specialists in their own people. 
The philosophy concerning the field training of foreign students, therefore, is opposite to that 
which pertains to training American students.” (Jones 1970: 252). 
This divergent approach suggests that native anthropologists were not fully respected as 
equal peers by, well, their peers. Instead of being accepted as “a professional who will 
conduct research and develop theories and generalizations”, the native anthropologists 
were rather seen “as a person who is in a position to collect information in his own 
culture to which an outsider does not have access.” This exposes the idea that the 
“insider” will be able to know things and assemble information in a more complete and 
different fashion than the “outsider”. (Jones 1970: 252). 
This approach is problematic on several levels. A general critique of the differentiation 
between a “regular” and a “native” anthropologist is that, regardless of the background of 
the anthropologist, one can never become a fully adequate insider, because no culture is 
homogenous, and any society is differentiated. Further, “a professional identity that 
involves problematizing lived reality inevitably creates a distance” (Narayan 1993: 671).  
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Narayan also offers another approach, moving away from the distinction between 
“native” and “foreign” anthropologists where she argues that it is much more complex 
than simply differing between insider and outsider or between the observer and the 
observed. This is due to several factors such as “education, gender, sexual orientation, 
class, race, or sheer duration of contacts” which can easily outweigh a cultural identity 
that is attributed to insider or outsider status (Narayan 1993: 671, 672). 
Narayan calls for directing the attention towards the “quality of relations with the people” 
which are ought to be represented in our texts:  
“are they viewed as mere fodder for professionally self-serving statements about a generalized 
Other, or are they accepted as subjects with voices, views, and dilemmas–people to whom we 
are bonded through ties of reciprocity and who may even be critical of our professional 
enterprise?” (Narayan 1993: 672). 
This reminds us of reflecting on one’s own intention with which the research project was 
begun, and that the society in which the research is done is highly complex and 
heterogenous and therefore deserves to be shown as such, meaning that collected data 
should not be used to make generalized statements about a whole society.  
Consequently, this means that, instead of trying to extract the point of view of “the 
native”, which implies that all natives are the same and share one common perspective, 
one should be aware that in all “societies, gender and age provide factors for social 
differentiation.” (Narayan 1993: 676). Therefore,  
“We would most certainly be better off looking for the natives’ points of view to realize their 
visions of their worlds while at the same time acknowledging that “we” do not speak from a 
position outside “their” worlds, but are implicated in them too” (Narayan 1993: 676). 
Further it is questionable if objectivity as such could be maintained in any 
anthropological research. Narayan argues that  
““Objectivity” must be replaced by an involvement that is unabashedly subjective as it 
interacts with and invites other subjectivities to take a place in anthropological productions. 
Knowledge, in this scheme, is not transcendental, but situated, negotiated, and part of an 
ongoing process. This process spans personal, professional, and cultural domains.” (Narayan 
1993: 682). 
This means that, independent of the background of the researcher, we should situate 
“ourselves as subjects simultaneously touched by life-experience and swayed by 
professional concerns”, something which would allow us to “acknowledge the hybrid and 
positioned nature of our identities.”, because “Writing texts that mix lively narrative and 
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rigorous analysis involves enacting hybridity, regardless of our origins.” (Narayan 1993: 
682).  
4.6.2 Factors of approximation and dissociation 
Considering the simultaneously of my personal life-experience and my professional 
concern, some factors of possible approximation and dissociation between the studied 
population and myself shall be explored in the following.  
4.6.2.1 Factors of approximation 
The strongest factor for a possible approximation of myself towards the local population, 
besides the citizenship/nationality and native tongue which I share with the participants, 
is most likely the fact that I grew up in Lauchringen for 20 years.   
I grew up in a household with both my parents and my older sister. In addition to that, the 
parents of my mother lived next door while the two sisters of my mother were also and 
are still living in Lauchringen, with their respective families. Growing up with such a 
family, a pair of grandparents next door and 2 aunts and uncles and 7 cousins, all in one 
village, I established a certain emotional proximity towards Lauchringen. Furthermore, 
friends that I know since the age of six, grew up with me in the same neighborhood, 
fostering the feeling of emotional attachment.  
Given the fact that Lauchringen is a village of around 8000 inhabitants in combination 
with the fact that I was active in several sport clubs while many of the family members 
were engaged in other communal associations, such as the musical society and carnival 
society and in the earlier years also in the church community, one could argue that my 
family and I were and are well connected throughout the local society. Those connections 
helped me to contact potential participants for my research.  
During the informal conversations as well as during the semi-structured interviews, I 
barely, if not to say never, had the impression that my counterpart would see me as 
someone from the outside but rather someone familiar who they trusted, based on us 
sharing, to some degree, the same background. Those sentiments were sometimes 
expressed directly during the interviews, most common with statements such as “you 




And while it should be noted that the image that I have and had of Lauchringen was 
certainly shaped by my experiences throughout my childhood and youth, and through the 
experiences I lived through during my visits as a student, this doesn’t imply by any 
means that someone who did not grow up in Lauchringen would not be able to conduct 
the project I chose to do. The fact that I do share a similar background with the 
participants, sometimes gave me a hard time not to go into interviews with certain 
expectations. And while each research carries expectations to a certain extent, I felt at 
times that my bias would get in the way of my project, meaning more precisely, I had to 
force myself to approach interviews with a neutrality, trying to blank out the experience I 
made concerning the local population of Lauchringen before I actively conducted 
fieldwork there. 
While there exists an emotional closeness to the locality, mostly based on family and 
friends, there are also factors which could encourage dissociation of the researcher 
towards the local population, as explained in the following. 
4.6.2.2 Factors of dissociation 
Although I share a similar background with the participants, there are some factors which 
needs to be considered when it comes to a possible dissociation between the myself and 
the local population. Since I didn’t live in Lauchringen for the past 10 years, I don’t have 
the insight on how notions such as integration, nation and identity were experienced in 
that period, notably from 2015 on, when the migration debate started to dominate the 
public discourse.  
The experiences I made during my bachelor studies and more so during my studies in 
Montréal, notably living outside of a small community with strong societal ties within, 
made the structural and social differences between rural and urban areas and its 
respective lifestyle visible for me. This situation resulted in me constantly reflecting on, 
if not to say questioning, my upbringing and my childhood and youth experiences, which 
I had subconsciously considered the norm. Or in the words of Kirin Narayan:  
“Institutions and belief systems that I took for granted as immutable reality […] have been 
dismantled as historical and discursive constructions. Even for a purported insider, it is clearly 
impossible to be omniscient: one knows about a society from particular locations within it” 
(Narayan 1993: 679). 
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 With this being said, it means not to convey that someone who has not stepped outside of 
his usual environment for a certain amount of time, would not be able to question and 
reflect on one’s experiences and perceived norms. 
4.6.3 Active participation 
Since any researcher is part of the social interactions he is observing, one needs to be 
aware of the position of the researcher itself and the impact the participation in social 
interactions most likely has, simply because the presence of the researcher becomes part 
of and influences the field he is observing. In other words, one could argue for an 
observation of the participating observation: 
“In the observation of participation, ethnographers both experience and observe their own 
and others’ coparticipation within the ethnographic encounter” (Tedlock 1991: 69). 
Therefore, in the following I will explore some ideas surrounding the reflexion of 
participating observation. 
4.6.3.1 Thoughts on intersubjectivity 
While being from Lauchringen and being well connected throughout the local society 
was certainly helpful to reach out to potential participants and establish a certain level of 
comfort and trust between me and the participants, the fact that ‘everybody knows 
everybody’ may entail the possibility that some answers during informal conversations as 
well as during the interviews might have been altered by that situation.  
When it comes to the topic of migration, integration and identity, - quite personal if not to 
say intimate subjects, especially identity – it might be that participants feel more 
comfortable sharing those thoughts with a complete stranger rather than with someone 
who they associate with the local society, regardless of the declaration of consent which 
was signed by both the interviewer and the interviewee before each interview. 
4.6.3.2 “Gone native” 
To ‘go native’, the most crucial part would have been to blank out my experiences from 
the past ten years where I have lived outside of Lauchringen. Since this was not 
completely possible, in my eyes, I still ended up going native because basically, I was a 
returning native.  
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To see an insurmountable obstacle in the past ten years to ‘going native’ would also 
simplify the local population of Lauchringen since members of that community are 
influenced by outside-experiences maintained in various forms, be it through vacation or 
through friends and family members who live outside of Lauchringen, just the way it is 
applicable in the case of my surrounding in Lauchringen and myself.  
Since I already had ‘gone native’ for the five months after my fathers’ passing, the three 
months in the springtime of 2017 were no different.  I participated in festivities as I 
would usually do when in the village. Strengthening this known feeling of a Lauchringen 
native, was the fact that I was living – during both stays – in my parental home, certainly 
reinforcing my memories and perception of what being in Lauchringen means. 
However, one aspect which was helping me to get a grip on the situation of a returning 
native was the several conversations I had with my mother about this issue. She herself 
had returned to Lauchringen after studying and working in cities in southern Germany. 
This allowed her to share some insight on the perception of differences between rural and 
urban lifestyles, or realities, and the positioning of oneself within that situation. 
In the chapter of “Native anthropology”, it was suggested that “native” researcher would 
tend to be biased to write about their own culture in a positive way. However, in my 
opinion and my perception, I would argue that my approach was rather critical, 
questioning, or skeptical than complaisant and favorable.  
 
4.7 Certificate of the Ethics commission 
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In the previous chapter I introduced Lauchringen as my site of fieldwork as well as the 
informants who participated in my research. Based on their statements I established three 
groups which I will now discuss. In doing so, I hope to shed light on how the perception 
of ‘the other’ shapes the national identity of my participants. As well, I hope to show how 
national identity shapes participants’ perception of the integration process. 
5.1 Group A – the young generation 
This group consists of Stephanie, Ulf, and Stefan. What the members of Group A have in 
common is 1) they are not older than 30 years, 2) they described mostly positive 
interactions with newcomers, and 3) they did not bring up neither Leitkultur nor religion 
as a factor for either integration or identity.  
I begin with looking at their interaction with migrants, children of migrants, and refugees 
to see how they position themselves towards the alleged other. 
5.1.1 interaction with migrants61 
When it comes to the interaction with migrants or children of migrants, all three 
participants of this group shared positive experiences. While Stefan recalled how he met 
parents of his class-mates with Turkish migration background, an experience he describes 
as friendly and in a warm atmosphere, Ulf told me that throughout his life, his circle of 
friends included people of different migration backgrounds.  
Stefan seems to approach his class-mates of Turkish origin in an inclusive manner, 
describing them as “not immigrants, but more so children or grandchildren of 
immigrants.”, situating them within the local population. The fact that his class-mates of 
Turkish origin get along great among each other, and further spending all their summer 
vacation in Turkey is unproblematic to Stefan because he is aware of the Turkish roots 
and the connection to family members in Turkey. 
                                                          
61 In the context of this thesis, the term migrants stands for people who migrated to Germany, or people whose parents 
migrated to Germany.The term refugees mostly refers to people who came to Germany as refugees since 2015, from 
predominantly Arabic and North-African countries. The term newcomers entails migrants and refugees alike. 
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Stephanie’s best friend is the child of an Italian family who migrated to Germany when 
the father was a guestworker in Germany. Her friend has an Italian passport but is, 
according to Stephanie, viewed and perceived as a German by the majority population. 
This indicates that for all three of them, belonging and being part of the German society 
is not linked necessarily to neither the possession of a German citizenship nor to being of 
a specific ethnicity. In other words, their approach to otherness seems to be rather fluid 
and their understanding of German society allows rather permeable boundaries. 
5.1.2 Interactions with refugees 
Concerning the interaction with refugees, the experience of the three young participants 
are not as similar as their experience with migrants or children of migrants. 
Stephanie, who works as a nursery school teacher, stated that she observed that children 
of refugees are treated less loving by their parents than children of German families or of 
migrant families who have been living in Germany for a longer time. However, she 
points out that it is impossible to generalize and that she also lived through very positive 
experiences where the parents (refugees) were very thankful for the work she is doing 
with the children. 
Ulfs’ experience with refugees came in the form of an internship. Two refugees 
completed an internship in his company. The internships worked out well, despite a few 
misunderstandings Ulf tells me. The misunderstandings led Ulf to attend an informative 
event which was offered to people who consider employing a refugee. Ulf recalls how the 
event was quite interesting and that it brought him a better understanding of the culture 
and mentality of the refugees. Overall, he found the experience beneficial and described 
the information he received their as logical and comprehensive.  
Stefan shared two stories of his encounters with refugees, both which he described as 
informative because “It is good to hear their voices, their opinions. Those encounters are 
only an advantage.”. Therefore, he is always interested in having a conversation with a 
newcomer if the opportunity presents itself. His two opportunities to do so took place as 
follows. Once, Stefan had an encounter with three Syrian refugees at a community and 
family center (FAZ) in Lauchringen: 
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“It was nice, we made waffles together. And while doing so, we got into a good 
conversation. They were all speaking relatively good German. They told me that they are 
from Damascus and yeah, how they observe the situation there. It was really interesting 
to talk to them.” – Stefan, 19, student 
Another time, refugees visited his class which created an opportunity for an exchange 
between the young men: 
“The refugees who came to class, one was living in the Chilbi-Halle in Waldshut. And he 
was very frustrated about that. He was living there with hundreds of other people in a 
small space while not being allowed to work. His English was very good, he used to be 
an English teacher. He said he doesn’t understand why he cannot work here, be it as a 
translator or something. They don’t let him do anything and that was hard on him. You 
could tell that he was a guy that likes to work and likes working with people. But now, in 
the Chilbi-Halle, the people are a bit too close to each other and he would just like to do 
something. I thought that really was reasonable and relatable. To understand how he is 
feeling, how frustrated they are.” – Stefan, 19, student 
Stefan displays understanding and empathy towards the situation the refugees find 
themselves in.  
While all three participants are aware of possible differences of cultures, they do not 
necessarily ascribe any negative aspects to those differences. Rather, they seem to see 
encounters with the alleged other as an opportunity to learn something new and to 
incorporate that into their perception. In cases where negative experiences are made, as 
Stephanie described, it is not generally attributed to a cultural norm, since the positive 
experiences that were also made lead the participants to believe that the reason for their 
negative experience must lie elsewhere. 
5.1.3 Perception of religion 
None of the three participants brought up the aspect of religion as an important or 
decisive factor in regard of integration or of their definition of Germany, German society, 
or German culture.  
Interim conclusion 
So far, Stephanie, Ulf, and Stefan seem to display an unbiased, open, and fluid 
understanding of ‘the other’. Signs of possible hierarchy between them and ‘the other’ do 
not appear.  
If their experiences and approach towards ‘the other’ affects their understanding of 
national identity is highlighted on the following pages. 
108 
 
5.1.4 National identity 
From a cultural standpoint, Ulf displays an inclusive, non-hierarchy approach: 
“there are nice things in our culture, but I wouldn’t put it above anything else. So, 
everything new that comes, is basically an enrichment. […] Everybody who lives here is 
a part of it [Germany]. Automatically, be it a German or someone with foreign roots, 
newcomers, they are all part of it.”. – Ulf, 29, self-employed 
In terms of citizenship and dual-citizenship, Ulf sees citizenship as one indication of 
being a member of a nation-state. Having no problem with a dual-citizenship, he states 
that he sees no reason as to why one should not be able to be loyal to two different 
nation-states. Regarding the birthright, the concept of jus soli sounds the most plausible 
to him. However, he gets a little fuzzy when elaborating:  
“It would have more positive sides if you get the citizenship of the country you are born 
in, presumed that your parents also have the same citizenship. Otherwise it would make 
no sense because it [having a different citizenship than your parents] could lead to 
complications and discrepancies [concerning one’s identity].” – Ulf, 29, self-employed 
At the same time, he shows the believe that the possession of a citizenship would be vital, 
for “one might not feel as German or might not implicate oneself as much if one knows 
that one is not German [on the passport]”. Overall, his inclusive approach in regard of 
culture seems to be the most accentuated way Ulf expresses his national identity. 
Stefan offers an inclusive, civic approach about Germany as such, saying that Germany is 
a multicultural country: 
“I like that the borders are being kept open, that there is no protectionism. Of course, we 
have good beer as well (laughs), I’d say Germany doesn’t have a, there is no such thing 
as the typical patriotic German, they don’t exist. Not like one imagines the classic 
American. I believe German culture shows itself, it is a multicultural country where one 
can live peacefully with each other. I think everybody can become a part of the German 
culture, because, well, there is, I don’t see that one German culture. And I think everyone 
can participate and live peacefully amongst all others in the country. And that is what 
makes Germany, what defines Germany.” – Stefan, 19, student 
Here, Stefan sees Germany and German culture as a multicultural society where everyone 
can be included. Mostly because he doesn’t belief in a static German culture. It seems 
like Stefan is defining German-ness mostly through a civic approach of national identity. 
However, in his next statement he contradicts himself, painting a rather static image of 
German culture: 
“I think in Germany, it is still everything like one imagines the German. He is on time, 
likes to work and works a lot, he likes to drink beer. And yeah, that is a bit different in the 
Arabic countries, alcohol is off the table for the most of them, and yeah, so, also 
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something that one always hears is the cliché about being on time and what not. I think 
that is a bit different here and one has to learn it first. Of course, that is something that a 
lot of people who come here have to adjust to first. And that’s how Germany is and 
probably always will be, and they have to take that on.” – Stefan, 19, student 
In this statement, the cultural understanding of Stefan’s national identity reveals itself. In 
his second quote, Stefan contradicts his earlier statement about there being no such thing 
as a typical German. While he describes German society and the German culture as very 
fluent and immigrant-friendly, he still comes back to German stereotypes of being on 
time, being diligent and drinking beer. Therefore, he stays vague in regard of what 
German-ness means to him. One possibility could be that he sees the culture of ethnic 
Germans as more less static while still seeing the possibility of an integration on a civic 
level, due to the multicultural approach. 
Citizenship as such, has less of a meaning for Stefan than the emotional connection to his 
homeland, more precisely his home-province or even his home-district, short: 
Lauchringen. He sees receiving citizenship based on the concept of jus soli as a helpful 
tool to ease the integration process, Stefan declares. 
While he believes that one can feel at home in two countries, he believes that dual-
citizenship would hinder integration because “you are either Turkish or German.” Here, 
Stefan seems to contradict his earlier statements where he acknowledged the Turkish 
origins of his class-mates as well as his belief that one can feel at home in two different 
countries.  
Stefan seems to define Germany as an open, welcoming country. However, his 
contradicting statements reveal a certain difficulty of pinning down questions of 
belonging, and further expose how national identity can be perceived through different 
layers, depending on the context through which one looks at it, as eluded to in chapter 1, 
page 3. 
Stephanie denied to attempting to define German society or German culture, pointing out 
that it is “different from generation to generation, even from family to family, since 
everyone teaches different values and norms.” Using her best friend as an example, 





The difficulty of defining a supposed ‘we-group’ as well as the required parameters to 
decide who and what belongs to such a group has become visible. However, based on the 
socio-cultural, civic openness, and the support of dual-citizenship (except for Stefan) as 
well as jus soli, a predominantly fluid national identity seems to be present among the 
young participants. We shall now see how this impacts the approach on integration. 
5.1.5 Integration 
In their approach towards how integration should be achieved, all three participants offer 
similar takes: 
Ulf emphasizes on societal integration, coming close to the concept of conviviality62. He 
wishes to reach a point where the two parties emerge as one coherent unit. In 
combination with his statement about German culture and the enrichment of new 
influences, it seems that Ulf does not call for the establishment of one coherent unit in the 
sense of assimilation but rather for the incorporation of the new cultures that migrants 
bring along. The coherent unit he calls for refers to establishing common basic values 
such as mutual respect and the way individuals interact with each other. 
Stefan shows empathy with newcomers concerning their beginnings in a new society, 
“Integration is intertwined with openness, towards the new country and towards the new. 
That one is not closed towards the new and maybe just accepting how things are, at first. 
I mean those are two completely different countries, that probably takes time until one 
approaches each other and finds commonalities. And, also, from our side, and from their 
side, trying to get into a conversation, […] I think that is how integration works at its 
best. I think if one simply tries to find each other in normal conversations.” – Stefan, 19, 
student 
while also placing responsibility on the local population, moving him closer towards the 
approach which supports a symmetric learning process rather than one-sided assimilation:   
“Integration is also for us, or, we also have to nurture it. It cannot only come from them, 
the people who come here. We also must practice it, to be open towards the people. […] 
If the opportunity presents itself to help someone or support someone, no matter how, one 
has to do one’s part in it.  […] One also must, or can, not must, one can, it is voluntarily 
for everyone, but that one is really standing side to side with the newcomers. It is not that 
easy to deal with a new language and a new country.” – Stefan, 19, student 
                                                          
62 As discussed on page 12 and 13.  
111 
 
Stefan calls for an active part which the local population should play in the integration 
process. While his statement promotes openness and understanding, he also signals that 
patience should be exercised by the local population as well. 
Stephanie approaches integration not just from a standpoint concerning newcomers 
coming into the country but also defines integration as something which must be 
achieved in terms of integrating people with a handicap and integrating other minorities 
within the majority population. She describes integration as a process in which the 
majority population has a great deal of responsibility.  
Conclusion of 5.1 
Through their experiences with migrants, children of migrants, and refugees, the process 
of othering is relatively weak – at least it does not come along with negative ascriptions – 
which leads to a rather fluid national identity which in return seems to turn into the 
preference of an inclusive and symmetric integration process. This goes hand in hand 
with the assumption that increased contact with ‘the other’ reduces prejudice, in short: the 
findings of group A seem to underpin the social contact theory.63 The participants 
experienced virtually no negative interactions with ‘the other’. Consequently, they show 
little to no signs of prejudice. 
 
5.2 Group B – consciously chose to be engaged with refugees 
This group consists of Gundula, 68 years old, who is in more less regular contact with a 
refugee family, Manfred, 70 years old, who is a member of the Helferkreis, and Christian, 
60 years old, who oversees several refugee houses in the district. The members of this 
group have the following commonalities: 1) They are at least 60 years old. 2) They chose 
consciously to be – although in different settings – engaged and in contact with refugees. 
5.2.1 Interaction with migrants 
Based on their statements, interactions with migrants are rather rare for the participants of 
this group. Nonetheless, they all shared their opinion on migrants in Lauchringen. 
Manfred stated that he did not really get in touch with refugees until joining the 
Helferkreis. Concerning interactions with migrants he says: “We have basically the Turks 
                                                          
63 As discussed in chapter 2.3  
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[in Lauchringen], but immigrants, in Lauchringen? Not that I know of. That’s never been 
a topic, really.” Concerning the Turkish community, Manfred explained that “they don’t 
integrate, they don’t want to. That’s more like a ghetto.”. 
Gundula tells me that she sometimes has the impression that “the Turkish kids are, at 
times, a bit more insolent than the German kids. But that’s just my feeling.”. She goes on 
pointing out that “we have a Turkish family in our neighborhood and it’s a super nice 
family, while the German neighbor downstairs is very rude, impolite, and doesn’t talk to 
anyone.”.  
Christian mentions that he is barely in touch with migrants, saying that  
“Well, they [Turks and German-Turks] simply live here at our place (bei uns). And there 
are some that integrated themselves well, and there are some that didn’t integrate at all. 
Maybe in cities, where there are built-up areas, Stuttgart for example. If one walks 
through the streets there, one recognizes many migrants, many foreign faces, many 
foreign looking people.” – Christian, 60, contact person for refugees 
What stands out in this group is that there are clear lines drawn between Germans and 
Turks/Germans with Turkish background. The participants do not distinguish – opposed 
to as Stefan did – between migrants and children of migrants. This becomes clear in 
Christian’s statement where the othering takes place in a way where German-ness 
becomes a conflation with whiteness64. With exception of the lovely family living in 
Gundula’s neighborhood, migrants are perceived rather critical or indifferent.  
5.2.2 Interactions with refugees 
In terms of interactions with refugees, the three participants do not share a similar 
experience. 
Gundula, not living far from where a Syrian refugee family settled in, shares the 
following story. She wanted to build a relationship with the family, but she was worried 
about approaching them in a crude way. 
“So, one day, I just – he [the father] already speaks relatively good German – 
approached him, talked to him and told him that we would have toys and bikes at home, 
stuff our boys used to play with. And I didn’t want to just drop of the things, so I asked 
him if I could come by one day. And when I came, he was there, and the kids must have 
known that I was coming. And it was very joyful.” – Gundula, 68, retiree 
She then continued to tell me how she engaged with the mother of the children: 
                                                          
64 See chapter 3.1.7  
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“And there was also a friend of the family present. She [the mother] doesn’t speak one 
word of German. And I only speak few words of English, but we managed to talk a little 
bit over some tea. And I was thinking to myself: ‘What are we actually expecting from 
them?’ She is so homesick. And she is not ready yet to learn German. He is trying to 
teach her. But he told me that she just wants to go home. I mean she is traumatized, she is 
homesick, she misses her family, her siblings are still in Syria. She is just not ready to go 
out there. She probably would like to just stay inside by herself. I guess a lot of refugees 
are going through similar emotions. And then, if she, you know, is wearing the headscarf, 
I think it can be difficult for Germans to understand that she doesn’t want to integrate 
right now. But we expect that. The pressure is there.” – Gundula, 68, retiree 
Gundula displays an open, welcoming approach, mostly based on empathy. Her story is 
basically an example of what Stefan had called for among the local population. While 
Gundula shows empathy for the refugee’s situation, she also utters understanding for a 
potential estrangement on the side of the local population.  
Christian has a great variety of different experiences with refugees, giving an example of 
a refugee family in a neighboring town: 
“The father tried to learn German from the first day on. The kids were immediately 
visiting kindergarten, the father joined the firefighters and the wife joined the country-
women’s association. So, they just tried, they realized: ‘There are people who want to 
help us, so we want to give back to them as well.’.” – Christian, 60, contact person for 
refugees 
At first, Christian states that he never had a negative experience with refugees. Later, he 
says the following:  
“Of course, we must help. And yeah there are those and those [newcomers]. I also had 
people [newcomers] where I told myself: ‘Hey, put him in the next plane and drop him 
somewhere [over his homeland] with a parachute. […] In my environment, the people 
who work with me, people talk bad about them [newcomers]. These days they 
[colleagues] are complaining about the Gambians and the problems with drugs. And 
well, in the refugee hostel I am overlooking, there are 10 Gambians, 20 Eritreans. Of 
course, everywhere there are one or two who overdo it at times. But overall, they are all 
great guys, that’s that. So, one has to form one’s own opinion.” – Christian, 60, contact 
person for refugees  
In Christian’s statement, the ambiguity of the integration debate is encapsulated. On one 
hand he suggests a radical approach concerning how to deal with a newcomer who does 
not, in Christian’s view, have a place in German society. On the other hand, he defends 
the refugees he is working with against unfounded criticism. 
Further, his prime example for integration shows that the component of gratefulness 




Manfred is supporting several refugees and helping them with administrative issues. 
While he shows a lot of empathy for the refugees and their struggle with the 
administrative, bureaucratic, and societal issues they are facing, he utters frustration 
concerning the Helferkreis. He laments that there is a lack of organization, lack of regular 
meetings, and lack of communication among its members.  
Where he becomes critical, is the aspect of Muslim refugee women wearing a headscarf:  
“They[refugees] shouldn’t isolate themselves. They should go into the clubs and 
associations, to integrate in the clubs, just in our society. And that thing with the faith, 
one shouldn’t carry that towards the outside. The faith is something you do at home, 
period. But it already starts with those headscarfs. […] Those are definitely not 
beneficial for the integration.” – Manfred, 70, retiree 
All three participants express empathy towards the situation the refugees find themselves 
in. However, Christian seems to draw a clear line between those who seem worthy of 
support and those who do not. Manfred’s statement about the headscarf – which Gundula 
uttered indirectly understanding for – suggests a certain static image of ‘the other’, the 
Muslim (woman) that is. 
5.2.3 Perception of religion 
For Manfred, religion is a private matter, as seen in the previous quote of his. A reason to 
why he believes that showing signs of Islam in public would be an obstacle to integration 
could be found in his general take on Islam: 
“In my opinion, the Arabs, those countries are not suited for democracy. They are not 
ready yet. It doesn’t work. And then they have so many, the Shiites and the Sunnis, they 
are rivals. So, as long as the Saudis and the Iranians don’t talk to each other, forget 
about it. They are tearing each other up. They[Muslims] are going through the same 
thing the Christians went through during the middle-age. Brutal.” – Manfred, 70, retiree 
Christian, who is involved in the local Christian community, would like to see a certain 
level of adaptation from the newcomers. However, this does not concern their religion: 
“I think a migrant should bring the readiness with him to integrate himself. That he says 
‘Okay, of course I want to learn the language, of course I want to try to somehow adapt 
to the culture’. But I don’t expect from anyone who comes as a Muslim to get rid of their 
faith. […] But I think that everyone should respect the other religion. And I also expect 
that from us Lauchringner, that they [population of Lauchringen] respect that there are 
people with a different faith.” – Christian, 60, contact person for refugees 
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He wishes that the freedom of religion is implemented, without judgement of another 
religion. Instead he calls for mutual respect and openness concerning the respective 
religion. 
A similar reasoning is applied by Gundula: 
“I think we don’t know enough about their [newcomers] culture. […] One would have to 
be really engaged with their culture before making a valid statement. We don’t know the 
Quran like that, the meaning of it. Even if a Christian is reading the bible, it is often a 
symbolic language and not to be taken literally. If one reads the bible without 
background knowledge, it is very brutal, especially the old testament.” – Gundula 68, 
retiree 
Interim conclusion 
The othering of members of the Turkish community and non-white members of the 
German society is rather common in this group. This does not necessarily go hand in 
hand with – at least direct – devaluation of ‘the other’ but can also bring out the quest for 
mutual respect, as seen in Christian’s and Gundula’s statements about religion. However, 
Manfred’s take on Islam and on Arab countries is a indicator of othering which comes 
along with devaluation. Christian’s opinions also demonstrate a hierarchy construct in 
which the newcomers are the ones who are expected to ‘deliver’. How the patterns of 
othering effect the takes on national identity of the three is to be shown now. 
5.2.4 National identity 
Christian attributes a high standard of living to German society. This, he argues is due to 
diligence and  
“well, there are so many attributes. Be it being on time, being reliable, all that. All that. I 
think, all that is part of the integration. They have to learn that as well, I think it is also 
part of it that this is being conserved.”- Christian, 60, contact person for refugees 
This suggests that Christian sees German culture through a socio-economic lens. Such 
norms and habits which lead to the German way of life should be taken on by the 
newcomers, he states. Christian’s take suggests that newcomers first must learn to be 
diligent, on time, and reliable. 
Concerning a multicultural society, he offers the following opinion: 
“So, I find that, how should I put it, well, I think ‘Multikulti’ (multicultural) is not bad, 
but we need to be careful. Because I would find it sad, hmm, we shouldn’t have to give up 
our culture. I think it shouldn’t go that far that we give up ourselves, our own culture. 
And maybe this danger is sometimes present. […] well I think, we tend a bit to, that 
sometimes we are looking for the other culture a bit too much, so I think we should still 
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try to keep our culture for a bit. We happen to be in Germany and we do have a bit of our 
standards here, and we should hold on to those a bit. I think it shouldn’t be like, that we, 
how should I put it, yeah that we get absorbed, somehow by whole different influences, 
different cultures. But I also think that this is something, it depends on the effort we put 
into the integration. If a good integration is made, then I think it is part of it that one 
teaches them our culture, also, accepting their culture, but that they also accept our 
culture. And leaving it at that for now.” – Christian, 60, contact person for refugees 
Here, Christian seems to contradict himself. A certain ambiguity becomes visible. While 
he states that a multicultural society is nothing bad and that Germans should also accept 
other cultures, he believes that the German culture might come under pressure if other 
cultures become too dominant. What stands out is that he also places responsibility on the 
side of the German population, calling for mutual acceptance, even though he uttered 
reluctance towards too many new influences.  
Christian’s statement indicates a rather static national identity, based on his reservations 
against – too much – multiculturalism and his belief that newcomers must take on norms 
and habits typical for German society. 
This assumption of a static national identity regarding Christian is reinforced when 
considering his opinion on birthright and dual-citizenship: 
“So, you know that in the refugee hostels, there are always babies born and, hmm, if it is 
a baby of Afghan parent, then the kid is Afghan. Why should the kid be German? It is 
Afghan, it has Afghan blood. So of course, it should be like that [jus sanginis].” – 
Christian on which birthright he prefers. 
“you can only live in one country and you are only home in one country, I think, and I 
believe that it would be right if one would have to decide, I am German, or I am Turk.” 
[…] Why the dual-citizenship? I can imagine that it brings benefits in some cases, but I 
think one should decide, I want to be German or Swiss. […] you can only be citizen of 
one, how can you be citizen of two, I can say my home is Germany or Switzerland, but it 
cannot be both, hence why I would tend to say we don’t need a dual-citizenship.”- 
Christian on dual-citizenship 
Christian reveals a strong ethnic understanding of national identity, based on descent with 
no permeable boundaries whatsoever.  
Gundula is reluctant to pin down specific characteristics of German culture: 
“I often read and hear in the media that ‘they’ [refugees] should adapt ‘our’ [Germans] 
values. But I ask myself: What are ‘our’ values actually? Can you tell me?” – Gundula, 
68, retiree 
This is a similar approach than Stephanie (group A) expressed. They both seem critical of 
attributing specific norms and values to the alleged ‘we-group’. 
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Gundula’s sense of citizenship is based on belonging, feeling of being part of a greater 
community with similar structures. This implies that Gundula sees herself as part of a 
‘we-group’, however this group is held together by civic norms and not by ethnic 
understanding. Gundula’s civic understanding is rather static, becoming visible by 
looking at her take on dual-citizenship. Gundula’s stated that,  
“if one is born in Germany and lives his whole life here, that one then should become German 
and not Deutschtürke [Turkish-Germans], because one owns it to the nation-state, that if one 
enjoys all the benefits, one has to fulfill duties as well. Therefore, dual-citizenship is not really 
necessary.” – Gundula, 68, retiree 
 Although, she says, she understands those who have roots in other countries and that 
they might have wistfulness to home. For newcomers it must be difficult because they 
have to give up lived years of identity. Nonetheless, she beliefs that dual-citizenship is an 
obstacle to the integration process. She exclaims her anger towards the Deutschtürken 
who protested and voted pro Erdogan in Germany, saying that she was very upset with 
that issue and that this indicates no integration at all, and that it is insolent that people 
who have no idea or relation to what happens in Turkey are voting and protesting for it. 
Here Gundula contradicts herself when saying that Deutschtürken have no idea or 
relation to what happens in Turkey. She earlier stated that she is aware of migrants 
having roots and relation towards their native country. 
When asked about a possible preference of one of the two birthrights, she said that she 
never really thought about birthrights, but that she would say that the jus sanguinis 
sounds more plausible. However, she stated that this opinion comes with mixed feelings 
because it would oppose her statement concerning about dual-citizenship (if one is born 
in Germany and lives his whole life there, that one then should become German). 
Manfred, in similar fashion than Christian, struggling to pin down what constitutes 
German culture, focuses on the economic identity:  
“Well, culture, difficult. Mentality is maybe more like, that the German works, likes to 
work and yeah culture. I don’t know if that belongs here as well, that one is not cleaning 
one’s car on a Sunday. That is somewhat typical German. I don’t think that it is like that 
everywhere, for example, in Canada, right?”. – Manfred, 70, retiree 
He further expressed the belief that German mentality is specific when it comes to the 
will to work,  
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“to work meticulously, just so that something is going forward, progress. The Arabs are 
more, if they didn’t find oil, they would still live in a tent, I assume. They would still sit in 
a tent and, running around outside with the camel. So that is a bit of a difference.” – 
Manfred, 70, retiree 
Here, Manfred, again, utters a devaluating opinion on Arabs, while ascribing terms as 
“going forward” and “progress” to the German society. Concerning citizenship and dual-
citizenship, Manfred declares that “I could also be European. I don’t need to insist [on the 
German citizenship], I don’t demand, request the German citizenship.” This reveals that 
Manfred draws the line, in this context, more between Western/European identity and 
Eastern – what equates for him to Muslim – identity. This would also explain his stance 
on dual-citizenship. After stating that he would have no problem with having a European 
identity, he believes that dual-citizenship is an obstacle to the integration process, naming 
the “Turks in Germany and the issue with [Turkish president] Erdogan.” as a reason why 
he would oppose dual-citizenship. 
Interim conclusion 
Christian reveals a strong ethnic, static national identity with skepticism towards 
multiculturalism. Gundula is approaching national identity from a rather civic 
perspective, although her civic perspective seems less permeable than static since she 
questions the possibility of being loyal to two different nation-states. Manfred seems to 
draw the line between a European/Western identity and an Eastern/Muslim identity, a 
line which seems impossible to overcome. Overall, the othering made by all three 
participants concerning national identity aimed at predominantly Muslim regions: 
Afghanistan, Turkey, and Arab countries. I now turn towards the integration approaches 
the three participants expressed. 
5.2.5 Integration 
For Manfred, the case of integration is rather simple:  
“Integration? That is really important to me. So, the refugees who are coming; 
integration simply means to integrate oneself into the German society. That is integration 
to me.” – Manfred, 70, retiree 
The responsibility is placed solemnly on the side of the newcomers. While he does not 




While Christian attributes the responsibility partially to the local population, a hierarchy 
in his approach is evident as well: 
“And since we’re talking integration, not we [local population] must integrate the 
people[newcomers], but eventually they have to integrate themselves. We must give them 
a hand, we must offer opportunities, so they can integrate themselves. They must make 
the major step by themselves. We give them a hand and must offer opportunities. But in 
the end, they must prove the will to take the steps to integrate themselves.” – Christian, 
60, contact person for refugees 
Christian doesn’t specify if he see’s integration as an issue that takes place mostly on 
either a socio-cultural/civic or economic level. While he acknowledges that the local 
population should provide a basis for any type of integration, the main effort that has to 
be made to achieve integration is, according to Christian, to be made by the newcomers. 
Gundula expresses the least signs of establishing a hierarchy concerning the integration 
process. 
“One must have understanding for each other. Integration takes place in the details, little 
things, little steps. One must not try to impose our [German] thinking, that ‘only our way 
is the right way’. Nevertheless, they [newcomers] have to meet a bit the expectation that 
they are trying to settle in here.” – Gundula, 68, retiree 
While her first two sentences imply a symmetric learning process, the hierarchy in her 
approach becomes visible when saying that the newcomers should meet the expectation 
of the local population.  
Interim conclusion of 5.2 
A certain degree of othering is present from the beginning. The othering reaches its peak, 
in Christian’s case in a strong ethnic, static national identity. At the same time, he expects 
the newcomers to take on the proclaimed German norms. Adding his skepticism on 
multiculturalism, it seems fair to say that Christian positions himself closer towards an 
approach supporting assimilation rather than aiming at a symmetric learning process to 
achieve integration. 
Manfred’s process of othering is mainly of cultural, more precisely of religious nature. 
Similar than Christian, Manfred expects newcomers to put the main effort into the 
integration process. However, he ascribes Muslim migrants a certain incapability to mesh 
with what he understands as German culture. 
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Gundula, with exception of her othering of the Turkish community, showed less signs of 
othering. Her more less civic national identity allows her to approach integration while 
leaning towards a symmetric learning process, with a touch of hierarchy between the 
newcomers and the local population still present in her approach. 
The fact that all three of them are in regular touch with refugees, or ‘the other’, does not 
seem to transform their static national identity into a more permeable national identity, 
nor does it affect their approach on integration. 
5.3 Group C – sporadic or no contact with refugees  
This group is constituted of Max, Thomas, Bert, Michael, Regina, and Kerstin. They 
share the following characteristics: 1) age between 31 and 60. 2) they are not – and if so, 
only sporadic – in contact with refugees. 3) they strongly rely on either Leitkultur or on 
Christianity – or on a combination of both – when defining national identity.   
5.3.1 Interaction with migrants or children of migrants 
While Thomas, Bert, Michael, and Max all shared with me how they had class-mates 
and/or friends who were either, or both, of Turkish or Italian origin, the othering based on 
these experiences differ.  
Max described how he remembers his friendships with members of the Turkish 
community in Lauchringen, friendships which remained distant, due to the behavior of 
‘the other’: 
“I always had Turkish friends. But I also always felt boundaries, especially with Turks. If 
I may, it is still allowed to say ‘Turks’. So, I believe there was always a problem on the 
Turkish side [Turkish parents] that the little Max would come around to play in the 
afternoon. This ‘staying amongst each other’, I can feel that, yes. I don’t even know who 
they voted for [in the Turkish elections]. But surely very supportive of [Turkish president] 
Erdogan. Our Turkish community [in Lauchringen] is very conservative, one could say.” 
– Max, 31, politician 
While Max acknowledges the fact that the Turkish migrants did not choose to isolate 
themselves, but that the Germans placed them in segregated areas, he also believes that 
Turks decided to stick to each other to the point of isolating themselves from the majority 
society. He, a member of the conservative CDU65, seems to be quite reproachful, not just 
because ‘they’ stayed amongst each other but also for being conservative. 
                                                          
65 Christian-Democratic Union, political party who leads the government in Germany. 
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Bert argues in similar fashion, saying that the Turks created their own environment in 
those housing blocks, which he sees as something negative. He then follows it up with 
this statement:  
“But then again, one can say ‘Well, do you want to be the one living next door to such a 
new one?’ and so on, well, the risk, and well, those are always the fears one has.”. Bert, 
42, broker 
He later brings up a Turkish friend of his, describing him as follows: 
“he is more so a German […] He is with us, he drinks beer with us, […] he shares our 
opinion, he is in our club, and he has less to do with Turks. Although he lives down there 
[Turkish blocks], but yeah, he is like a colleague to us.” – Bert, 42, broker 
Bert further shares a story where he took his children to a children-party for the Turkish 
national holiday at the town hall, organized by the Turkish community of Lauchringen: 
“And everyone was so welcoming. That would not be the case with us [Germans]. But 
you can tell on that day, it is a very different culture. […] The Germans have to plan 
everything through, from A to Z. And they [the Turks] are more relaxed when it comes to 
that. […] And then we were singing the national anthems of Germany and Turkey. My 
ears were hurting [because the Turks were singing their national anthem so loud]. You 
know those little things, if they have their national pride. Well you can just tell, they are a 
different kind of people.” – Bert, 42, broker 
While Bert expresses a positive experience, he points out that there are, according to him, 
accentuated differences between the local population without migration background and 
the local population with a Turkish migration background. The differences he points out 
in his last statement are not described as negative, he rather acknowledges differences 
without judgement. However, his previous statements, including risks and fears, suggests 
a clear reservation against the Turkish community. 
Thomas explains that he has Turkish neighbors, Turkish students, and that he “so far, had 
no negative encounters. But I also don’t start a conversation about [Turkish President] 
Erdogan with them.”. In his youth, having Turkish class-mates “never was a problem. 
But that was of course less [migrants] than today. Today every class has at least five or 
six Turks.”. With his Turkish students today, “overall, looking back, I never had a bad 
experience. And I hope it stays like that.”. In all of these statements by Thomas, a 
reservation towards the Turkish community becomes visible. Even though he says he 
never experienced bad encounters, his statements suggest that this could easily change, 




While Regina states that she has never been in touch with migrants or refugees, Kerstin 
expresses how she had different encounters with families of Turkish and Kurdish origins. 
She highlights that she is looking at questions concerning integration through the lens of 
a woman and is therefore focused on the issue of women rights. Her encounters with the 
mentioned families held mixed experiences for her. She explains how she met families in 
which the woman was barely allowed to act independently, but also points out that she 
got in touch with families where the role of women was highly appreciated and where 
women had rights and freedoms, something she noted as extremely positive.  
In this group, similar to group B, the othering is mostly directed towards members of the 
Turkish community in Lauchringen. What stands out is Bert’s statement “Well, do you 
want to be the one living next door to such a new one?” as well as his depiction of his 
Turkish friend who “is more so a German” based on the fact that this person drinks beer, 
shares Bert’s opinion, is a member of their club, and has less contact with Turks, 
exposing not only how Bert perceives Turkish migrants but also what it means for him to 
be German. 
5.3.2 Interaction with refugees 
As a police officer, Michael has experienced encounters with refugees. In Waldshut, a 
town not far from Lauchringen, 200-300 young male refugees were accommodated in the 
community gym (Chilbi-Halle): 
“In the Chilbi-Halle, well, only young men. And then it was, whenever something was 
going on there, it was very difficult for us [police]. Also due to the constellation. Of 
course, if you only have young people in a small space. I mean they had 300 men in 
there. That is unbelievably tight, there is no room for oneself. And you know, one is being 
loud, another one smoked, the other one didn’t stick to the rules and so one thing leads to 
another. And well, then there is a constant potential for conflicts. We had to show up 
there several times. Never something serious, but still, several times, yes. […] With the 
refugees, it is a double-edged sword. On one hand, you have those – what we also see a 
lot – who are trying to integrate, who speak the language after three months and who are 
trying to advance. And on the other hand, you have those who we [police] get in touch 
with more often.” – Michael, 46, police officer 
In this quote Michael shares his understanding of the situation the refugees face in the 
immediate surroundings. Problems that arise are explained by Michael through the living 
condition the refugees endure in the named location. Michael refrains from explaining 
problematic behavior through eventual cultural differences. At the same time, his idea of 
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integration shines through as well as he names learning the language and trying to 
advance in society as indicators for integration. 
As for Bert, he declares that he never had a bad experience with refugees, “But also, I am 
not in touch with them on daily basis, so.” Implying that he would expect to have 
negative experiences with refugees if he would spend actual time with them. This shows 
similarities to Thomas’ statements about the Turkish community. The skepticism towards 
refugees also shines through in Thomas’ quote about refugees in Lauchringen. 
“Of course, one sees refugees every now and then walking through the village and…well 
refugees, sometimes one doesn’t even know if they are refugees or if they have already 
been here a long time, but basically, they don’t bring negative attention towards them, at 
least not when it comes to me. So, I see it resolved quite well for Lauchringen.” – 
Thomas, 50, teacher 
His skepticism is backed up once more, when he says that he never heard from a robbery 
or thievery. “I don’t know, at least it wasn’t published in the media. Me personally, I 
never had a bad encounter with anyone.”. 
While Bert and Thomas ascribe potentially negative aspects to the refugees, Michael 
seems to express a more rational and balanced view. If this remains the same when they 
bring up the factor of religion is about to be highlighted. 
5.3.3 Perception of religion 
The aspect of religion proved to be crucial in terms of othering among the participants in 
this group. While Michael previously seemed to have a rational approach towards the 
refugees, his statement, when asked about possible differences of cultures, about north-
African and Syrian refugees reveals that, for Michael, Islam seems not consolable with 
German society: 
“The north-Africans, they have a completely different, they, they are completely different, 
that is insane. Well they, we cannot really comprehend them or relate to them (in sie 
hineinversetzen). So, that doesn’t match at all, it doesn’t work. For the biggest part. With 
the Syrians, one thinks there are already some more similarities (Geimsamkeiten). 
Despite there are many Muslims amongst the Syrians, or the majority are Muslims, but 
still there are similarities, I think, yeah.” – Michael, 46, police officer 
Kerstin pointed out that the perfect migrant, to her, is “is an open human being. One that 
is open towards our conventions, our mentality, and especially our Christian image of 
mankind.” – Kerstin, 54, self-employed 
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After Kerstin mentioned Christian values several times throughout the interview, I asked 
her if she could describe Christian values. In her opinion, the big difference between 
Christianity and Islam is the aspect of forgiveness: 
“We have the forgiveness, Christ brought us practically the forgiveness of sins and hmm, 
that is not in the Islam, that is well, the vengeance, and that as a non-believer, that they 
don’t have much of a value, that is already a fact where it drifts apart and I am glad to be 
Christian (sein darf), that I grew up here….that we are open…that I am open as a 
Christian, also for Muslims. That I accept them the same way, that I don’t differentiate 
there, if it is a Christian or a Muslim refugee. That I am there for them in the same way. 
And that this is also practiced, I am proud of that. And I mean, of course, well, yes, 
basically everything, the Decalogue of course yes, which is our stipulation and our duty. 
So, I mean, it partially reflects also in the Islamic faith, we also have intersections 
there…Now, I have to ask again, what was the question? Now I am all over the map. 
[interviewer: “well, how do you describe Christian values”] Ah yes, well, just that one is 
approaching each other, no prejudices and that one accepts every person how they are. 
With no judgment. And well also, hmm, yes, the forgiveness as well. If someone does 
something [bad] no matter if Christian or Muslim, that one accepts him again, if one is 
really ready for reversion, yes. I mean everybody can make mistakes, or everybody does 
make mistakes, and that is huge plus for me with that way of faith.” – Kerstin, 54, self-
employed 
While Kerstin seems to take energy out of her own faith, in terms of her wanting to 
approach newcomers with an open mindset, she also puts Christianity above Islam, 
devaluating the faith of Muslim migrants and refugees. 
Despite not having personal contact with newcomers, Regina offers her opinion. In 
Regina’s opinion, the religion of the newcomers affects the integration negatively 
because the huge role religion plays in their daily lives.  
“Maybe if the kids are in a club, if they grow up here, getting into a club through school. 
Maybe that [integration] is easier for them and maybe they [Kids] will make their 
parents come outside with them. But many parents are not going with their children. 
Usually because their faith doesn’t permit it.” – Regina, 58, housewife 
Thomas declares that he would like the newcomers to visit a Christian mass “just to see 
what is going on there, what are they preaching. Even as a Muslim, why not? Just to 
check it out.” This would be important to Thomas because to him, it would signal interest 
in the local culture and customs. And for Thomas, Islam has no place in the local culture: 
“I will put it this way: Islam as religion, as perception of the world, to me it doesn’t 
belong to the German tradition, not to the German culture, but the people, the Muslims 
who live here, they belong to the German culture, the people as such yes, but not the 
ideology, I just want to separate this.” – Thomas, 50, teacher 
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He continued arguing that German culture is, amongst other things, impacted and 
influenced by Christian values, and that the biggest differences between the German 
culture and the culture of the newcomers would be religion: “The image of women and 
the sharia, the Islamic law, those are the basic things.”.   
Bert’s view of the refugees and their homelands is strongly influenced by his view of 
Islam: 
“Well, maybe you know more about that, of course the image of women is a very different 
one in other nationalities. Maybe for them [Muslims], it is not normal to see how women 
act and how they walk around here [in Germany] on New Year’s Eve. So, of course, our 
image of women is completely different. So, we denounce it [sexual harassment], right? 
And for them [Muslims], it is maybe not so bad, as in ‘At home I treat the woman like 
that as well.’ […] And those are things where cultures are clashing, view of life and 
image of women. […] So, I digress a bit. I find it difficult, the discussion about the 
Muslims, in general, and also about Turkey, how they are acting. It is just, for centuries, 
they have been living with a different view of life, or another religion. So, you won’t be 
able to consolidate the two from one day to another. Maybe it takes millennia. Well, in 
my opinion, it won’t go fast. Eventually, well, some countries are just a couple of 
centuries afterwards us. Not just economically, but, also just, mentally. Right?” – Bert, 
42, broker  
Here, Bert displays othering, based on economic and social superiority, devaluation of 
Islam and Muslims, declaring Islam and Muslims as inconsolable with German culture. 
Interim conclusion 
The othering among the participants of this group is clearly directed towards Muslim 
refugees and implies that the participants have a rather static view of what German-ness 
means or how German society is shaped.  
5.3.4 National identity 
Max says that 
“Here [in Germany], everyone can say everything, one has respect for women. And 
everyone can belief what they want, can love who they want. And I think some [of the 
newcomers] don’t recognize and don’t accept that. And to them, one must say: ‘You are 
just in the wrong country, just go back.’. – Max, 31, politician 
He continues that the German civilization “has a high degree of freedom, and to defend 
that, that means being German to me.”. Concerning the discussion about a Leitkultur, 
Max says that De Maizière was misunderstood, arguing it is important for “us” to not 
throw “our” culture overboard. 
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When it comes to citizenship and dual-citizenship Max explains that for him, citizenship 
means “that one has to decide. One is citizen of the country you live in and which is your 
Heimat (native land) and because of that I have a problem with dual-citizenship, a 
gigantic one.”  Consequently, Max favors the jus sanguinis over the jus soli. 
He further says that in his view, it is not possible to say that “I am half German and half 
Turk”. Also, he doesn’t believe in being loyal to two different nation-states, using the 
example of the relation between Germany and Turkey, where he perceived it as irritating 
that Turks living in Lauchringen decide on issues of putting away democracy in Turkey, 
while living in a democracy in Germany and simultaneously deciding for people in 
Turkey, something he describes as outrageous.   
In regard of the Leitkultur, Regina agrees with De Maizière:  
“but I think, well, we can stand by our German values. We cannot let our German values, 
that we are without headscarf, that we have eye contact, how one is towards the other, 
the way one behaves, all that must stay that way and we cannot let that – because 
someone is coming from a different culture – we cannot let that be busted, no way.” – 
Regina, 58, housewife 
Similar than Max, Regina shows skepticism regarding the newcomers. For her, it seems, 
the arrival of someone from a different culture equals the potential threat of her own 
culture. In regard of dual-citizenship Regina believes that it is a difficult concept because 
one “would have to decide between the two citizenships, otherwise they live in an 
intermediate world” and she imagines that they don’t feel like they belong to either place. 
Regina explains her view on the birthright, favoring the jus sanguinis, as follows: “A 
Chinese stays a Chinese, even if he has an American passport.” 
Here, Regina reveals an understanding of an ethnic national identity, exclusively based 
on descent. This would mean that regardless of any type of integration effort or process, 
the ethnic factor is decisive when it comes to belonging. 
Describing what is typical German according to him, Michael names “correct, 
hardworking and sometimes stubbornness.”, and folk festivals with brass music as typical 
traits of German culture. His approach of national identity seems to be of socio-cultural 
nature. 
Concerning the Leitkultur debate, Michael says: 
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“Well, that’s just, so, what he [De Maizière] called German culture, those are just social 
graces which developed throughout the years. And I mean, that’s like in other countries 
as well. Those manners develop. And if I am in a foreign country, then I have to do that 
as well, to adjust to certain things. And here [in Germany] it is the same, I think.” – 
Michael, 46, police officer 
In this statement, Michael expresses the belief that newcomers must adapt, placing the 
responsibility of integration on the side of the newcomers. 
For Michael, citizenship means that “Basically, if you have a German passport, you are 
German. But then again, is this everything what renders you a fully equal member of 
society? How does one decide that?”. To him, he says, his German citizenship is a sign of 
his descent, but nothing more than that. When asked if nationality is important to him he 
states the following: 
“I mean, that is like belonging to a group, which gives the group as such a certain 
importance. So, you usually think that this group has certain characteristics, depending 
on your imagination. And I think that’s the same, if you are in Germany, or if you are 
German, you try to identify with Germany, definitely. Which means that you care about 
what happens in Germany.” – Michael, 46, police officer 
Michael points out the difficulties that come with trying to pin down the criteria of 
belonging to, being part of a society. While he states that the possession of a German 
passport makes you German, he recognizes that this doesn’t necessarily decides whether 
one is considered an equal member of society. 
In regard of the dual-citizenship, Michael argues that dual-citizenship is possible if both 
nation-states are similar. If there are two opposite states, he brings up Turkey and 
Germany as an example, countries who are governed very differently, the two 
citizenships are contradicting each other and therefore don’t fit. The same applies, 
according to him, to the factor of loyalty, e.g. “Turkey with Erdogan at the top is a 
completely different world, so one is either supporting it or is against it.”. This approach 
suggests that citizenship is understood as a civic national identity. Meaning that if two 
countries have a seemingly different set of rules, different constitutions, one cannot 
combine abiding by both of those civic frames. 
Kerstin describes the German society as follows: 
“We are culturally diverse. If I look at the north and the south, very different. Our co-
citizens, be it of Turkish roots, or Syrian, Portuguese or Greek, all of them are part of it, 
they all belong here.” – Kerstin, 54, self-employed 
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While this implies that Kerstin has a very inclusive approach in terms of German culture 
and society, she ascribes certain characteristics to a typical German habitus, such as being 
extremely industriousness and structured: 
“We are leading the world economic-wise, for example, the car industry. It is fantastic 
what we did. We had the unification, see Helmut Kohl and the European Union etc., we 
were heavily involved in that progress [European integration]. We [FRG] brought up the 
new federal states [former GDR], we paid them solidarity surcharge. We are second to 
none on that issue.” – Kerstin, 54, self-employed 
Here it becomes visible that for Kerstin, the standing that Germany attained throughout 
Europe, and worldwide, has an impact on her identification.  
Thomas already stated that German culture is heavily impacted by Christianity. He 
further declared Germany as a country which is based on a democracy, shaped by the 
constitution which grants human rights and openness. Here Thomas contradicts himself. 
By referring to the constitution, which supports freedom of religion, he nixes his 
statement where he places Islam outside of German society. 
Concerning the meaning of citizenship, Thomas explains that citizenship means 
belonging to the country, respecting and acknowledging the constitution and laws of the 
country, the democracy as a government form. Kerstin uttered almost identical words in 
the regard of citizenship. This indicates that both Thomas and Kerstin favor a civic 
approach of national identity, or at least a civic approach of citizenship.  However, 
Thomas’ inclination towards the jus sanguinis seems to interfere with his civic approach 
of citizenship. His stance on dual-citizenship seemingly opposes his earlier statement 
about the meaning of citizenship even more. Thomas says that the dual-citizenship should 
be given out once the integration process is complete.  
“[…] because just by having the passport, it doesn’t show/prove that one is a 
German citizen with all duties and rights that you have, but first you have to 
prove that you are willing to live like that.” – Thomas, 50, teacher 
Interim conclusion 
The participants in this group tend to point out the civic national identity with reference 
to the constitution, freedom of speech, and human rights. However, the rejection of dual-
citizenship and the favoring of the jus sanguinis suggest a static national identity, only 
achievable through proving “that you are willing to live like that.” as Thomas put it. The 
othering of Muslim refugees and migrants suggests also a strong differentiation between 
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the German culture and the culture of newcomers coming from predominantly Muslim 
countries. We will now see how these opinions affect the participants stance on 
integration.  
5.3.5 Integration 
For Max, the learning of the language of the host-country is a main requirement to 
achieve a successful integration. Without the knowledge of German, “one cannot be 
integrated.”. He further expects the perfect migrant “to be ready to accept our rules, our 
culture; needs to learn the language and should want to work and to arrange his own life. 
But first and foremost, accepting our value proposition.”. His statement suggests that he 
is leaning towards assimilation rather than a symmetric integration process. 
Thomas understands integration as one trying to insert oneself into the community. While 
uttering that it is difficult to enter pre-existing structures as an immigrant, he stated that 
“a certain initiative of the immigrant is necessary. The effort to try to learn the language, 
trying to get a professional education, maybe integrating into a club, an association. It 
also means accepting that we live in a democratic country which has a parliamentary 
democracy and that certain preambles for the way we live together are already present in 
our constitution. To accept this and live accordingly, that is what I understand as 
integration.” – Thomas, 50, teacher 
Thomas places the responsibility for a successful integration exclusively on the 
newcomers, leaving no doubt about him favoring assimilation. In his statement about 
what he expects from the local population, his skepticism towards the newcomers shines 
through once again. Thomas expects his fellow citizens: 
“to be unbiased, would I expect, to take on the people unbiased, until they maybe get 
proven wrong, get disabused. To handle it without prejudices, to see that we can also 
benefit from them, at least from those who mean well and want to integrate. We can 
benefit from it because we need skilled workers, especially here in the country side. Yeah, 
that’s basically it.” – Thomas, 50, teacher 
While he expresses his wish that the local population should approach the newcomers 
without bias, his statement suggests that he anticipates that sooner or later, newcomers 
would prove those who are unbiased wrong. 
Michael acknowledges that the local population also plays a part in the integration 




“it means that the foreigners get integrated into the society. That they have the 
opportunity to integrate themselves. They must have the will to do so, otherwise it won’t 
work. In my opinion.” – Michael, 46, police officer 
A stronger sense of hierarchy is displayed by Bert, who sees the goal of integration as 
follows: 
“That they [newcomers] not only feel well and good in our society, but they also should 
integrate themselves into the society, so that they are a part of the society. But of course, 
also with, in my opinion it is still, I’ll blather and say: ‘the right of domicile’ 
(Heimatrecht), that one is befriending oneself a bit with the local culture and not just, I’ll 
just say it with a bit of a negative touch, trying to hash over or spread out their own 
thing.” – Bert, 42, broker 
Bert’s view on integration seems to not only place the responsibility solemnly on the 
newcomer but also reveals a hierarchy thinking. Due to the right of domicile, integration, 
in the eyes of Bert, is a process where the newcomers adapt the local culture. Also, it 
becomes clear that Bert doesn’t attribute any positive effects to the culture newcomers 
would bring along.  
To Kerstin, integration means: 
“Tolerance and openness from both sides. And acceptance. And I just think, just taking 
on the other person the way they are and not limiting each other freedoms and not trying 
to impose something on someone else.”. – Kerstin, 54, self-employed 
Similar than Ulf’s and Gundula’s statement, Kerstin emphasizes on general efforts, 
applicable for both newcomers and the local population. 
Conclusion of 5.3 
In this group, National identity is often described through a socio-cultural, civic lens. 
This might suggest, at first, that the national identity is rather permeable than static.  
However, through the clear othering of Muslims, the participants are placing them 
outside the German culture. This would prove the statements of all participants regarding 
the average local population being the most critical towards the refugees to be a fitting 
description. Especially considering the skepticism voiced by Thomas and Bert.  
Further, the results stemming from this group lead to the assumption that the stronger the 
differentiation between the self and ‘the other’ is made, the more likely it is to support 




5.4 Discussion of key notes 
It seems like the perception of ‘the other’ is strongly linked to the national identity 
displayed by the participants and that national identity then has effects on the 
participants’ perception of integration. Therefore, I will now look at the results 
considering the notions of alterity, national identity (including the meaning of citizenship 
and nation), and integration, and their respective interrelations. 
5.4.1 Key notes to Group A 
Alterity – approach towards ‘the other’ 
The participants in group A all expressed how they experienced either positive or little to 
no negative encounters with either migrants or refugees. This resulted in the participants 
showing no or rather minimal stereotypical image of ‘the other’ or prejudice towards ‘the 
other’. More so, they displayed permeable boundaries towards ‘the other’. This could 
underline the social contact theory which says that positive interactions with ‘the other’ 
reduces stereotypes and prejudice.66  
The permeable boundaries the participants of group A seem to display suggest that the 
participants recognize the argument of identities being multiple and complex.67 Further, it 
is noted that no participant of group A eluded to religion as a possible divisive factor 
between them and ‘the other’. 
National identity  
The national identity was mostly defined based on an inclusive, civic approach. 
Consequently, the participants supported ideas of multiculturalism, jus soli, and dual-
citizenship. Concerning the meaning of citizenship, and of the birthright, ideas of dual-
citizenship as well as the idea of jus soli are favored or at least not opposed.68 However, 
there were made some contradicting statements.69 These contradicting statements might 
be explained through the argument that identity can be expressed differently, depending 
                                                          
66 See chapter 2.1. 
67 See chapter 2.2. 
68 With exception of Stefan’s take on dual-citizenship 
69 For example, when Stefan describes Germany as multicultural but saying that one can only be either German or 
Turkish; after earlier situating the children of Turkish migrants within the German society. Further Stefan and Ulf 
became a bit fuzzy as the conversation shifted towards questions about citizenship, dual-citizenship, and birthright. 
Stefan, after saying that one can feel home in two countries, argues that dual-citizenship would hinder integration. 
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on the context.70 By average, participants of group A broadly displayed an inclusive, 
multicultural, and civic national identity.  
Integration 
The understanding of integration amongst the participants of group A differs only 
insignificantly. All three participants positioned themselves close to the concept of 
conviviality, based on common basic values, mutual respect, and a symmetric learning 
process.71  
The results of group A lead me to the assumption of the following order. Positive or no 
negative experience with ‘the other’ produce permeable boundaries towards ‘the other’ 
which results in an inclusive and civic national identity (which supports multiculturalism, 
dual-citizenship, and the birthright jus soli). Such a national identity then produces the 
just described perception of integration as a symmetric learning process.  
5.4.2 Key notes to group B 
Alterity 
While the participants of group B didn’t share experiences of specific negative 
encounters with migrants or refugees, the participants did show signs of othering towards 
the Turkish community in Lauchringen, towards Muslims, and towards the non-white 
part of the population of Germany. Within this process of othering, negative and 
devaluating opinions about named groups of ‘the other’ were uttered. Manfred’s 
statement about the Turkish community in Lauchringen as well as Christian’s statement 
about ‘foreign looking faces’ suggest rather rigid boundaries – of ethno-cultural nature – 
towards ‘the other’. In terms of religion being a factor of othering, Christian and Gundula 
don’t seem to be opposed towards Muslims. Manfred, however, seems to devaluate 
Muslims by declaring them ‘not suited for democracy’. 
The positive encounter described by Gundula as well as the negative encounter described 
by Christian and their respective relation towards ‘the other’ both might be explained 
through the social contact theory.72 
                                                          
70 See chapter 1.1, citation of Neumann. 
71 See chapter 1.2 and 2.1. 
72 See chapter 2.1: positive experience reduces prejudice; negative experience potentially fosters prejudice. 
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Overall, the average participant of group B expresses negative views towards ‘the other’, 
suggesting not only rigid boundaries but also a perceived hierarchy between the 
participants and ‘the other’, a hierarchy in which the local population sits atop. This leads 
to believe that the understanding of identity is rather static. 
National identity 
The assumption of a rather static understanding of (national) identity amongst 
participants of group B stands its ground considering the participants all are critical of or 
reject the idea of dual-citizenship. Further, they favor the birthright jus sanguinis, 
implying an ethnic understanding of national identity. The understanding of a nation as 
an ethno-cultural nation (Kulturnation73) is also conveyed in Christian’s skepticism 
towards multiculturalism. Additionally, national identity is also expressed – by Manfred 
– from a standpoint of economic superiority.74 The proclaimed superiority goes hand in 
hand with the simultaneously happening devaluation of ‘the other’.  
In general, participants of group B express a rather static national identity based on 
ethnic, ethno-cultural understanding that comes with the tendency of devaluating ‘the 
other’. 
Integration 
Among the members of group B, the perception of integration is expressed differently 
than the perception of integration of group A. While Gundula leans towards the approach 
of conviviality, her idea of conviviality contains structures of hierarchy, placing the local 
population above the newcomers. Manfred and Christian both offer an understanding of 
integration – based on hierarchy and interpretational sovereignty75 – which is close to the 
idea of assimilation. 
For group B, I understand the interrelation between alterity, national identity, and 
integration as follows: A process of othering which accentuates alleged differences, based 
on devaluating ‘the other’ fosters a rather static national identity. Such static national 
identity is characterized by an ethnic, ethno-cultural understanding of German-ness, by 
skepticism towards multiculturalism, by the belief of economic superiority, and the 
                                                          
73 See chapter 2.4. 
74 See chapter 3.1 
75 See chapter 1.4. 
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rejection of dual-citizenship. Consequently, said idea of national identity results in the 
perception of integration as a one-sided process in which the newcomers must assimilate 
into the majority society. This creates a hierarchy between majority society and 
newcomers. Such hierarchy equips the majority society with interpretational sovereignty 
over whether the integration, or assimilation, is considered successful or not. 
5.4.3 Key notes to group C 
Alterity 
Some participants in group C did share experiences of negative encounters with 
migrants.76 Those participants who did share those encounters tended towards a – 
concerning to certain questions77 – critical view of ‘the other’, a dynamic which might be 
another example for the social contact theory. Other encounters with or opinions about 
‘the other’ that were referred to by participants of group C were usually accompanied by 
conveyed skepticism towards ‘the other’, at times mounting in the display of 
ethnocentrism or eurocentrism78.  
The average participant of group C ascribes mostly negative aspects to ‘the other’. This 
includes the anticipation of a negative experience if one would either spend a certain 
amount of time with ‘the other’ or would ask ‘the other’ certain questions.79 Other 
negative aspects are the labeling of Islam as not consolable with the German or European 
culture. The othering of ‘the other’ based on the negative connotations of Islam is quite 
common among the participants of group C. This conveys an image of ‘the other’ 
strongly shaped by Islam. Further the othering made by participants of group C suggests 
a static view of what German-ness means and how German society is constituted. 
National identity 
The national identity is mostly defined through references to Leitkultur and/or 
Christianity which comes with the rejection of dual-citizenship (except if the two 
countries are culturally similar), the preference of jus sanguinis, and with an ethnic or 
                                                          
76 Max’ experience of perceived rejection from the Turkish community during his childhood; Kerstin’s encounters with 
Turkish families in which the woman’s role was not seen in a positive light according to Kerstin. 
77 Context-bound, see chapter 1.1, page 6, citation of Neumann.  
78 See chapter 2.2 
79 Thomas states that he “so far, had no negative encounters. But I also don’t start a conversation about [Turkish 
President] Erdogan with them.”; Bert adds to his statement that he never had a bad experience with refugees: “But also, 
I am not in touch with them on a daily basis, so.”. 
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ethno-cultural approach of German-ness rather than a civic one. This is demonstrated in 
the statement of Thomas where he declares that the possession of a German passport 
doesn’t mean that the holder of the passport is automatically “a German citizen with all 
duties and rights that you have, but first you have to prove that you are willing to live like 
that.”. Further, Germany, or its citizen, is also described as something which resonates 
with the idea of a nation as an imagined community. At the same time, participants of 
group C often hinted at a civic national identity, by referring to the constitution (keyword 
Verfassungspatriotismus80) freedom of speech, and human rights. The simultaneous 
exclusion of ‘the other’ based on the cultural and/or religious otherness of ‘the other’, is 
an example for labeling ‘the other’ and its culture as inconsolable with what it means to 
be German. 
Integration 
The majority participants of group C perceive integration as assimilation into the 
Leitkultur of the majority population.  
In group C, it seems like the connection of alterity, national identity, and integration is 
structured in similar fashion as it is in group B. What stands out in group C is the focus 
on culture and religion in terms of othering as well as defining national identity. This 
results in a strong ethno-cultural understanding of national identity (with exception of 
Kerstin’s approach), and at the same time a rather accentuated Verfassungspatriotismus. 
Such combination of a civic (Verfassungspatriotismus) and ethno-cultural national 
identity seems to be made possible by the reference of Leitkultur, a construct which, as 
argued in chapters 1 and 3, proclaims basic values and is simultaneously excluding Islam 
and Muslims. 
5.5 Conclusion  
Overall, the results lead me to the conclusion that the preference of assimilation over a 
symmetric learning process, in terms of how integration should take place, is usually to 
be found among those members of the local population who display a rather static and 
exclusive understanding of national identity. Such understanding is based on favoring the 
jus sanguinis, rejecting the concept of dual-citizenship, and the upholding of the 
                                                          
80 Constitutional patriotism, See chapter 2.5 
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perception of a unique Leitkultur. Further, the participants who are part of this group tend 
to position themselves towards ‘the other’ with comments that serve to devaluate ‘the 
other’ – often directed against Muslims – and to establish a hierarchy in which the 
participants take the upper echelon in contrast to the lower seeded ‘other’.  
Participants who did not bring up neither Leitkultur nor the aspect of religion showed a 
significantly more inclusive and fluid understanding of national identity. Among these 
participants, positive approaches – with few exceptions – towards dual-citizenship, jus 
soli, and multiculturalism were the norm. 
Leitkultur as a tool to exclude Muslims and Islam 
It is the identification with the idea of the Leitkultur which caused the most 
contradictions. Seen in the case of participants who refer to Germany as an open society, 
based on the constitution which grants freedom of thought and freedom of religion, and 
simultaneously label Muslims and Islam as inconsolable with German culture, based on 
the assumption that Muslims and Islam are not fit for democracy, just as Schiffauer 
eluded to in chapter 1 (Schiffauer 2004). This reflects what Scherr describes as Leitkultur 
being “clearly designed to exclude Islam and Muslim immigrants.” (Scherr 2013: 7). This 
explains how participants uttered civic approaches to national identity and simultaneously 
positioned themselves against Muslims, Muslim migrants and refugees from 
predominantly Muslim countries (see Münkler, and Schiffauer in Chapter 1). 
While no participant directly rejected the migration of Muslims or the intake of refugees, 
participants who displayed an exclusive national identity expressed clear expectations of 
assimilation. These expectations became also clear through patterns of hierarchy and 
interpretational sovereignty, concerning the definition of culture as well as the desired 
outcome of the integration process, expressed by the supporters of the assimilation 
approach. Such patterns became visible when participants with a static and exclusive 
national identity described the newcomers mainly as possible beneficial factors for the 
German economy and the decreasing demographic numbers of the German population 
while conveying that “culture, values and political structures should be protected against 




To come back to the question that I ask on the cover page of this thesis, my findings 
suggest the following:  
1) A national identity based on a predominantly ethno-cultural, and therefore static and 
exclusive understanding shapes the perception of integration to a degree at which 
integration is thought of as assimilation, meaning a one-sided effort made by the 
newcomer in the attempt to become fully accepted, a status over which the majority 
population holds the interpretational sovereignty based on the hierarchy that comes along 
with the use of the concept of Leitkultur and of integration (if understood as 
assimilation).  
2) A national identity based on a predominantly civic, and therefore rather fluid and 
inclusive understanding shapes the perception of integration in a way which results in 
seeing integration rather as a symmetric and transformative learning process than as an 
end goal that could be achieved through assimilation. Such understanding of integration 
as a symmetric and transformative learning process is usually accompanied by the 
support of multiculturalism, dual-citizenship, and the birthright of jus soli. 
While the first variation broadly describes the participants of group B and C, the second 














6. Discussion and Conclusion 
In this chapter, I will come back to the content of the earlier chapters of the thesis which 
allows me to discuss how the literature I drew my inspiration from stands in relation to 
my findings.  Before I start, I recall the basic findings of chapter 5: 
An ethno-cultural national identity (Group B and C) is likely to display rigid boundaries 
towards ‘the other’ and expects assimilation into the Leitkultur of the majority 
population. This goes along with devaluation of ‘the other’, maintaining or establishing a 
hierarchy between the self (majority population) and ‘the other’ (newcomers). Further, 
the described interrelation between ethno-cultural national identity and the upholding of a 
Leitkultur comes with a rejection of Islam, of dual-citizenship, and of the birthright jus 
soli. 
A civic national identity (Group A) is likely to display permeable boundaries towards 
‘the other’ and is open to an integration process that understands integration as a 
symmetric learning process. This goes along with a multicultural appreciation, and the 
belief of basic rights for everyone. 
6.1 Discussion to group A 
If I follow the assumption made on page 4, – that  
“The central issue is whether Germany is to become a multicultural society, consisting of 
people of different ethnic origins and religions sharing common citizenship and basic 
values of a civil society, or whether it should become an ethnically homogeneous 
country” (Blank, Schmidt 2003: 290). –  
I would say that the participants belonging to group A support the idea of multicultural 
society in Germany, based on basic values and common citizenship for members of the 
civil society regardless their religion or ethnic origin. This goes hand in hand with the 
civic approach of national identity the group A participants expressed. I recall the 
meaning of civic identity which emphasizes metaphorical kinship entailing shared rights, 
values, and duties (Byrne 2013).81 The shared rights and duties are entailed in the 
common citizenship. 
                                                          
81 See chapter 2.2 
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The reason as to way the participants of group A seemingly have no issue with sharing 
their citizenship privileges with ‘the other’ could be explained as follows. The social 
contact theory argues that negative emotions towards ‘the other’ such as stereotypes can 
be drastically reduced through positive interaction between individuals of a different 
group.82 According to the shared encounters of the participants of group A, this might 
very well be a reason to the civic and inclusive approach displayed by members of group 
A. The positive encounters then might have led the participants to refrain from 
conceptually separating cultures, something which would have led to the devaluation of 
the culture of ‘the other’ (Rüsen 2004).83 
Instead, the participants established their understanding of integration, an understanding 
closely linked to the idea of conviviality, a concept where everybody makes adjustments 
in order to get along with each other. This integration concept, as said on page 9 in 
chapter 1.2, does not work as a one-way integration of the newcomer into a pre-existing 
homogenous society, but as a reciprocal integration of everyone into an immigration 
society in which citizens share a common general principle (Münkler 2016). It seems to 
be this concept that allows the participants to assume and accept alternative identities for 
themselves and ‘the other’ alike, rendering the ethnic identity less focal.84 
Those references to the literature explored earlier this thesis seem to confirm the 
assumption about the interrelation between alterity, national identity, and integration, as 
in a civic national identity tends to support an integration approach marked by a 
symmetric reciprocal integration process. Or in other words: a civic national identity is 
more likely to support naturalization policies and inclusive immigration policies. In 
opposition to the ethno-cultural national identity, which is said to produce rather 
restrictive and exclusionist policies (Peters 2002).  
This being said it seems like the right time to turn to discuss the two groups that I found 
to express an ethno-cultural national identity. 
 
 
                                                          
82 See chapter 2.3  
83See chapter 2.3 
84 See chapter 2.2.3 
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6.2 Discussion to group B and group C 
Since both these groups are based on ethno-cultural national identity, I decided to discuss 
the two groups together. Fittingly, both groups shared expressions that hinted towards a 
perceived interpretational sovereignty over questions of what it means to be German, 
often linked to references to the idea of Leitkultur.85 This would fit the previously made 
statement concerning ethno-cultural national identity pursuing restrictive policies (Peters 
2002). 
This claim is supported by the thought of the majority population ostracizing and 
stigmatizing newcomers when they don’t appear committed enough to assimilation. The 
commitment is often evaluated and judged by the local population based on the national, 
ethnic, religious, and cultural background of the newcomers. It was found that 
newcomers who share the same race, skin color, or religion as the host-society population 
are more likely to be commonly accepted. Further, if the newcomers come from a country 
which is considered culturally similar or compatible with the culture of the host-society, 
the chance of being accepted from the local population also increases (Maxwell 2017).86 
Considering the statements of participants of groups B and C towards Muslim newcomers 
and predominantly Muslim countries, the above described criteria for being accepted by 
the majority population don’t seem farfetched. Especially not when remembering the 
ethnocultural conception of nationhood is described as a community based on “common 
genealogy and descent ties, a common history, shared cultural traditions and customs as 
constitutive elements of the nation or of national identity.” (Peters 2002: 4).  
Such ethnocentric narratives are not unusual, however, compared to other countries such 
as France or the USA where one is more likely to find a civic conception of nationhood, 
Germany stands as a prime example for the continuity of importance of ethnic 
understanding (Peters 2002). And for many participants in groups B and C, the ethnic 
identity often equated with a perceived homogeneity of the majority population which 
lead to social frontiers being taken for granted.87 This, in return can trigger a perception 
of the nation as a community.88 And the perception of the nation as a community 
                                                          
85 See chapter 1.3 
86 See chapter 1 
87 See chapter 2.2.3 
88 See chapter 2.4 
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produces automatically we-groups expectations such as loyalty and emotional 
proximity.89 Since those we-groups expectations are applied on ‘pseudo-we-groups’, a 
devaluation process towards the outsider, ‘the other’, takes place.90 Those described 
dynamics – from perceived ethnic homogeneity to social frontiers being taken for 
granted; imagining Germany or the German society as a community rather than a society 
and therefore demanding absolute loyalty in the form of emotional commitment from the 
newcomers, and if the newcomer doesn’t display enough emotional commitment (see 
Maxwell 2017) he receives devaluation from the local population – were quite common 
among participants of groups B and C. 
Another facet of devaluation ‘the other’ and proclaiming the own superiority is the 
economic identity, displayed by few participants, but with strong devaluation towards 
‘the other’. ‘The other’ at who the devaluations were aimed at from the participants was 
‘The Muslim’. ‘The Muslim’ experienced devaluation even from those participants who 
claimed a civic national identity which we have seen earlier to be characterized by the 
common shared values regardless of one’s ethnic or religious background. So, how come 
participants supporting a civic national identity (or: Verfassungspatriotismus),91 were 
devaluating ‘the Muslim-other’? 
Some participants also expressed their sense of European identity, or their sense of 
European community. Possibly, the civic identity – not national identity anymore but 
European identity – still stands for shared values, but not exceeding the European 
community. Considering what Schiffauer has to say about the construction of the 
‘Muslim-other’, one might be able to see how participants who proclaim a civic national 
identity (Verfassungspatriotismus) can exclude the ‘Muslim-other’. 
The construction of the “Muslim-Other” is mostly based on two aspects which differ 
tremendously from the considered shared set of values by the European community. First, 
there exists a general assumption that Muslims are not ready for democracy, generally 
due to the lack of enlightenment. The second point addresses the equality of man and 
woman. The Islamic family is usually considered a place of authoritarianism, 
patriarchalism, misogyny and domestic violence (Schiffauer 2004).  
                                                          
89 See chapter 2.2.2 
90 See chapter 2.2.2  
91 See chapter 2.2.2, “constitutional patriotism” 
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Based on such perception, the Islamic family is painted as the complete opposite of the 
egalitarian and liberated European family. Overall, Islam as a world religion is ascribed a 
certain value. However, in addition to the mistrust, fear for one’s own identity is fueling 
the fears of a growing influence of Muslims across Europe and Germany (Schiffauer 
2004). This could be applied to several participants of groups B and C who stated that 
‘we’ should not let go of ‘our’ culture because of the newcomers. 
Maybe not surprisingly, there are tendencies of making Islam responsible for problems of 
socio-cultural segregation. Again, several participants exclaimed how wearing the 
headscarf would be hindering the integration process. Such tendencies lead to problems 
that are solvable – from a social standpoint – are being declared unsolvable due to alleged 
irreversible religious influence. This reinforces Islam-labelling. It becomes evident that 
Islam is tried to be excluded from a European identity. Because the integration of 
migrants of Muslim faith is not wanted, its integration is labelled as impossible with the 
above shown reasoning (Münkler 2016).  
Interrelation between Leitkultur and the preference of assimilation 
As described by Münkler92, the idea of Leitkultur represents the claim of the majority 
population to maintain the hegemony over the discourse of what German national identity 
constitutes. One way to uphold this hegemony is the creation of a hierarchy, established 
through the exclusion of Islam via definition of Leitkultur as well as using the term 
integration in a way which ascribes deficits to newcomers. The ascribed deficits are then 
used as a justification to exclude the newcomers and simultaneously placing the full 
responsibility to make the desired integration, or assimilation process, happen.93 The 
ascribed deficits are mostly aimed at Muslim newcomers since islamophobia has become 
socially acceptable, according to Münkler.94 
Such preference of assimilation, in the sense of an absorption into the majority 
population, to make the newcomers same or at least similar,95 seems plausible for the 
supporters of a Leitkultur since they seem to perceive the German population more as a 
                                                          
92 in chapter 1.2  
93 Chapter 1.4 
94 See chapter 1.5 
95 As eluded to in chapter 2.1 
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Gemeinschaft, bound by traditions, folk customs and feelings of loyalty and emotional 
proximity.96  
Consequently, these participants showed a tendency of seeing culture as a major factor to 
distinguish between themselves (host-society) and the others (the newcomers). Congruent 
to what is described by Barth (Barth 1969: 12)97, this led to the participants focusing less 
on the individual aspect of each newcomer but more so on the general characteristics they 
ascribed to the culture or religion of the newcomers. Such focusing on the alleged traits 
of one’s culture, and the simultaneous neglecting of individual characteristics and its 
recognition, seems to deny any achievement of a successful conviviality. Because, in 
other words, this could be read as a strict and conceptual separation of cultures, 
something which leads to conflicts in today’s multicultural context of globalization 
because it ignores the possibility of individuals displaying a multitude of identities. 
Overall, I see the majority reviewed literature being in accord with my assumption about 
ethnocultural national identity linked to Leitkultur and its effect on the perception of 
integration. This brings me to concluding this thesis with one last section. 
 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, I portrayed how national identity can impact the perception of integration. 
In other words, I come to the result that the way national identity is defined significantly 
can change the perception of an attained integration process.  
The interrelation between national identity and the perception of integration can create 
contradicting views. This comes due to national identity being expressed through either 
an ethno-cultural and/or a civic approach, two approaches which entail different 
meanings of belonging. Therefore, contradicting views usually emerge when participants 
refer to both approaches while trying to pin down who and what belongs to the German 
society. 
This contradiction seems to stem from the concept of Leitkultur which many participants 
understand as a form of constitutional patriotism (Verfassungspatriotismus). 
Constitutional patriotism is generally another term to describe civic national identity, 
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which is supposed to stand for an inclusive approach towards ‘the other’. However, since 
Leitkultur tends to exclude Islam, the participants supporting Leitkultur often uttered 
exclusionary and devaluating remarks towards Islam and Muslims. The fact that many 
participants insist on Leitkultur as a defining element of national identity suggests that 
Germany, even though officially declared an immigration-country for several years now, 
is slowly coming to terms with the existing diversity in the German society.   
One reason as to why this process is taking place rather slowly might be the following. 
The fuzziness of the ethno-cultural understanding of German-ness still seems to be 
common among the majority population. Such understanding, mostly found to be 
prevalent among the older participants, seemingly limits the available identities the 
participants ascribed to ‘the other’. Ethno-cultural understanding usually leads to 
exclusionary practices towards ‘the other’, accompanied by expressing the belief of one’s 
own superiority. Such perceived superiority mostly refers to the German economy and 
the alleged incompatibility of Islam and democracy. 
This might be explained through looking at how the German nationhood was historically 
constructed as a Gemeinschaft based on common descent and common culture, 
simultaneously establishing an understanding of influences from ‘outside’ as a danger to 
the German Gemeinschaft. Additionally, the citizenship law in Germany was, until a 
change was made in 2000, based on jus sanguinis. This meant that to be eligible for a 
German citizenship, one had to have at least one German parent. Such ethnic emphasizes 
on German-ness also was, and to a degree still is, responsible for many Germans saying 
that Germany is not an immigration country, even if the amount of non-ethnic Germans 
coming to Germany suggested and suggests otherwise. 
Among the young participants, the idea of a German society (Gesellschaft) of 
multicultural nature in the sense of conviviality seemed much more common, together 
with the acceptance of the jus soli and the concept of dual-citizenship.  
To achieve a successful conviviality – read: living together – Azdouz believes that it is 
more likely to take place on the level of individual interaction and less on a group level. 
But since individual identity is also linked to collective identity98, conviviality remains 
fragile and can be reversed or be taken aback through attacks “comme à New York, le 11 
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septembre 2001 ou au Bataclan, à Paris en 2015, pour nous faire perdre des acquis et 
fragiliser les relations interculturelles.” (Azdouz 2018: 1).  
In addition to the link between individual and collective identity, an individual usually 
draws from multiple identity pools.99 Or as Azdouz puts it:  
“Plus les sociétés se diversifient, plus il devient difficile d’associer des individus à une 
seule case identitaire […] Dans une même journée, on peut être montréalais à l’heure du 
lunch […], africain à l’heure du souper, britannique à l’heure du thé, québécois 
francophone devant ses séries télé préférées, catholique dans le trafic quand on se retient 
pour ne pas sacrer. […] Les identités multiples et l’hybridation sont en train de tous nous 
transformer en manoritaires” (Deglise 2018: 1). 
Here, it becomes clear that it is possible to simultaneously belong to a minority and a 
majority, which adds to the complexity of the notion of integration and identity. 
Considering the multiple facets of culture and identity, terms which are relevant for the 
notion of integration, it seems plausible to think of integration as a subjectively 
experienced process that is difficult to determine by static parameters. This implies that 
measurements for (a successful) integration, in other words, a functional vivre-ensemble, 
would become a question of social ethics, rather than putting notions such as “race”, 
culture (“the new race”), religion and ethnicity at the forefront of the integration debate. 
Therefore, what remains to be seen is what type of understanding of the notion of 
integration – assimilation, with focusing on culture, religion, ethnicity, or conviviality 
and the concentration on social ethics – will prevail in the German society as the debate 
about national identity continues.  
This thesis makes me want to explore in depth how national identity becomes constituted 
and how big of an impact it has on an individual in its everyday life, preferably in a city 
the size of Montréal. Another topic which would interest me is the relationship between 
the German majority population and the Turkish community in Germany. I am curious 
where my interests will take me next, since the question of how to deal with ethno-
cultural diversity remains important, not only for the German society, but around the 
world, for example in Québec (Azdouz 2018). Therefore, the following quote of Rachida 
Azdouz seems to make for a good ending of this thesis: 
“On ne le répétera jamais assez: la gestion de la diversité ne se réduit pas aux immigrants 
et aux minorités religieuses. En ethnicisant et en racisant à outrance une question 
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d’éthique sociale (comment vivre ensemble?), on s’enliserait d’avantage dans l’obsession 
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